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Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Introduction
Small business activities have been receiving attention from many economists and policy
makers. Many small rms create new technologies and new businesses; therefore, they play
important roles in economic growth. However, small businesses face diculty in nancing
investment opportunities even if the net present value is positive because the problems asso-
ciated with asymmetric information between creditors and small businesses are serious. As
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) mention, it is dicult for creditors to acquire information about
the types of borrowers, so creditors might reduce the credit supply to small businesses. Be-
cause of asymmetric information between creditors and borrowers, many previous papers
(e.g., Storey, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998) argue that nancial markets do not work well
for small businesses. 1
Berger and Udell (2006) argue that several lending technologies used by private nancial
institutions mitigate the problem of information asymmetry, such as nancial statement
lending, small business credit scoring, asset-based lending, and relationship lending. One
of the most eective lending techniques for small business loans is relationship lending.2
Banks obtain information on small business borrowers through past transactions with the
1To enhance credit supply for SMEs, the government can establish public lending and credit guarantee
schemes, which can improve social welfare (Mankiw, 1986). Therefore, public nancial supports for SMEs can
be justied from the perspective of economic theory. However, because of government failure, public nancial
support does not always improve social welfare.
2See Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) for a detailed survey about relationship lending.
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borrowers, and they mitigate the problem of information gaps by establishing long-term
relationships. According to Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), banks
obtain soft qualitative information through lending relationships. Berger and Udell (2006)
argue that \This soft information may also include an assessment of the future prospects of the
SME garnered from past communications with SME's suppliers, customers, or neighboring
businesses" (p. 2951). As hard information (such as information from nancial statements)
about informationally opaque small businesses is less credible, soft information is important
for assessment and monitoring of small business loans.
Using rm-level data of small businesses, previous studies show empirically that credit
constraints caused by the information gap are mitigated by relationship lending. For example,
Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that small businesses that have been with their banks for
a long time have greater access to bank loans using the National Survey of Small Business
Finance (NSSBF), which provides survey data for small businesses in the US. Similarly,
Berger and Udell (1995) insist that borrowers with longer lending relationships pay a lower
interest rate and are less likely to pledge collateral.
Previous studies also argue the cost side of lending relationships, the problem of hold-
up, the relationship between bank performance and borrowers' activity, and the relationship
between macroeconomic shocks and borrower performance. First, as Rajan (1992) and Sharpe
(1990) argue, the hold-up problem is serious for small businesses. They argue that if a
bank acquires information about a small business through long-term relationships, the small
business faces diculty in borrowing from other uninformed banks because the problem of
asymmetric information is severe. Furthermore, as Berger et al. (2005) argue, they acquire
soft information about borrowers through the lending relationship, which is not transferable
to other lenders. The small businesses are locked into lending relationships with informed
banks; therefore, they face the hold-up problem. As a result, the informed banks can set
a higher interest rate over the competitive level to extract monopoly rents. This problem
induces the underinvestment problem among small business borrowers.
Many papers investigate empirically the eects of the hold-up problem. For example,
8
Angelini et al. (1998) and Degryse and Cayseele (2000) use small business data to show that
borrowers with longer lending relationships pay a higher interest rate. Similarly, in D'Auria
et al. (1999), a borrower with higher dependence on bank loans pays a higher interest rate.
In addition to these studies, Houston and James (1996) examine the hold-up problem and
the cost of lending relationships using a sample of publicly-listed rms. Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998) focus on the Japanese main bank system, showing that banks extract monopoly rents
from borrowers through main bank relationships by using data of publicly-listed rms. These
studies conclude that the hold-up problem is serious for borrowers.
However, many previous studies point out that it is not easy for informed banks to ac-
quire information rents. Borrowers often have relationships with multiple banks to avoid the
extraction of rents by the banks. Therefore, the hold-up problem might not be serious. For
example, Ongena and Smith (2000) and Farinha and Santos (2002) investigate the number of
lending relationships using small business data for the EU and Argentina, respectively. They
nd that larger-sized small businesses and older businesses have multiple lending relation-
ships. Using data from Italian rms, Detragiache et al. (2000) show that borrowers establish
multiple relationships with banks to reduce the likelihood of early liquidation.3 In Japan, the
percentages of rms with a single lending relationship are 7.6% for rms with 20 employees
or fewer and 2.9% for rms with 21{100 employees.4 This implies that many small businesses
have multiple lending relationships and do not lock-in lending relationships with one bank.
Second, the cost of lending relationships is related to the issues of bank distress or bank
failure. If informed banks reduce credit supply for borrowers, borrowers face severe credit
constraints because other uninformed banks cannot oer sucient credit. As a result, the
borrowers cannot nance protable investment opportunities and experience lower perfor-
mance. For example, Slovin et al. (1993) discuss how the performance of borrowers that
depend upon bank loans deteriorates if informed banks having a relationship with the bor-
rower go bankrupt. They argue that a rm cannot raise funds from other banks because the
3Rajan (1992) argues that if there are multiple informed banks, Bertrand competition with informed banks
occurs and extracting rent is impossible.
4See Figure 2-3-26 in 2007 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan
(http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamet/hakusyo/h19/download/2007hakusho eng.pdf).
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problem of information asymmetry is serious, and consequentially the performance of bor-
rowers worsens. Yamori and Murakami (1999) obtain similar results focusing on the failure
of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which is one of the largest banks in Japan. Similarly, Houston
and James (2001) and Gibson (1995) claim, based on data from stock-listed Japanese rms,
that bank performance is linked to borrower performance. 5
Third, the level of activity and performance of small businesses are low when macroe-
conomic shocks occur. During shock periods, many banks decrease credit supply, which
induces a credit crunch. As Gilchrist and Gertler (1994) argue, bank-dependent small busi-
nesses suer the negative eects of nancial shocks because they have alternative ways of
nancing. This is the cost side of lending relationships, as argued by Berger and Udell
(2002). Many studies argue that the Japanese experience during the late 1990s is evidence
that small businesses were aected adversely by the nancial shock. For example, Hoshi
and Kashyap (2004) conclude that Japanese banking problems led to a credit crunch that
depressed employment and investment, citing empirical work by Ogawa (2003) and Moton-
ishi and Yoshikawa (1999) on small businesses in Japan. According to previous studies, this
problem is known as \kashishiburi" (reluctance to lend), which has had a negative impact on
the Japanese economy.
In addition, small businesses can use trade credit if bank loans are not available. For
example, using the NSSBF, Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that when credit from banks
is unavailable, borrowers use more trade credit. McMillan and Woodru (1999) show that
a longer duration of supplier{customer relationships is associated with larger credit investi-
gating in the case of Vietnam. Fisman and Love (2003) show that industries with higher
dependence on trade credit exhibit a higher rate of growth in countries with weaker nancial
institutions.
Although many studies empirically investigate the costs and benets of lending rela-
5Acquisition of monopoly rents by banks improves credit availability for young small businesses. As banks
acquire monopoly rents by establishing lending relationships, many previous studies nd that banks oer a
lower interest rate and more credit to young rms. They acquire monopoly rents more easily if credit markets
are more concentrated; therefore, banks in concentrated credit markets oer more loans to young rms. For
example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) nd that banks in concentrated markets oer a lower interest rate and
more loans to young rms using NSSBF.
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tionships, some issues still remain unresolved. First, the eects of termination of lending
relationships are investigated by previous studies using data of listed rms in Japan (e.g.
Houston and James, 2001; Yamori and Murakami, 1999; Gibson, 1995), but not using rm-
level small business data, except for Hori (2005). In addition, the studies investigating the
negative eects of bank distress focus on the lending relationship with a particular bank
(generally, those with a main bank), but few studies focus on the eects of ending relation-
ships with all banks.6 After the 2000s in Japan, many small businesses ended their lending
relationships with all banks, despite many previous studies nding that lending relationships
are very important for small businesses. Therefore, it is important to examine empirically
the factors and eects of ending relationships between small business borrowers and banks.
Second, many studies (e.g. Gilchrist and Gertler, 1994) assert that the negative eects of
nancial shocks are more severe for small businesses, but the evidence is insucient in Japan.
As we argued, Ogawa (2003) and Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) show that the negative
eects on the activities of small business borrowers are signicant using the data for the late
1990s. Although the negative shocks examined in these studies are very severe, they rely on
the aggregate data of small businesses, but not the rm-level data of small businesses. Many
rm-specic factors have some eects on the activities and performance of small businesses,
but these factors are not controlled for using aggregate data. Therefore, rm-level data are
suitable for investigating the negative eects of nancial shocks.
Third, the leverage7 of small businesses is higher than that of large rms because the
small businesses are dependent on lending relationships with banks. However, it is not clear
whether the costs of high leverage are severe or not for small businesses. On average, the
leverage of small businesses that have lending relationships with banks is 0.872 in Japan8,
which is higher than for rms in other developed countries. As Myers (1977) argues, highly
leveraged small businesses face the debt overhang problem. Therefore, they face severe credit
constraints, which induces the underinvestment problem and low rm performance. Further-
6Using US rm data, Cole (2010) investigates whether the cost of not having a lending relationship with
any bank is signicant for borrowers
7Leverage is dened as the ratio of a rm's book value of total debts to the book value of total assets.
8See Table 7.3 in Chapter 7.
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more, highly leveraged rms prefer high-risk investments; thus, banks reduce credit supply
for these rms under information gaps between lenders and borrowers. To our knowledge, few
studies investigate these issues using rm-level data of small businesses in Japan, although
many small businesses are highly leveraged.
1.2 Organization
This dissertation is based upon the following works:
・ Chapter 2 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2016. No lending relationships and liq-
uidity management of small businesses during a nancial shock", published in Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies 42, 31{46.
・ Chapter 3 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2016. Natural or unnatural selection? The
end of lending relationships for small businesses", published in Applied Economics 48 (15),
1416{1428.
・ Chapter 4 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2014. Changing banking relationships
and client-rm performance: Evidence from Japan for the 1990s", published in Review of
Financial Economics 23 (3), 107{119.
・ Chapter 5 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2010. Do nancial shocks have negative
eects on small businesses? New evidence from Japan for the late 1990s", published in The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (1), Topics, Article 87.
・ Chapter 6 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2015. Bank loan availability and trade
credit for small businesses during the nancial crisis", published in The Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance 55, 40{52.
・ Chapter 7 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2015. Leverage and rm performance
of small businesses: Evidence from Japan", published in Small Business Economics 44 (2),
385{410.
・ Chapter 8 is based on the paper \Tsuruta, D., 2016. Variance of rm performance and
leverage of small businesses", forthcoming in Journal of Small Business Management.
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To investigate the remaining issues argued in Subsection 1.1, this thesis presents the
following results. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 investigate why borrowers and banks terminate lending
relationships and the eects of the ending of lending relationships on borrowers. As argued
in Subsection 1.1, small businesses were more likely to end lending relationships with banks
after the 2000s in Japan. According to previous studies, lending relationships with banks
are valuable for small business borrowers; therefore, the termination of lending relationships
is costly for them. Furthermore, if banks terminate lending relationships with borrowers
because bank loan supply decreases (e.g., accumulation of nonperforming loans and bank
failures), the ending of lending relationships is observed in not only risky borrowers, but also
nonrisky borrowers. However, borrowers are locked into a relationship with a main bank;
therefore, they cannot change their lending relationships with their current main bank when
that bank is distressed.
Chapter 2 shows that small businesses end their lending relationships with all banks
when their working capital requirements and rm growth are low. Firms with low working
capital requirements and nongrowing rms have low credit demand, so the end of lending
relationships are caused by demand-side eects. In addition, during the global nancial shock
in 2008, rms without lending relationships reduced their cash holdings to nance credit
demand, while those with lending relationships increased their bank loans. This implies
that rms without lending relationships borrow less from banks if they faced credit demand
during the shock. However, the dierence in the performance between rms with lending
relationships and those without relationships is insignicant; therefore, the cost of no lending
relationships is not supported.
Focusing on the borrowing rms that had lending relationships over ve or 10 consecutive
years, Chapter 3 examine why the lending relationships between banks and borrowing rms
terminate. The estimation results show that the relationships end if borrowing rms are
unprotable rms, highly leveraged rms, those with high cash ow volatility, or slow-growing
rms. This result is similar for the global nancial shock in 2008. These estimation results
imply that risky rms end relationships with banks; therefore, the termination of lending
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relationships is determined eciently.
Chapter 4 uses the rm-level data of listed rms during the 1990s to examine whether rms
change their main bank relationships if the main bank is distressed. The estimation results
show that rms change their main bank if the nonperforming loans of that bank are high.
This is because rms are more likely to face liquidity shortages if they continue to borrow
from their main bank. Therefore, rms do not prefer to continue their main bank relationship
if that bank is distressed. This implies that rms can change their main bank relationship
and are not locked into their current main bank relationship. In addition, rm performance
(in terms of Tobin's Q) does not deteriorate after a change in a main bank relationship. In
contrast, postrm performance after a change in the relationship was enhanced just before
the nancial shock after 1997.
Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the nancial activity and rm performance of small busi-
nesses during the nancial shock. Chapter 5 investigates whether the nancial shock had
negative eects on small businesses. As we argued, lending relationships with a bank enhance
the credit availability of small businesses borrowers. In contrast, because small business bor-
rowers are locked into lending relationships, they could not borrow sucient funds when
informed banks decreased credit supply during the nancial shock (Gilchrist and Gertler,
1994). Many previous studies assert that the nancial shock in late 1997 in Japan induced
a credit crunch for small businesses, which deteriorated the performance of small businesses.
However, previous studies used aggregate data, not the rm-level data of small businesses;
therefore, they do investigate adequately whether the negative eects of the credit crunch
were signicant on small businesses.
Using rm-level data of small businesses, this chapter shows that rms decreased their
borrowing if the amount of borrowing was high during the nancial shock. Furthermore,
if the nancial shock was severe for small businesses, bank-dependent small businesses un-
derperformed compared with nondependent small businesses. However, the dierences are
insignicant, implying that the negative eects of the nancial shock are not supported.
Chapter 6 investigates the trade credit of small businesses during the nancial shock.
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Previous studies argue that the cost of trade credit is higher than that of bank loans; therefore,
rms use trade credit (or trade debt) when bank loans are unavailable. Thus, many studies
use the amount of trade credit as a proxy of the extent of nancial constraints (e.g., Petersen
and Rajan, 1994). Many previous studies show that rms depended more on trade credit
during the nancial shock because the availability of bank loans was limited. However, as
Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) argue, the cost of trade credit is not always higher than the cost
of bank loans. Thus, the estimation of relationships between bank loans and trade credit are
aected by the endogeneity problem. This chapter focuses on the emergency public credit
guarantee program after 2009 as an exogenous event that enhanced the credit availability of
bank loans, which mitigates the simultaneity problem between bank loans and trade credit.
If rms used trade credit when the credit constraints on bank loans were severe during the
shock, they decreased trade credit after credit availability improved. However, the estimation
results in this chapter shows that trade credit increased (not decreased) after an increase in
the availability of bank loans.
Chapters 7 and 8 investigate the eects of high leverage of small businesses of their
nancial activities and performance. As relationship lending is important for small businesses,
many small businesses depend on bank loans. Furthermore, they face diculty in issuing new
equity in capital markets; therefore, the leverage of small businesses is higher than that of
large rms on average. In contrast, as Myers (1977) argues, highly leveraged rms cannot
borrow sucient funds to nance protable investment opportunities; therefore, the cost of
high leverage might be signicant. Chapters 7 and 8 show that the cost of high leverage is
severe for small businesses.
Chapter 7 shows that highly leveraged small businesses increase bank borrowings and
trade payables less compared with low leveraged rms when they face protable investment
opportunities. In contrast, they increase the use of discounting note receivables to nance
protable investment opportunities. These results imply that highly leveraged small busi-
nesses face credit constraints, but they have nancial resources to mitigate the constraint.
Chapter 7 also shows the relationships between the level of leverage and rm performance
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(in terms of protability and rm growth). If highly leveraged small businesses face signif-
icant credit constraints, their performance is lower than that of nonhighly leveraged small
businesses. However, the estimated results show that the performance of highly leveraged
small businesses is higher (not lower) than that of nonhighly leveraged small businesses. This
result implies that the eects of credit constraints on rm performance are insignicant.
Chapter 7 investigates the relationship between average rm performance and leverage
of small businesses. However, economic theory (e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008) suggests that
highly leveraged small businesses prefer high-risk high-return investment under information
asymmetry; therefore, the variance of rm performance is higher if small businesses are highly
leveraged. Chapter 8 focuses on the relationship between the variance of rm performance
(in terms of protability and rm growth) and leverage. The estimation results show that
the variance of rm performance is higher if small businesses are highly leveraged, after
controlling for the other determinants of rm performance. This relationship is stronger if
the cash ow of small businesses is negative because they incur no loss from defaulting on
debt. In contrast, if small businesses have many collateral assets, the relationship between
the variance of rm performance and leverage is weak. This implies that collateral assets
prevent investment in high-risk high-return projects.
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Abstract
We investigate the determinants of the end of lending relationships with banks using small
business data. We also investigate how small businesses without lending relationships nanced
credit demand during the global nancial shock. First, we nd that rms with lower growth,
low working capital, and high internal cash were more likely to end lending relationships with
banks. Supply-side eects on the determinants of the end of relationships are insignicant.
Second, when rms experienced credit demand during the nancial shock, those with lending
relationships increased bank borrowings while those without lending relationships reduced
internal cash. Third, rm performance (in terms of protability) was neither lower nor
higher for rms that did not have lending relationships with banks during the shock period.
JEL classication: G21; G32
Keywords: lending relationship; nancial shock; liquidity management; small businesses.
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Abstract
We investigate the situation where small business borrowers and banks end their lending
relationships. If credit allocation is ecient, banks terminate their relationships with risky
borrowers. Alternatively, small business borrowers are more likely to end their relationships
when they have poor investment opportunities and do not require borrowed funds. However,
if the soft budget constraints of banks or credit crunches are a signicant problem, banks
are likely to continue their relationships with risky rms or end their relationships with
nonrisky rms, which is representative of an unnatural credit allocation. Using Japanese
rm-level data, we show empirically that these relationships end naturally, with natural
credit allocation supported even during the recent global nancial crisis.
Keyword: Lending relationships; nancial shocks; bank loans; small businesses
JEL classication:G21; G32; G33
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Abstract
The extant literature generally suggests that the performance of client rms deteriorates
if their distressed main bank reduces the supply of credit. However, this insight is only
consistent with the notion that main banks have an information advantage over other banks
to the extent that a client rm has trouble getting access to credit if the rm changes its main
bank. We show that Japanese rms did change their main banking relationship when their
main banks become distressed in a period with nancial shocks. Surprisingly, these rms did
not suer from loss of access to credit and actually their performance signicantly improved
after their change of main banks. JEL classication: G20; G21; G32
Keywords: Bank{rm relationships; Bank distress; Private information.
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4.1 Introduction
Banking theory suggests that any deterioration in bank health has a potential negative impact
on the performance of client rms. To investigate this, many empirical studies focus on the
negative shock of the bursting of the asset price bubble in Japan during the late 1980s.
During this period, the performance of banks began to deteriorate following the substantial
increase in nonperforming loans during the bubble economy. These conditions created an
ensuing weakness in the banking sector during the 1990s. In focusing on this shock, these
studies argue that bank health entails negative impacts on client-rm performance during
the subsequent deep recession.
For example, using Japanese rm-level data, Gibson (1995) shows that client-rm invest-
ment is sensitive to the nancial health of the main bank. Similarly, Kang and Stulz (2000)
conclude that rms whose debt in 1989 included a higher proportion of bank loans performed
relatively worse after the bursting of the bubble economy. In other work, Yamori and Mu-
rakami (1999) infer the negative eect of bank failure on client-rm stock returns using the
case of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank.1 Using rm-level data outside Japan, several other
studies (see, for example, Agarwal and Elston, 2001; Ongena et al., 2003; Fok et al., 2004)
also nd that the performance of client rms is adversely aected by bank weakness. Most
recently, Sohn (2010) has argued that the positive abnormal returns of client rms are signif-
icantly associated with the forced market exit of failed banks and the transfer of their loans
to healthy banks.
For the most part, these studies assume that main banks have an information advantage
over other banks gained through their lending relationships. The asymmetric information be-
tween banks and client rms then induces the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
To mitigate these problems, the client rm and the bank establish long-term relationships, so-
called relationship lending. As Petersen and Rajan (1994) have argued, relationship lending
enhances credit availability for client rms, representing the main benet of banking relation-
ships. However, banking relationships can also have a dark side, as argued by Rajan (1992).
1That said, Hori (2005) suggests, using unlisted rm data, that the magnitude of the negative eects of
bank failure depends on both client characteristics and the liquidation procedure used by the bank.
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For example, client rms can face severe nancial constraints if they switch from an existing
banking relationship because other banks may not have sucient information on the rm.
As a result, Rajan (1992) argues that client rms exiting an existing banking relationship
face a holdup problem in the availability of credit.
If informed main banks are then obliged to decrease lending for whatever reason, other
banks cannot oer sucient credit to these client rms because of the prevailing information
problem. During nancial shocks, as Udell (2009) has pointed out, distressed banks decrease
loans to maintain an adequate capital ratio. Therefore, existing client rms face nancial
shortfalls and thus experience poorer performance. In Japan, as Hoshi et al. (1991) and Wu
and Yao (2012) argue, the relationship between main banks and their client rms is very
close. These close relationships help mitigate the information problem. On this basis, the
banking literature suggests that poor bank performance and the changing of main banks
together account for the low level of activity and poor performance of Japanese client rms.
Contrary to existing ndings, if the information problems between client rms and non-
main banks are not severe, client rms have an incentive to shift their main banking relation-
ship from a distressed bank to another bank. Because distressed banks cannot oer sucient
funding to maintain an adequate capital ratio, client rms then benet by changing their
relationships with distressed banks. In addition, the performance of client rms can improve
after they change their main bank if they are able to obtain benets in changing their bank.
Importantly, if client rms can switch their main bank easily, we observe that rms will move
from a distressed bank. Some studies (for example, Gibson, 1995; Kang and Stulz, 2000) use
data from the nancial shock of the 1990s to show that the performance of Japanese client
rms deteriorates if they have a main bank relationship with a distressed bank. However,
they do not provide any evidence about whether the change in the main bank relationship
improves the performance of the client rms. In addition, Wu et al. (2009) and Wu and
Au Yeung (2012) show that (especially high-growth) rms are often able to employ equity
issuance as an alternative source of rm nancing. Therefore, equity can mitigate rent ex-
traction by banks. That is, rms do not lock in a relationship with their incumbent main
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bank, and so they can switch between main banks more easily.
We use Japanese rm-level data from the 1990s to investigate whether client rms shift
their main banking relationship away from a distressed bank. We also investigate whether
the ex post rm performance of client rms changes afterwards. As many banks suered
problems with nonperforming loans, and commensurately reduced loans for rms following
the postbubble nancial shock, these data are very appropriate for our analysis. Moreover,
in addition to the relationship between bank health and rm performance, we investigate
whether client rms lock in main banking relationships with distressed banks. This is a
question not adequately addressed in existing work.
We nd that client rms switch their main bank relationship if their main bank has
relatively more nonperforming loans and goes bankrupt. However, by applying a propensity
score matching method, we show that credit availability (in terms of the amount and annual
change in bank borrowing) does not deteriorate following a change in main bank. Further, the
interest payments for rms changing main bank generally fall in relative terms. In addition,
we nd that in 1997 (the pre-nancial-shock year), the change in ex post rm performance
(in terms of Tobin's q and ROA) is higher for rms switching their main bank relationship
compared with rms that did not switch their main bank. However, during the period 1993{
96, the change in ex post rm performance is neither higher nor lower following the change
in main bank. In theory, for client rms locked into a main bank, those that switch their
main bank tend to face severe nancial constraints and lower rm performance. Our results
do not support this prediction.
Instead, we show that Japanese rms do not lock into main bank relationships, and thus
switch their banking relationship if their main bank is likely to go bankrupt. Further, in the
pre-nancial-crisis period, the change in performance for rms changing their main bank is
signicantly high. As we argue, rms are likely to change their main bank relationship if
they have an existing relationship with a distressed bank. Given that during the nancial
crisis, distressed banks were unable to oer sucient credit to their client rms, those with
distressed main banks could face a nancial shortage. Therefore, the changing of the main
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bank away from a distressed bank before the nancial crisis should enhance rm value.
Unlike many previous studies, our ndings imply that the main banking relationship in
Japan is endogenously determined. This endogeneity could account for bias in the estimated
eects of the main bank. Further, selection bias can be serious with a sample comprising
only the client rms of distressed banks because these rms generally change their main bank
relationships from distressed banks to healthy banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the hypothesis
and our data set. Section 4.3 provides the estimation results concerning the determinants of
the change in the main bank. In Section 4.4, we examine the performance of rms after chang-
ing their main bank by applying the propensity score method and discuss the implications
from our results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Hypothesis and Data
4.2.1 Hypothesis
If, as the banking literature asserts, incumbent main banks have an information advantage
over other banks, client rms face severe nancial constraints when they change their main
banking relationship. The information advantage of the main bank causes a lock-in problem
for client rms, in that these rms are unlikely to change their relationship with their existing
main bank, even if the bank becomes distressed, because their access to credit will deteriorate.
This is the so-called dark side of the main banking relationship.2 Conversely, if the incumbent
main bank does not specialize in accumulating credit information on its client rms, rms
benet from a change in their main banking relationship. This implies that the lock-in
problem for client rms is not severe. In this case, we would also observe that client rms
change their main banking relationship if their main bank becomes distressed.3
Further, if the main bank has an information advantage over other banks, rms that
change their main banks face nancial constraints because their cost of external nance in-
2See Kang and Stulz (2000) for details.
3Some listed rms can choose to issue bonds or stock to nance credit demand. To focus on the banking
relationship, we only investigate bank loans.
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creases with the diculty of getting access to new loans. As a result, client-rm performance
deteriorates after shifting the main banking relationship from the distressed bank to another
bank. In contrast, if the information advantage for the main bank is insignicant, the avail-
ability of loans and loan rates for the client rms either improve or do not change after
changing the main bank. In addition, if client rms benet from changing their main bank,
their performance improves after changing their main banking relationship because of the
concomitant improvement in credit availability.
We employ a probit model to estimate the determinants of a change in the main bank
relationship. To compare the availability of credit and the performance of rms after changing
or maintaining their main bank relationship, we employ a propensity scoring matching method
to mitigate any potential sample selection bias.
4.2.2 Data
Many Japanese nancial institutions faced severe diculties with large amounts of nonper-
forming loans following the bursting of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. During the
late 1990s, many of these nancial institutions later went bankrupt. We therefore employ
Japanese listed-rm data from 1993 to 1997. We sample 1,745 nonnancial Japanese rms,
the data for which we obtained from the Nikkei Financial Quest database. We identify a
rm's main bank as the private bank that lent it the most each year.4 We omit from our
database rms with more than one main bank.
We proxy the health of the main bank with the ratio of nonperforming to total loans,
which is obtained from the Financial Statements of All Banks issued by the Japanese Bankers
Association. Each bank's nonperforming loans ratio is dened as the ratio of \Loans to
borrowers in legal bankruptcy" (hatansaki saiken) plus \Past due loans" (entai saiken) plus
\Restructured loans" (kinri genmen saiken) to total loans (hereafter NPL3). As some data
for regional banks before 1995 are unavailable, we also use several alternative denitions of the
nonperforming loans ratio. These are the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy"
plus \Past due loans" to total loans (hereafter NPL2) and the ratio of \Loans to borrowers
4This denition is the same as that used by Kang and Stulz (2000).
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in legal bankruptcy" to total loans (hereafter NPL1).
4.3 Determinants of a Change in the Main Bank Relationship
4.3.1 Estimation
To investigate the choice of main bank relationship, we estimate the following regression:
Ci;t+1 = 1Nonperforming Loansi;t + 2Failed Bank Dummyi;t + yi;t + ui;t (4.1)
Ci;t+1 = 1 if Ci;t+1 > 0
Ci;t+1 = 0 otherwise;
where ui;t  N(0; 2): The proxies for main bank health are Nonperforming Loansi;t and
Failed Bank Dummyi;t. Nonperforming Loansi;t is the ratio of nonperforming loans to
total loans of a main bank for rm i in year t (dened as NPL1, NPL2, or NPL3). We also
use a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the main bank for rm i in year t is an ex
post failed bank (Failed Bank Dummyi;t).5 The dummy variable Ci;t+1 takes a value of one
if the name of the main bank for rm i in year t diered from that in year t+1 (Changing the
Main Bank Dummy), and zero otherwise.6 Ci;t+1 is a latent variable indicating the change
in the main bank, which is the net benet from changing the main banking relationship. If
Ci;t+1 is greater than zero, rms change their main banking relationship. If client rms that
have a main banking relationship with a distressed bank have an incentive to change their
bank relationship, the estimated coecients for Nonperforming Loansi;t (NPL1, NPL2,
and NPL3) and Failed Bank Dummyi;t (1; 2) will be positive in the estimates of Equation
5The ex post failed banks (month and year of failure) in our sample are Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Nov.
1997), the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (Oct. 1998), Nippon Credit Bank (Dec. 1998), Hanwa Bank
(Mar. 1996), Hyogo Bank (Aug. 1995), Fukutoku Bank (May 1999), Naniwa Bank (Oct. 1998), Koufuku
Bank (May 1999), and Tokyo Sowa Bank (Jun. 1999), all of which failed between 1995 and 1999.
6During our sample period, there was a single main bank merger with the merger of Mitsubishi Bank and
Tokyo Bank in April 1996 to form the Tokyo{Mitsubishi Bank. For this reason, the main bank dummy has
a value of zero if rms change their main bank from Tokyo Bank to Mitsubishi Bank or to Tokyo{Mitsubishi
Bank in either 1996 or 1995. The main bank dummy also has a value of zero if rms change their main
bank from Hyogo Bank to Midori Bank because Midori Bank, established after the collapse of Hyogo Bank in
August 1995, assumed any outstanding loans.
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(4.1).
Following Ongena and Smith (2001), we specify rm scale, leverage, protability, Tobin's
q and the natural log of the number of lending relationships with banks in year t as control
variables (yi;t) in Equation (4.1). In addition, we include liquidity, main bank dependence,
the natural log of total loans from the main bank in year t, and year and industry dummies
as control variables. Our justication is as follows. First, larger rms are generally more
informationally transparent, so they may nd it easier to change their main bank relationship.
We predict that the eect of rm size is positive for the change in main bank. We specify
the natural log of a rm's total assets in year t as a proxy for rm size.
Second, we dene leverage as the book value of rm debts divided by the book value of
rm assets. In general, highly leveraged rms are more dependent on banks, so they are
more likely to lock in their existing main bank. Consequently, the estimated coecient for
leverage should be negative given a change in the main bank dummy variable. Conversely,
highly leveraged rms are risky for banks, so main banks will decrease the supply of credit
to these rms. If this second eect is stronger, leveraged rms are more likely to be obliged
to change their main bank. Therefore, the coecient for leverage should be negative given a
change in the main bank dummy variable. We thus predict that leverage has either positive
or negative eects on the dummy variable indicating the change in the main bank.7
Third, protable rms can also change their main bank relationship more easily, so we
expect protability has a positive eect on the dummy variable indicating the change in main
bank. We dene protability as the ratio of a rm's operating incomes to total assets in year
t. In addition, we use Tobin's q to control for rm values as these determine the relative
bargaining position of the borrowing rms. We dene Tobin's q as the ratio of each rm's
market value of debt and equity to its book value.
Fourth, rms with higher liquidity are less likely to default, so they may also nd it easier
to change their main bank relationship. We use the ratio of a rm's cash holdings to total
assets in year t as a proxy for liquidity.
7Ongena and Smith (2001) provide evidence that highly leveraged rms are more likely to change their
primary bank.
99
Fifth, rms with a larger number of lending relationships do not typically face a lock-in
problem with their main bank. As these rms can easily change their main bank relationship,
we predict that the number of relationships has a positive eect on the change in main bank.
Conversely, as Ongena and Smith (2001) have argued, multiple banking relationships also
have negative eects because rms with a large number of separate banking relationships do
not face a holdup problem. Since those rms do not face holdup problem, they can continue
with a stable main bank relationship. Therefore, the probability of a change in the main bank
is lower for rms with a large number of banking relationships. To proxy for this eect, we
specify ln(Number of Lending Relationships) being the natural log of the number of banks
that oer loans for a sample rm in year t.
Sixth, rms that depend more on their main bank are also less likely to switch main bank,
so the eects of bank dependence should be negative. We dene main bank dependence as
the ratio of loans obtained from the main bank to total loans in year t.
Finally, rms that borrow large sums from their main bank cannot easily change their
main banking relationship as only a few (especially large) banks can oer large loans to
substitute for the role of the main bank. Therefore, the size of loans from the main bank
implies negative eects on the dummy variable indicating a change in the main banking
relationship. For this, we specify the natural log of total loans from the main bank as a
proxy.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the variables. The median and means of all the
explanatory variables are similar. This suggests that the problem of outliers is not serious
in our estimation. In addition, the mean of changing the main bank is 0.070. We infer from
this that the number of observations involving the changing of the main bank is sucient for
estimating a probit model.
In Table 4.2, we include a correlation matrix for the independent variables. Table 4.2
shows that the correlation between ln(Amount of Loans from Main Bank) and Main Bank
Dependence exceeds  0:7. Similarly, the correlation between ln(Amount of Loans from Main
Bank) and ln(Number of Loans from Main Bank) exceeds 0.6, suggesting that the multi-
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
Changing the Main Bank 7,183 0.070 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
NPL1 7,183 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.087
NPL2 6,668 0.033 0.016 0.002 0.023 0.031 0.038 0.241
NPL3 3,154 0.043 0.030 0.004 0.027 0.039 0.053 0.253
Failed Bank Dummy 7,183 0.045 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm Scale 7,183 10.803 1.296 6.611 9.894 10.699 11.544 15.272
Leverage 7,183 0.634 0.192 0.089 0.499 0.641 0.773 2.984
Protability 7,183 0.028 0.038 -0.431 0.012 0.028 0.046 0.221
Liquidity 7,183 0.106 0.081 0.000 0.049 0.087 0.140 0.688
Tobin's q 7,183 1.331 0.448 0.524 1.087 1.240 1.459 8.933
Main Bank Dependence 7,183 0.355 0.165 0.046 0.242 0.315 0.424 1.000
ln(Number of 7,183 2.225 0.685 0.000 1.792 2.197 2.639 4.605
Lending Relationships)
ln(Amount of Loans 7,183 7.708 1.416 2.708 6.802 7.649 8.556 12.548
from Main Bank)
Note: This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the probit model.
collinearity problem can be serious. However, the results of the probit estimation (in Table
4.4 in Subsection 4.3.2) show that the coecients of all variables are similar and stable across
all of the columns. Therefore, we infer that multicollinearity is not too serious.
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4.3.2 Results
Table 4.3 compares the independent variables for rms that experienced a change in main
bank during the sample period with those that did not. To start with, 19.4% (338) of the
sample rms changed their main bank during the sample period. This clearly illustrates that
not all rms lock into a relationship with a specic main bank. The column headed \Change"
includes the statistics for the subsample of rms that changed their main bank relationship,
while the column headed \No Change" provides the statistics for those client rms that did
not change their main bank relationship. In Table 4.3, we calculate the average for each
variable within the rm and then average these across rms. If rms change their main bank,
we group these rms as \Change (A)".
In Table 4.3, we also create a dummy variable, \Failed Bank", to take a value of one if a
rm has a main bank relationship with a failed bank, zero otherwise. As shown, the means
of NPL1, NPL2, NPL3, and \Failed Bank" in the \Change" group are large, suggesting that
the main banks of rms that changed their main banking relationship had large amounts
of nonperforming loans. The variables indicating rm scale, leverage, main bank depen-
dence, number of lending relationships, and the amount of loans for the main bank are also
smaller and statistically signicant for rms that changed their main banking relationship.
In contrast, the liquidity of rms that changed their main banking relationship is higher and
statistically signicant.
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Table 4.4 includes the estimation results for Equation (4.1). As shown, the estimated
coecients for NPL1, NPL2, and NPL3 in columns (1){(3) are all positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level. These results suggest that client rms are more likely to change
their main banking relationship if their main bank has a large amount of nonperforming
loans. In addition, the estimated coecients for the failed bank dummy are positive and
statistically signicant at the 1% level. In sum, our results suggest that client rms are more
likely to change their main banking relationship if their main bank is distressed.
The signs on the estimated coecients for the control variables are consistent with our
predictions. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the eects of leverage are positive and sta-
tistically signicant at the 1% level, suggesting that highly leveraged rms are more likely
to change their main bank relationship. As we predicted, the estimated coecients for prof-
itability and liquidity are positive, apart from the result for protability in column (3), but
are not statistically signicant. The estimated coecients for Tobin's q are negative, but are
statistically insignicant. The estimated coecients for the number of lending relationships
are negative, implying that rms with many banking relationships are unlikely to change
their main bank relationship. In other results, the eect of the amount of loans from the
main bank is negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level.
4.3.3 Robustness Check
To conrm the robustness of the results for the eect of main bank health on the changing
main bank dummy, we control for bank mergers, size, and lending capacity following Ongena
and Smith (2001). First, we control for the eect of bank merger given that two banks,
Mitsubishi Bank and Tokyo Bank, merged to form the Tokyo{Mitsubishi Bank during April
1996. Firms that have a main bank relationship with a merged bank could face a nancial
shortage because the main bank may cut its loan supply while asset restructuring. Therefore,
these rms are likely to change main bank. To control for this eect, we add a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the main bank is Mitsubishi Bank, Tokyo Bank, or
Tokyo{Mitsubishi Bank to Equation (4.1). The result is shown in column (1) of Table 4.5. As
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results of the Probit Model for Changing the Main Bank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Changing the Main Bank
NPL1 31.7294 31.8429
(5.182) (4.889)
NPL2 8.8228
(1.385)
NPL3 5.6898
(1.055)
Failed Bank Dummy 0.5636 0.5380 0.7454 0.5669
(0.096) (0.100) (0.146) (0.094)
Firm Scale 0.0831 0.0861 0.0827 0.1020
(0.030) (0.032) (0.045) (0.030)
Leverage 0.4048 0.4235 0.2027 0.4315
(0.172) (0.179) (0.259) (0.163)
Protability 0.5493 0.3512 -0.1131 -0.0348
(0.708) (0.752) (1.070) (0.670)
Liquidity 0.2044 0.4426 0.7466 0.1398
(0.304) (0.327) (0.484) (0.300)
Tobin's q -0.0915 -0.1003 -0.0442
(0.061) (0.064) (0.082)
Main Bank Dependence -3.2019 -3.0863 -3.3785
(0.275) (0.288) (0.429)
ln(Number of -0.7559 -0.7683 -0.7889 -0.0326
Lending Relationships) (0.078) (0.082) (0.120) (0.049)
ln(Amount of Loans -0.1599 -0.1497 -0.1213 -0.2641
from Main Bank) (0.032) (0.033) (0.047) (0.030)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 7,183 6,668 3,154 7,025
Log Likelihood -1589 -1439 -702.1 -1,619
Note: This table provides the estimates of a maximum-likelihood probit model with the changing the main
bank dummy as the dependent variable. Changing the Main Bank is a dummy variable that takes a value
of one if rms change their main bank between year t and t+1. NPL1, NPL2, and NPL3 are proxies for
nonperforming loans in the main bank for the sample rms. NPL1 is the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in
legal bankruptcy" to total loans. NPL2 is the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy" plus \Past
due loans" to total loans. NPL3 is the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy" (hatansaki saiken)
plus \Past due loans" (entai saiken) plus \Restructured loans" (kinri genmen saiken) to total loans. Failed
Bank Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the main bank for rm i in year t is an ex post failed
bank between 1996 and 1999, otherwise zero. Firm Scale is the natural log of a rm's total assets in year t.
Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets in year t. Protability is the ratio of
a rm's operating incomes to total assets in year t. Liquidity is the ratio of a rm's cash holdings to total
assets in year t. Tobin's q is the ratio of each rm's market value of debt and equity to its book value in year
t. ln(Number of Lending Relationships) is the natural log of the number of banks that oer loans for a sample
rm in year t. Main Bank Dependence is the ratio of loans obtained from the main bank to total loans in
year t. ln(Amount of Loans from Main Bank) is the natural log of total loans from the main bank in year t.
Standard errors in parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level; 
signicant at the 1 percent level, respectively.
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expected, the estimated coecient for bank merger is positive, but not statistically signicant.
Second, bank size may also have an eect on the decision to change main bank. In general,
rms that have relationships with large banks are not likely to change their main bank, as
larger banks are typically more creditworthy with strong competitive advantages. To capture
the eect of bank size, we include a large bank dummy variable by identifying if a rm's main
bank is a \toshi ginko" (city bank)8. The estimated result for the equation including the large
bank dummy variable is in column (2) of Table 4.5. As shown, the estimated coecient is
negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level, conrming that rms with a main bank
relationship with a large bank are less likely to change their main bank.
Third, we also control for the lending capacity of the main bank. Unfortunately, we
do not have a direct measure of the lending capacity of the main bank as in Ongena and
Smith (2001). Instead, we use the capital ratio gap, dened as the main bank's capital ratio
less 8% if the capital ratio gap is positive and zero otherwise. To satisfy capital adequacy
requirements under Basel I, the capital ratio of banks with an international presence should
be at least 8%. Therefore, banks with a capital ratio close to 8% may reduce their level
of risk-weighted assets, including loans to nonnancial rms. As this entails a diminished
lending capacity, rms with a relationship with such a bank may be more likely to change
their main bank relationship. In column (3) of Table 4.5, we can see the estimated coecient
for the capital ratio gap is positive, which is contrary to our expectation.
In addition, we also control for the seriousness of the lock-in relationship with the main
bank. Wu and Wang (2005) generalize the Myers and Majluf (1984) model and show that
asymmetric information concerning rm value produced by growth (not assets in place) can
facilitate rm equity issuance. Moreover, Wu et al. (2009) show that rent extraction by the
main bank is not severe for high-growth rms because they can draw upon other nancial
resources, including new equity. To reect this eect, we estimate equation (4.1) using only
those observations for middle- and low-growth rms (that is, excluding high-growth rms).
Following Wu et al. (2009), we use Tobin's q as a proxy for rm growth. We classify rms with
8Comprising Daiichi-Kangyou Bank, Fuji Bank, Sakura Bank, Tokyo{Mitsubishi (formerly Mitsubishi
Bank), Asahi Bank, Sanwa Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Daiwa Bank, Tokai Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank,
and Tokyo Bank.
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results of the Probit Model for Changing Main Bank (Robustness
Check)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Changing Main Bank
NPL1 32.1935 29.9793 29.0833 32.2508
(5.211) (5.083) (5.546) (6.213)
Failed Bank Dummy 0.5682 0.4983 0.6385 0.4880
(0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.118)
Firm Scale 0.0820 0.1014 0.0944 0.0716
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.040)
Leverage 0.4050 0.4300 0.3426 0.6323
(0.172) (0.171) (0.172) (0.229)
Protability 0.5579 0.4799 0.5445 0.2982
(0.709) (0.713) (0.719) (1.075)
Liquidity 0.2037 0.1618 0.1748 0.2934
(0.304) (0.304) (0.308) (0.378)
Tobin's q -0.0914 -0.0900 -0.0782 -0.4947
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.225)
ln(Number of -3.2089 -3.2176 -3.1798 -3.4639
Lending Relationships) (0.275) (0.274) (0.277) (0.344)
Main Bank Dependence -0.7562 -0.7620 -0.7588 -0.8106
(0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.094)
ln(Amount of Loans -0.1596 -0.1712 -0.1583 -0.1418
from Main Bank) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.040)
Bank Merger 0.0799
(0.088)
Large Bank Dummy -0.2477
(0.053)
Capital Ratio Gap 18.3787
(4.499)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,183 7,183 7,142 4,777
Log Likelihood -1588 -1578 -1551 -1092
Note: This table provides the estimates of a maximum-likelihood probit model with changing the main bank
dummy as the dependent variable. Changing Main Bank is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if rms
change their main bank between years t and t+1. The denitions of NPL1, Firm Scale, Leverage, Protability,
Liquidity, ln(Number of Lending Relationships), Main Bank Dependence, and ln(Amount of Loans from Main
Bank) are in the notes accompanying Table 4.4. Bank Merger is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if the main bank is the Mitsubishi Bank, Tokyo Bank, or Tokyo{Mitsubishi Bank. Large Bank Dummy takes
a value of one if the rm's main bank is a \toshi ginko" (city bank). Capital Ratio Gap is the main bank's
capital ratio minus 8% if the capital ratio gap is positive, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses;
 signicant at the 10% level;  signicant at the 5% level;  signicant at the 1% level, respectively.
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a Tobin's q in the top tertile as high-growth rms, which are rms that we do not consider
typically locked into a main bank. We provide the estimated results excluding high-growth
rms in column (4) in Table 4.5. As shown, the eects of bank health are positive and the
estimated coecient for Tobin's q is negative and statistically signicant. Together, these
checks conrm that the results concerning the positive eects of main bank health are robust.
The negative coecient of Tobin's q in column (4) in Table 4.5 implies that rms with a
lower Tobin's q may have relationships with a troubled main bank, so they are more likely
to change their main bank. We include NPL1 and failed bank dummy as proxies for bank
health. However, according to Gibson (1995), the credit rating of the main bank can also be
a proxy for bank health. Gibson (1995) shows that main bank credit ratings have negative
eects on borrower rm performance. Therefore, we can interpret from this result that a
lower Tobin's q indicates a relationship with a main bank that has a lower credit rating
4.4 Consequences of Changing the Main Bank
4.4.1 Propensity Score Matching
We found that rms that have a main bank relationship with a distressed bank are more likely
to switch to a new main bank. This means that rms prefer not to have relationships with
distressed main banks. However, we can also interpret this as meaning that rms change their
main bank relationship because the main bank ceases oering credit to the rm. In this case,
rm performance deteriorates after changing their main bank relationship. To investigate
rm performance and other behavior, we apply propensity score matching methods. If the
dummy variable for changing main bank (Ci;t+1) is a random variable, the coecient in
a simple regression model specifying rm performance as the dependent variable and the
changing main bank dummy as an independent variable will show the eect of changing the
main bank on client-rm performance. However, as shown in Table 4.4, client rms that have
a main banking relationship with a distressed bank are also likely to change their main bank.
In support, as shown in Table 4.3, the characteristics of rms with and without a change in
the main bank are not very similar. Therefore, the dummy variable indicating the change in
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main bank is a nonrandom variable.
To mitigate these problems, we employ the propensity score matching method, rst intro-
duced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This is because we need to compare rms changing
and not changing their main bank with similar characteristics. Propensity score matching
methods allow us to compare rms changing their main bank and those that do not, as these
will have similar characteristics based on the propensity score. We can thus mitigate the
selection bias problem.
Propensity score matching methods require a conditional independence assumption (CIA):
Y0; Y1 ? C j w; z; (4.2)
where Y0 is an outcome variable without treatment (not changing main bank), Y1 is an
outcome variable under treatment (changing main bank), C is a bilateral variable indicating
treatment, and w; z is a set of observed rm characteristics. This assumption means that
the outcome variables are independent of whether the participants receive treatment or not.
In addition, the assumption of common support needs to be satised. As the number of
observations (more than 7,000 in our data set) is sucient, our data satisfy this assumption.
The propensity score is the probability of receiving treatment, which in our paper is the
probability of changing the main bank. To calculate the propensity score p(wi;t; zi;t), we
estimate the probability of changing the main bank using the following probit model:
p(wi;t; zi;t)  P (Ci;t+1 = 1 j wi;t; zi;t)
= (zi;t +wi;t); (4.3)
wherewi;t = (Leveragei;t, Protabilityi;t, Liquidityi;t, ln(Number of Lending Relationshipsi;t),
ln(Amount of Loans from Main Banki;t), Industrial Dummies) and zi;t = (Nonperforming
Loansi;t, Failed Bank Dummyi;t). We use NPL1 as a proxy for nonperforming loans. To
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satisfy the balancing property, we omit the bank dependence and year dummies. As we now
employ Tobin's q as an outcome variable (Yi for i = 0; 1), we exclude it from the matching
estimation. We limit the observations to those where Tobin's q in t+1 and t+2 are both
available.  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The
propensity score satises the common support condition, which is 0 < p(wi;t; zi;t) < 1. If the
CIA described in Equation (4.2) holds, the following condition also holds.
Y0; Y1 ? C j p(wi;t; zi;t) (4.4)
The estimation result for Equation (4.3) is shown in column (4) of Table 4.4. Using the
estimated coecients (^, ^) in column (4) of Table 4.4, we calculate the estimated propensity
score (p^(wi;t; zi;t)) for each observation, and match the observations based on the estimated
propensity score. We employ a k -nearest neighbor-matching algorithm to match the treat-
ment and control observations where k indicates the number of control observations matched
with each treatment observation. We estimate the propensity score by matching each treat-
ment observation using its ve nearest neighbors.
We checked the balancing test as follows. First, we test that the mean of each variable
diers between the treated and matched rms using a t-test. The mean of each of the
variables specied in Equation (4.3) indicating the treated and control observations is shown
in Table 4.6. The column headed \Treated" provides the means for the treated observations
(rms changing their main bank). The column headed \Unmatched" details the means for
the control observations (rms that do not change their main bank) before matching. We
test that the dierence of mean between control and treated observations is zero. Table
4.6 shows that the null hypothesis that the dierence of treated and control samples is zero
is rejected for all variables at the 1% or 5% level before matching. This suggests that the
characteristics of those rms changing and not changing their main bank are not similar
for the variables listed in Table 4.6. Similarly, the table provides the means for the control
observations after matching, shown in the column headed \Matched." The dierence between
the treated and matched control observations is not statistically signicant, so we fail to reject
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Table 4.6: Dierence Between the Treated and Control Samples Before and After Matching
Unmatched Matched
Treated Control t statistics Control t statistics
NPL1 0.009 0.007 9.63  0.008 0.75
Failed Bank Dummy 0.116 0.038 8.11  0.109 0.33
Firm Scale 10.493 10.831 -5.54  10.488 0.07
Leverage 0.603 0.637 -3.83  0.594 0.73
Protability 0.031 0.028 1.90  0.033 -0.76
Liquidity 0.120 0.105 3.90  0.124 -0.71
ln(Number of Lending Relationships) 2.066 2.250 -5.79  2.048 0.41
ln(Amount of Loans from Main Bank) 7.077 7.779 -10.73  7.051 0.29
Note: This table details the means of the independent variables used in the probit estimation. The column
headed \Treated" contains the means for the rms changing their main bank (treated rms). The column
headed \Unmatched" contains the means for rms not changing their main bank (control rms). The column
headed \matched" contains the means for the matched observations of rms not changing their main bank. 
signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level;  signicant at the 1 percent level,
respectively.
the null hypothesis that the dierence in the means between the treated and matched control
observations is zero. This suggests that after matching, the dierence in characteristics
between the treated and control observations is small.
Second, we estimate Equation (4.3) using only the treated and matched control observa-
tions, and test that all of the estimated coecients for each variable are jointly zero. Before
matching, the pseudo R2 value for the estimate of Equation (4.3) is 0.080. The LR 2 value
is 281.18, which rejects the null hypothesis that all estimated coecients for variables in
Equation (4.3) are equal to zero at the 1% level. After matching, the pseudo R2 value for
Equation (4.3) decreases to 0.009, which is lower than that in the model using all observa-
tions. The LR 2 value is 5.15, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that all coecients
are jointly equal to zero. These results suggest that the dierence between the treated and
matched observations is not signicantly large.
4.4.2 Outcome Variables
We use Tobin's q, ROA, the total borrowing to total assets ratio, the annual growth rate
of total borrowing, the interest rate, and the cash-holdings ratio as outcome variables. Our
hypothesis is as follows. If rms lock into a relationship with the incumbent main bank and
are obliged to reduce their loan supply for any reason, rms that change their main bank do
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not obtain sucient funds from the new main bank. In this case, the availability of credit for
rms that change their main bank worsens, so the total borrowing to total assets ratio and
the annual growth rate of total borrowings for rms changing their main bank are lower than
that for matching rms. We dene the total borrowing to total assets ratio as the ratio of a
rm's total borrowing to its total assets. The growth rate of total borrowing is dened as the
annual growth rate of a rm's total borrowings [(total borrowingst { total borrowingst 1) /
total assetst 1].
In addition, if rms changing their main bank need to compensate for this nancial
shortfall by drawing on more expensive sources of nancing, their average interest rate will
be higher than that for matching rms. We dene each rm's interest rate as the ratio of
rm interest expenses to the sum of total borrowings. Conversely, if the credit availability
for rms changing main banks improves, the annual growth rate of total borrowings and the
total borrowing to total assets ratio will be higher and the interest rates lower for these rms.
As Opler et al. (1999) have argued, when nancial shortfalls for rms are severe, they
draw on internal cash holdings. We predict that cash holdings for rms changing their main
bank are lower than those for matching rms if the nancial shortfall is severe. In contrast, if
the problem of a locked-in relationship with the main bank does not matter, the dierences
in these variables between rms that change their main bank and the matching rms will
not be statistically signicant. We dene the cash-holdings ratio as the ratio of a rm's cash
holdings to total assets.
We also check whether rm performance deteriorates after changing the main bank using
Tobin's q and ROA. Following Morck et al. (2000), we use the average Tobin's q as a proxy
for rm performance. As Wu and Xu (2005) have argued, information on market valuation
in Japan became more meaningful following nancial deregulation up until the late 1990s, so
Tobin's q is a suitable measure of rm performance. If rms face an underinvestment problem
because of nancial constraints, Tobin's q and the ROA for rms changing their main bank
should be lower than for matching rms.
In contrast, if nancial constraints do not matter, the dierences between these rms and
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the matched rms should not be statistically signicant. In addition, the change in the main
bank can enhance each rm's behavior, such that both Tobin's q and ROA can improve after
the rm changes its main bank. We dene Tobin's q as the ratio of each rm's market value
of debt and equity to its book value. We dene ROA as the ratio of each rm's operating
income to total assets. We compare the change in the outcome variables for the treatment
and control groups from year t to year t+1 or year t+2. We evaluate the treatment eects
by highlighting the dierence in dierences of the outcome variables.
4.4.3 Results
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide the means of the outcome variables for the treated and control
rms and the dierence in dierences of the means. We apply the dierence in dierences
of the mean in each outcome variable for evaluating the treatment eects. We take the
dierence of the outcome variables between t and t+1 or t+2, which are the years before
and after changing the main bank. To compare the outcome variables in t and t+1 or t+2,
we limit the observations to those available in t+1 and t+2. Panels A, B, and C in Table
4.7 provide the results for the total borrowing to total assets ratio, the annual growth rate
of total borrowing, and the interest rate, respectively. The column headed \Matched" shows
the results for the observations of matching rms using the propensity score. In addition, we
provide the results using all rm observations for rms not changing main bank as controls
in the column headed \Unmatched". \Treated" are the results using only those observations
for rms changing their main bank.
We provide the dierence in dierences of the mean using all the sample years and for
each year. The nancial crisis hit the Japanese economy late in 1997, so 1997 is immediately
before the nancial crisis. The dierence in dierences of the means for the total borrowing
to total assets ratio is not statistically signicant in all years apart from 1995 for a year (t+1),
suggesting that rms changing their main bank did not decrease their bank loans. In 1995,
the total borrowing ratio decreased more for rms changing their main bank, but the negative
eects are insignicant for two years (t+2). As shown in the column headed \Unmatched",
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results for Treatment Eects on Credit Availability
Panel A: Total borrowing to total assets ratio
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 0.3027 0.3112 0.3407
t+1 0.3132 0.3178 0.0039 0.0065 0.3501 0.0012 0.0052
t+2 0.3129 0.3183 0.0031 0.0100 0.3479 0.0030 0.0079
t=1994 t 0.3236 0.3032 0.3482
t+1 0.3218 0.3013 0.0001 0.0069 0.3462 0.0002 0.0059
t+2 0.3100 0.3015 -0.0119 0.0103 0.3396 -0.0049 0.0090
t=1995 t 0.3499 0.2981 0.3426
t+1 0.3283 0.2981 -0.0217 0.0095  0.3377 -0.0168 0.0061 
t+2 0.3373 0.2903 -0.0048 0.0137 0.3361 -0.0061 0.0100
t=1996 t 0.3075 0.3090 0.3327
t+1 0.3104 0.3079 0.0040 0.0093 0.3304 0.0052 0.0063
t+2 0.3112 0.3195 -0.0069 0.0106 0.3376 -0.0013 0.0091
t=1997 t 0.3152 0.2821 0.3256
t+1 0.3196 0.2878 -0.0013 0.0072 0.3339 -0.0040 0.0053
t+2 0.3348 0.2975 0.0041 0.0103 0.3505 -0.0053 0.0086
All t 0.3192 0.2946 0.3375
t+1 0.3186 0.2941 0.0000 0.0046 0.3393 -0.0024 0.0026
t+2 0.3223 0.2965 0.0013 0.0056 0.3424 -0.0017 0.0040
Panel B: Growth rate of total borrowing
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 0.0611 0.1398 0.1118
t+1 0.0901 0.0856 0.0831 0.1003 0.0559 0.0850 0.1111
t+2 0.0898 0.0262 0.1422 0.1104 0.0144 0.1261 0.1097
t=1994 t 0.2386 0.0547 0.0580
t+1 0.0849 0.0377 -0.1366 0.1862 0.0141 -0.1096 0.0674 
t+2 0.0273 0.0069 -0.1634 0.1894 0.0012 -0.1544 0.0644 
t=1995 t -0.0127 0.0762 0.0349
t+1 0.0114 0.0390 0.0613 0.0721 0.0162 0.0427 0.0495
t+2 0.0923 -0.0112 0.1923 0.0635  0.0021 0.1377 0.0523 
t=1996 t -0.0080 -0.0007 0.0266
t+1 0.1069 -0.0009 0.1152 0.0692  0.0110 0.1305 0.0452 
t+2 0.0219 0.0555 -0.0262 0.1012 0.0274 0.0292 0.0544
t=1997 t 0.0647 0.0309 0.0236
t+1 0.1511 0.1156 0.0017 0.1529 0.0550 0.0550 0.0556
t+2 0.0907 0.0432 0.0138 0.0808 0.0692 -0.0195 0.1111
All t 0.0665 0.0372 0.0503
t+1 0.0923 0.0422 0.0209 0.0600 0.0310 0.0451 0.0313
t+2 0.0684 0.0697 -0.0305 0.0947 0.0240 0.0281 0.0391
[continued to the next page]
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Panel C: Interest rate
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 0.0815 0.0639 0.0602
t+1 0.0604 0.0507 -0.0079 0.0077 0.0495 -0.0104 0.0030 
t+2 0.0487 0.0452 -0.0140 0.0113 0.0443 -0.0170 0.0037 
t=1994 t 0.0539 0.0557 0.0502
t+1 0.0454 0.0481 -0.0010 0.0029 0.0446 -0.0030 0.0019 
t+2 0.0352 0.0384 -0.0014 0.0041 0.0363 -0.0048 0.0039
t=1995 t 0.0465 0.0452 0.0447
t+1 0.0350 0.0370 -0.0033 0.0050 0.0362 -0.0031 0.0033
t+2 0.0251 0.0314 -0.0075 0.0034  0.0302 -0.0070 0.0036 
t=1996 t 0.0393 0.0352 0.0349
t+1 0.0283 0.0291 -0.0048 0.0026  0.0289 -0.0049 0.0019 
t+2 0.0275 0.0253 -0.0018 0.0039 0.0258 -0.0027 0.0019
t=1997 t 0.0273 0.0298 0.0287
t+1 0.0239 0.0280 -0.0015 0.0021 0.0256 -0.0003 0.0012
t+2 0.0233 0.0314 -0.0056 0.0049 0.0248 0.0000 0.0030
All t 0.0486 0.0441 0.0432
t+1 0.0378 0.0380 -0.0047 0.0018  0.0365 -0.0042 0.0011 
t+2 0.0316 0.0332 -0.0062 0.0028  0.0320 -0.0058 0.0015 
Panel D: Cash-holdings ratio
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 0.1305 0.1228 0.1135
t+1 0.1268 0.1199 -0.0008 0.0068 0.1111 -0.0013 0.0046
t+2 0.1275 0.1144 0.0054 0.0089 0.1059 0.0047 0.0055
t=1994 t 0.1244 0.1279 0.1118
t+1 0.1233 0.1229 0.0041 0.0055 0.1069 0.0040 0.0046
t+2 0.1132 0.1081 0.0088 0.0081 0.0971 0.0037 0.0057
t=1995 t 0.1264 0.1298 0.1077
t+1 0.1139 0.1132 0.0040 0.0069 0.0980 -0.0029 0.0043
t+2 0.1120 0.1045 0.0109 0.0084 0.0903 0.0030 0.0049
t=1996 t 0.1230 0.1268 0.1004
t+1 0.1164 0.1126 0.0077 0.0075 0.0920 0.0019 0.0041
t+2 0.1028 0.1069 -0.0003 0.0070 0.0895 -0.0093 0.0050 
t=1997 t 0.1017 0.1040 0.0938
t+1 0.0910 0.1008 -0.0076 0.0059 0.0912 -0.0081 0.0035 
t+2 0.0987 0.1100 -0.0090 0.0056 0.0991 -0.0083 0.0047 
All t 0.1197 0.1239 0.1049
t+1 0.1124 0.1162 0.0004 0.0026 0.0993 -0.0017 0.0019
t+2 0.1100 0.1114 0.0027 0.0033 0.0962 -0.0010 0.0023
Note: This table provides the treatment eects on the Total borrowing to total assets ratio, Growth rate of
total borrowing, Interest rate, and Cash-holdings ratio for treated and matched rms before and after changing
their main bank; t denotes year immediately before changing main bank and t+1 denotes year after changing
main bank. Total borrowing to total assets ratio is the ratio of a rm's total borrowing to its total assets in
year t. Growth rate of total borrowing is the growth rate of a rm's total borrowings [(total borrowingst {
total borrowingst 1) / total assetst 1]. Interest Rate is the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its
total borrowings for in year t. Cash-holdings ratio is the ratio of a rm's cash holdings to total assets in year
t. The column denoted as \Di. in Di." shows the dierence in dierences between year t and t+1/t+2 and
the treated and matched rms. Standard errors for the dierence in dierences in the column headed \Std.
Err.". Standard errors obtained from bootstrapping based on 50 replications.  represents signicance at the
10% level,  at the 5% level and  at the 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results for Treatment Eects on Firm Performance
Panel A: Tobin's q
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 1.3281 1.3567 1.3226
t+1 1.3976 1.4411 -0.0149 0.0329 1.3964 -0.0044 0.0213
t+2 1.2558 1.2989 -0.0145 0.0404 1.2800 -0.0298 0.0273
t=1994 t 1.3902 1.4399 1.4161
t+1 1.2516 1.2941 0.0072 0.0385 1.2884 -0.0109 0.0284
t+2 1.3725 1.3973 0.0249 0.0357 1.4087 -0.0102 0.0398
t=1995 t 1.3127 1.3083 1.2823
t+1 1.4486 1.4038 0.0404 0.0343 1.4001 0.0181 0.0318
t+2 1.2364 1.1919 0.0401 0.0382 1.1910 0.0150 0.0313
t=1996 t 1.4079 1.4566 1.4272
t+1 1.1978 1.2051 0.0415 0.0309 1.2025 0.0147 0.0294
t+2 1.0266 1.0395 0.0358 0.0417 1.0615 -0.0155 0.0382
t=1997 t 1.2094 1.2068 1.2099
t+1 1.0791 1.0312 0.0453 0.0282 1.0582 0.0213 0.0185
t+2 1.1554 1.0270 0.1259 0.0515  1.0709 0.0850 0.0368 
All t 1.3193 1.3590 1.3307
t+1 1.2615 1.2549 0.0463 0.0179  1.2609 0.0120 0.0131
t+2 1.2012 1.1743 0.0666 0.0228  1.1942 0.0184 0.0169
Panel B: ROA
Matched Unmatched
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err. Controls Di. in Di. Std. Err.
t=1993 t 0.0310 0.0331 0.0285
t+1 0.0226 0.0247 -0.0001 0.0038 0.0214 -0.0013 0.0024
t+2 0.0236 0.0256 0.0001 0.0034 0.0240 -0.0029 0.0032
t=1994 t 0.0271 0.0252 0.0223
t+1 0.0281 0.0263 -0.0001 0.0041 0.0242 -0.0009 0.0028
t+2 0.0248 0.0263 -0.0034 0.0061 0.0251 -0.0051 0.0040
t=1995 t 0.0318 0.0269 0.0244
t+1 0.0313 0.0270 -0.0006 0.0034 0.0247 -0.0008 0.0026
t+2 0.0339 0.0299 -0.0009 0.0036 0.0275 -0.0010 0.0033
t=1996 t 0.0322 0.0360 0.0297
t+1 0.0340 0.0366 0.0012 0.0026 0.0316 -0.0002 0.0026
t+2 0.0268 0.0313 -0.0008 0.0038 0.0268 -0.0026 0.0035
t=1997 t 0.0327 0.0405 0.0331
t+1 0.0295 0.0323 0.0050 0.0027  0.0273 0.0026 0.0022
t+2 0.0296 0.0228 0.0146 0.0043  0.0208 0.0091 0.0033 
All t 0.0312 0.0331 0.0278
t+1 0.0291 0.0305 0.0005 0.0015 0.0261 -0.0004 0.0011
t+2 0.0279 0.0283 0.0015 0.0021 0.0248 -0.0003 0.0016
Note: This table provides the treatment eects on Tobin's q and ROA for treated and matched rms before
and after changing their main bank; t denotes the year just before changing main bank and t+1 denotes the
year after changing main bank.Tobin's q is the ratio of the rm's market value of debt and equity to its book
value of debt and equity. ROA is the ratio of a rm's operating income to total assets. The rows denoted
\Dierence" contain the dierence in each variable in year t and t+1 for the matched and treated rms.
The column denoted as \Di. in Di." shows the dierence in dierences between years t and t+1 and the
treated and matched rms. Standard errors for the dierence in dierences in the column headed \Std. Err.".
Standard errors obtained from bootstrapping based on 50 replications.  represents signicance at the 10%
level,  at the 5% level and  at the 1% level, respectively.
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these results are similar to those if we used all observations.
As shown in Panel B, the dierences in dierences of the means of the growth rate of total
borrowing are both positive and negative. If we use unmatched observations, the dierences
in dierences are statistically signicant in 1994, in 1995 for two years (t+2), and in 1996 for
one year (t+1). After matching, the dierence in dierences is statistically signicant only in
1995 for two years (t+2) and in 1996 for a year (t+1), but the eects in the remaining years
are statistically insignicant. Together, the results in Panels A and B of Table 4.7 imply that
credit availability in rms changing their main bank did not worsen compared with those
rms not changing their main bank.
In Panel C, we show the results using the interest rate. Using all observations, the
dierence in dierences of the means of the interest rate is negative and statistically signicant
at the 5% level. This suggests that rms reduce their interest payments more after changing
their main bank, when compared with rms not changing their main bank. If we sample by
year, the dierences in dierences of the means are all negative and statistically signicant
in 1995 for two years (t+2) and in 1996 for a year (t+1) if we use matching observations for
controls.
We also check the change in the liquidity of rms using the cash-holdings ratio in Panel
D of Table 4.7. In both 1996 and 1997, the dierences in dierences are negative and sta-
tistically signicant if we use unmatched observations for controls. However, using matched
observations as controls, the dierence in dierences of the mean for cash holdings is statis-
tically insignicant in all years. This suggests that rms do not reduce their internal cash
holdings more after changing their main bank, when compared with rms that do not change
their main bank.
Table 4.8 provides the results concerning the performance of the treated and control rms.
Panel A details the means of Tobin's q for rms changing their main bank and the matching
rms and the dierences in dierences of the means in each year. If we use observations
from the full sample period, the dierences in dierences for Tobin's q between t and t+1
or t+2 are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% or 5% level if we use matched
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observations for controls. The level of Tobin's q for both groups decreases from t to t+1 or
t+2 because our sample period includes the postbubble recessionary period. Dividing the
sample by year, we can see that before 1996 the dierences in dierences for Tobin's q are
statistically insignicant. In contrast, the change in Tobin's q for rms changing their main
bank is higher than those for matching rms and statistically signicant at the 5% level in
1997 for two years (t+2). This implies that in 1997 (the pre-nancial-shock year), the change
in Tobin's q was relatively large in rms that changed their main bank. These results suggest
that the impact of changing the main bank persists for two years after 1997.
Panel B provides the results using ROA as the outcome variable. As with the results
in Panel B, the dierences in dierences for one and two years are positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% or 10% level (only using matched observations) in 1997, but insignicant
in the other years. These results also suggest that although the level of ROA decreased,
the change in client-rm ROA was larger after a change in the main banking relationship,
especially in 1997, the pre-crisis year.
As shown in Table 4.4, we nd that rms that have a main bank relationship with a
distressed bank are more likely to switch to a new main bank. This suggests that rms
do not prefer to have relationships with distressed main banks. Interestingly, the change in
performance (in terms of Tobin's q and ROA) of client rms that switched their main bank
relationship immediately before the nancial shock (in 1997) is greater than that for rms
that did not switch main bank. As argued, many large banks (e.g., Hokkaido Takushoku
Bank, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Nippon Credit Bank, etc.) went bankrupt after
November 1997. The reason for the relatively higher rm performance is that rms changed
relationships to nondistressed banks during the nancial shock period, which led to more
stable sources of nance.
The discounted sum of expected cash ows to rms determines rm value (such as Tobin's
q). If the main bank relationship moves from a distressed bank, we expect credit availability
in the future to improve. The improvement in future credit availability prevents the loss
of protable investment opportunities. Therefore, rm value improves because changing the
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main bank increases the probability of achieving future protable investment opportunities.
Table 4.7 supports the argument that interest rates fall for rms changing their main bank.
Thus, credit availability improves after rms change main bank, and this leads to relatively
larger changes in ROA and Tobin's q for rms switching main bank.
To investigate the reason for the higher ROA in the treatment group, we detail the average
total assets and operating income growth rates for the control and treatment groups for one
and two years in Table 4.9.9 In 1997, the growth rates of total assets for the treatment group
are positive and larger than for the control group. As the change in the cash-holdings ratios
for the treatment group is lower after changing the main bank relationship (Table 4.7), rms
that change their main bank increase their inventory and/or capital investment by reducing
their cash holdings. The two-year growth rates of operating income for the treatment group
are also positive, while those for control group are negative in 1997. These ndings indicate
that rms that change their main bank increase their operating incomes with increasing
investment. As a result, the changes in ROA for the treatment group are larger than those
for the control group. However, the change in total assets is also large, so the changes in
ROA for the treatment group are negative for one and two years.10
Possible reasons for the increasing investment and operating incomes are as follows. First,
as new main banks can monitor client rms more eciently, these rms increase the level of
investments with positive net present value. Second, as client rms do not need to prepare for
future nancial shortages given the failure of the main bank, they do not require additional
precautionary cash holdings. They can then invest more in capital and inventories. As a
result, the operating incomes for rms changing their main bank increase.
These results imply that rms changing main bank can retain their existing level, which is
inconsistent with our prediction that the new main bank cannot oer sucient credit because
9Total assets growth in year t+1 is dened as [(Total assets in year t+1 { Total assets in year t)/Total
assets in year t]. Total assets growth in year t+2 is dened as [(Total assets in year t+2 { Total assets in
year t)/Total assets in year t]. Operating income growth rate in year t+1 is dened as [(Operating incomes
in year t+1 { Operating incomes in year t)/Total assets in year t]. Operating income growth rate in year
t+2 is dened as [(Operating incomes in year t+2 { Operating incomes in year t)/Total assets in year t].
We normalized operating income growth using total assets because the operating incomes for some rms are
negative.
10The dierences between the treated and control rms are not statistically signicant if we use matched
rms as the control group. Therefore, there is insucient evidence of a reduction in cash holdings.
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Table 4.9: Average ROA, Total Assets Growth, and Operating Income Growth
ROA Total Assets Operating Income
Growth Growth
Treated Controls Di. in Di. Treated Controls Treated Controls
t=1997 t 0.0327 0.0405
t+1 0.0295 0.0323 0.0050 0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0069
t+2 0.0296 0.0228 0.0146 0.0481 -0.0082 0.0042 -0.0150
All t 0.0312 0.0331
t+1 0.0291 0.0305 0.0005 0.0065 0.0108 0.0000 -0.0007
t+2 0.0279 0.0283 0.0015 0.0477 0.0263 0.0008 -0.0017
Note: This table provides average ROA, total assets growth, and operating income growth for the treatment
and control rms. Total assets growth in year t+1 is [(Total assets in year t+1 { Total assets in year t)/Total
assets in year t]. Total assets growth in year t+2 is dened as [(Total assets in year t+2 { Total assets in year
t)/Total assets in year t]. Operating income growth rate in year t+1 is [(Operating incomes in year t+1 {
Operating incomes in year t)/Total assets in year t]. Operating income growth rate in year t+2 is [(Operating
incomes in year t+2 { Operating incomes in year t)/Total assets in year t].
the incumbent main bank has an information advantage. The results from the propensity
score matching also suggest that the new main bank can oer sucient credit to its new
client rms because its information problems are not severe.
4.4.4 Robustness Check
By applying the propensity matching method, we showed that the change in the performance
of client rms switching their main bank was relatively higher during the pre-nancial-crisis
period. However, we also made some rather strict assumptions, including that of CIA and
common support. To support the robustness of our results, we estimate a treatment eects
model as follows:
Ex Post F irm Performancei;t+s = 1Nonperforming Loansi;t + 2Failed Bank Dummyi;t
+ xi;t + Ci;t+1 + ui;t (4.5)
Ci;t+1 = 1Nonperforming Loansi;t + 2Failed Bank Dummyi;t
+ yi;t+1 + vi;t (4.6)
Ci;t+1 = 1 if Ci;t+1 > 0
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Ci;t+1 = 0 otherwise;
where ui;t  N(0; 2); vi;t  N(0; 2) and Cov(ui;t; vi;t) =  6= 0:
We use Tobin's q and ROA as a proxy for Ex Post F irm Performancei;t+s, where
s equals 1 or 2. The proxies for main bank health are Nonperforming Loansi;t and
Failed Bank Dummyi;t. Nonperforming Loansi;t is the ratio of nonperforming loans to
total loans of a main bank for rm i in year t (dened as NPL1). We also use a dummy
variable that equals one if the main bank for rm i in year t is an ex post failed bank
(Failed Bank Dummyi;t). As in the previous section, the dummy variable Ci;t+1 takes a
value of one if the name of the main bank for rm i in year t diered from that in year t+1
(Changing the Main Bank Dummy), and zero otherwise. Ci;t+1 is a latent variable for the
change in the main bank. If the performance of the client rms improves after they change
their main banking relationship, the estimated coecient for Ci;t+1 () in Equation (4.5)
will be positive and statistically signicant. We use a treatment eects model to mitigate
any endogeneity bias. As argued, the dummy variable indicating the change in main bank
is a nonrandom variable. We estimate the parameter vectors using a maximum likelihood
method.
We also specify several control variables (xi;t) in the estimation of rm performance in
Equation (4.5), including assets, leverage, protability, liquidity, main bank dependence, and
the number of lending relationships, along with the year and industry dummies for each year
t. To start with, we employ the natural log of each rm's total assets as a proxy for rm
scale (size). We measure protability using the ratio of each rm's operating incomes to total
assets. As a rule, protable rms are better performing rms and so each rm's Tobin's q will
be higher. Protability is also used in Wu and Xu (2005) in their analysis of the determinants
of rm value in Japanese rms. We predict that a rm's protability has a positive eect
on rm performance. We do not include protability as a control variable when ROA is the
dependent variable. As Kang and Stulz (2000) argue, rms with more liquidity should also
have better performance because they do not suer liquidity constraints. We predict that
liquidity has a positive eect on rm performance, with liquidity dened as the ratio of cash
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to total assets.
We include leverage to control for the eects of capital structure, dened as the ratio of a
rm's total debts to total assets, as used in Wu and Xu (2005) to control for rm value. From
a theoretical point of view, rm performance and capital structure are irrelevant. However,
some studies suggest that capital structure can have either positive or negative eects on rm
performance. For example, Fama and French (1998) investigate the eects of taxes on leverage
and argue that debt has a positive eect on rm value. However, they also discuss the lack of
empirical support for this argument. In addition, higher leverage increases bankruptcy costs,
which lowers rm value. Wu and Xu (2005) summarize the eects of leverage by focusing on
agency costs and asymmetric information, which have either positive or negative eects on
rm values. In particular relation to the Japanese nancial system, Wu and Xu (2005) argue
that the eects of leverage can be positive given monitoring by the main bank and negative in
the presence of rent extraction by the main bank. To reect these eects, we include leverage
in our estimation of rm performance.
The number of lending relationships with banks is the number of banks that oer loans
for rm i in year t. According to Detragiache et al. (2000), as rms with a large number
of lending relationships are less likely to face liquidity problems, the number of lending
relationships has a positive eect on rm performance. Main bank dependence is the ratio of
loans obtained from the main bank to total loans. According to Rajan (1992), a close main
bank relationship causes the holdup problem. As a result, the performance of client rms
that depend more on their main bank is lower. Conversely, a close main bank relationship
can enhance credit availability for these client rms. Overall, bank dependence should then
have some impact on rm performance, but the predicted sign is ambiguous. We also include
proxies for nonperforming loans and a failed bank dummy in Equation (4.5). As Gibson
(1995) nds that the deterioration of main bank health has a negative eect on client-rm
performance, we predict that the performance eects of nonperforming loans and the failed
bank dummy will be negative. The control variables specied in Equation (4.6) are the same
as in Equation (4.1).
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We use the natural log of total loans from the main bank as an instrumental variable.
Firms that borrow large sums from their main bank cannot change their main banking re-
lationship easily. This is because only a few (especially large) banks can oer large loans to
substitute for the role of the main bank. Therefore, the size of loans from the main bank
negatively correlates with the dummy for changing the main banking relationship. This vari-
able is mainly determined by rm size, so it is not considered to be correlated with rm
performance and ui;t.
Table 4.10 provides the estimation results for Equations (4.5) and (4.6). We simultane-
ously estimate columns (1) and (2) using the treatment eects model. We omit the results of
Equation (4.6) in columns (3){(5) as they are similar to the results in column (1). Column
(1) details the results of Equation (4.6). As shown, the estimated coecients for NPL1 in
column (1) are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. These suggest that client
rms are likely to change their main banking relationship if their main bank has a large
amount of nonperforming loans. In addition, the estimated coecient for the failed bank
dummy is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. In sum, our results suggest
that client rms are more likely to change their main banking relationship if their main bank
is distressed, which is a similar result to that provided earlier in Table 4.4.
We provide the estimation results for Equation (4.5) in columns (2){(5). We use Tobin's
q in columns (2) and (3) and ROA in columns (4) and (5) as proxies for rm performance.
In columns (2) and (4), we use the dependent variables in t+1 and those in t+2 in columns
(3) and (5). As shown, the estimated coecients for changing the main bank are all positive
and statistically signicant at the 1% level. This suggests that a client-rm's performance
(in terms of Tobin's q and ROA) improves after it changes its main banking relationship.11
11We also estimate a treatment regression using only those observations from 1997. However, the estimated
 is not statistically signicant from zero, which is inconsistent with the assumption in Equations (4.5) and
(4.6) that Cov(ui;t; vi;t) =  6= 0. If we estimate Equation (4.5) using simple least-squares regression using the
same observations, the estimated coecient for the changing main bank dummy is positive and statistically
signicant.
124
Table 4.10: Estimation Results of the Treatment Eects Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Changing Firm Performance Firm Performance
the Main Bank (Tobin's q) (ROA)
Year of Dependent Variable t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2
Changing the Main Bank 0.5933 0.5659 0.0546 0.0460
(0.020) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002)
NPL1 28.0233 -4.6382 -6.6301 -0.3978 -0.5525
(4.605) (1.337) (1.438) (0.117) (0.120)
Failed Bank Dummy 0.4457 -0.0878 -0.0960 -0.0039 -0.0019
(0.091) (0.025) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Scale 0.0797 -0.0102 -0.0028 0.0029 0.0023
(0.027) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.2909 0.4113 0.4448 -0.0409 -0.0338
(0.153) (0.032) (0.034) (0.003) (0.003)
Protability -0.1108 1.7403 1.4222
(0.653) (0.144) (0.153)
Liquidity 0.5289 0.0571 0.0303 0.0458 0.0388
(0.268) (0.067) (0.071) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(Number of -0.5259 -0.0185 -0.0064 0.0033 0.0023
Lending Relationships) (0.069) (0.014) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Main Bank Dependence -2.5400 0.2847 0.2960 0.0147 0.0126
(0.236) (0.046) (0.049) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Amount of Loans -0.1308
from Main Bank) (0.025)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,183 7,183 7,025 7,183 7,041
Log Likelihood -5120 -5,120 -5,374 12,492 12,090
Estimated  -0.7488 -0.6631 -0.7949 -0.6338
Note: This table provides the estimates of the treatment eects model with the changing main bank dummy
and rm performance (Tobin's q) or ROA as dependent variables. Denitions of all variables are in notes
accompanying Tables 4.4 and 4.8.  represents signicance at the 10% level,  at the 5% level and  at the
1% level.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the empirical relationship between the change in main banking
relationship and client-rm performance (in terms of Tobin's q and ROA) using Japanese
rm-level data from the 1990s. Our ndings are as follows. First, we nd that client rms
were likely to change their main banking relationship if their main bank suered from non-
performing loans or even went bankrupt during the 1990s. Second, our data do not support
the argument that credit availability (in terms of loans) for client rms decreased after they
changed their main bank. Third, we nd that the change in client-rm performance for rms
switching their main banking relationship is better than that for rms not switching during
the pre-nancial-crisis period. For the most part, the extant literature suggests that credit
availability for client rms worsens when their main bank becomes distressed because they
are locked into a particular main bank relationship. As one result, the performance of these
rms decreases. However, our results show that client rms can change their relationship
with a distressed main bank to enhance their performance. In addition, our ndings suggest
that client rms are not actually locked into a main banking relationship with distressed
banks.
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Chapter 5
Do Financial Shocks Have Negative
Eects on Small Business?:New
Evidence from Japan for the Late
1990s
This study was published in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 10(1) (Tsuruta,
2010). The 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ect those of the CRD Association. This study is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientic
Research, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The author would like to thank Thomas C. Buchmueller,
the editor, and two anonymous referees for many valuable suggestions. The author also thanks Yoshiro Miwa,
Yasuyuki Sawada, Kaoru Hosono, Kuniyoshi Saito, and participants in the Japanese Economic Association
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Abstract
The banking literature suggests that the low performance of the banking sector can spread
to real economic activities, especially small businesses. Many previous studies insist that the
Japanese experience of the 1990s supports this argument. However, many studies of small
businesses are often insucient since they depend on aggregate data, even though small
businesses are likely to face dicult constraints in their activities when nancial problems
are severe. In this study, we use rm-level data on small businesses and investigate whether
bank-dependent small businesses face severe constraints on their activities, which lowers
performance. Our results dier from the ndings of previous work in this area. First, we show
that per the widely used TANKAN statistics, the focus of many existing studies, is misleading
and that a majority of respondents in this survey (at least 71%) report no worsening in the
lending attitude of nancial institutions in the so-called credit crunch period of 1998-1999 (or
even in the 2000-2001 period). Second, using detailed rm level panel data from CRD, we
nd no signicant reductions in the loans for the majority of small businesses. Third, while
we do nd evidence that bank-dependent rms increased reliance on internal funds during
the period of the credit crunch (1998-2001), we nd no evidence that this negatively impacted
rm performance (as reected in rm growth and protability measures).
JEL classication: G20; G21; G32
Keywords: credit crunch, nancial shock, small business.
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5.1 Introduction
Despite the Modigliani-Miller Theorem supporting irrelevance, the banking literature sug-
gests that the negative eects of banking shocks can spread to real economic activity. In
this literature, banks can mitigate the information gap between lenders and borrowers using
their monitoring abilities. For instance, James (1987) argues that banks provide special ser-
vices unavailable from other creditors, while Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that lending
relationships with banks are valuable for borrowers wishing to mitigate problems with the
information gap. Small rms in particular can have trouble accessing capital markets be-
cause of the problem of information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors. Therefore,
numerous studies argue that loans from nancial intermediaries are important sources of -
nancing for small rms.1 Thus, if banks stop lending because of a large macro shock, small
rms cannot borrow enough and may therefore face severe nancial constraints. The banking
literature suggests that small rms cannot nance investment opportunities and thereby may
lose potential prots.2
This literature also suggests that the recent U.S. banking crisis has had negative eects for
the real economy, especially the small business sector. In the aftermath of the 2007 subprime
crisis, many banks suered large losses in the real estate market. To maintain an adequate
capital ratio, as Udell (2009) argues, they needed to cut loans by raising credit standards,
making very few new loans, and renewing fewer existing loans. Consequently, small businesses
may have been signicantly damaged by the nancial crisis, mainly because the sources of
external nance for small businesses are relatively limited. Some studies, (for example, Tong
and Wei, 2008) have since investigated whether the subprime crisis had serious eects on
the real economy. As Udell (2009) also argued, however, it is not clear whether the negative
eects for small businesses are serious.3
Research on the Japanese experience of the 1990s may be helpful in investigating whether
1However, bank loans are not the only sources of nance for small rms, as they can also employ trade
credit, factoring, existing cash holdings, etc.
2Rajan (1992) and Kang and Stulz (2000) also discuss the adverse eects of information production by
banks.
3For example, Udell (2009) argues \How bad will this credit crunch be? Right now, it is too hard to tell"
(p. 124).
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the current U.S. banking shock has negative eects on small businesses, because many studies
argue that the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s is similar to current circumstances in the
U.S. For example, Reinhart and Rogo (2008) dispute whether the current nancial crisis is
a special case by comparing it with ve of the largest global crises in the past, including that
of Japan in the 1990s. They argue that \[W]hile each nancial crisis no doubt is distinct,
they also share striking similarities in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in
growth patterns, and in current account decits" (p. 342). Moreover, Udell (2009) and Hoshi
and Kashyap (2008) argue that the current U.S. crisis and the 1990s Japanese experience
parallel each other as both shocks arose from the bursting of real estate market bubbles. In
this paper, we use late 1990s Japanese small business data to investigate whether a negative
banking shock is a serious problem for the small business sector.
The conventional view is that the 1990s Japanese experience supports the banking lit-
erature, especially the late 1990s when banking problems posed severe implications for the
real economy. For instance, in November 1997, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi
Securities, two of the largest nancial institutions in Japan, went bankrupt.4 In Japan, the
bankruptcies of such large nancial institutions were somewhat surprising events, as it was
widely believed that large nancial institutions would be preserved by the Ministry of Fi-
nance (MOF). In addition, many nancial institutions faced diculties with large amounts
of nonperforming loans as their assets deteriorated when the bubble economy burst. During
this period, the main concern for small business was the credit crunch, which involved a
signicant reduction in credit supply from banks to both viable and nonviable borrowers.
Policymakers and journalists referred to this as kashishiburi and argued anecdotally that it
was especially serious for small businesses. Moreover, many nonnancial rms struggled with
the economic downturn, and the number of rms declaring bankruptcy increased after 1998.
More generally, the real growth rate of GDP in Japan fell to around {2.0 percent in 1998 and
{0.1 percent in 1999, the lowest growth rates since World War II. Accordingly, during the
1990s a banking crisis and a severe recession simultaneously took place in Japan.
4Several middle-sized nancial institutions, including Sanyo Securities and Tokuyo City Bank, also went
bankrupt.
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Many studies support the observation that credit supplies from banks were squeezed and
the nancial system collapsed, suggesting that kashishiburi was a serious problem during
this period. They also argue that the nancial shocks were the main cause of the severe
recession known in Japan as the \the lost decade." For example, Hoshi and Kashyap (2004)
conclude that Japanese banking problems led to a credit crunch that depressed employment
and investment, citing recent empirical work by Ogawa (2003) and Motonishi and Yoshikawa
(1999) on small business in Japan. Similarly, Diamond and Rajan (2001) use the Japanese
recession to substantiate their models, insisting that \[U]ndercapitalized banks squeeze their
borrowers and do not make new loans. Some viable borrowers are forced to restructure and
some banks are being closed" (p. 66). Using aggregated data, Bayoumi (2001) also shows
that the disruption of nancial intermediation throughout the 1990s was the main cause of
the Japanese economic slump, while Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Watanabe (2007) argue
that a credit crunch also took place after late 1997.5
Unfortunately, most of the existing work in this area focuses on listed rms or aggregate
data, and the use of rm-level small business data is relatively uncommon.6 According to
Bernanke (1983), credit crunches potentially lead to more serious harm for small businesses
than for listed rms, as the former usually have fewer alternatives to bank nancing.7 If
the banking problem was serious, small businesses in the late 1990s could not borrow enough
money from banks. As a result, they could not invest an adequate amount and would thereby
suer lower performance. Accordingly, nancial shocks are relatively more likely to harm
bank-dependent small businesses.
5Several other studies focus on the early 1990s, because the performance of banks began to deteriorate
with the increase in nonperforming loans made during the bubble economy. Using listed rm data, Gibson
(1995) shows that rm investment was sensitive to the nancial health of its main bank. Similarly, Kang and
Stulz (2000) conclude that rms whose debt in 1989 included a higher proportion of bank loans performed
relatively worse from 1990 to 1993.
6The eects of nancial shocks in the real economy are investigated using data from various countries.
For example, Borensztein and Lee (2002) and Bae et al. (2002) investigate, using data on Korean listed
rms, how bank-dependent rms are damaged by credit crunches. Likewise, using aggregate data in the U.S.,
Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998) examine the real eects of a credit crunch. Finally,
Ongena et al. (2003) conclude that bank-dependent rms did not experience lower performance during the
1990s banking crises. However, studies of the negative eects on small business using rm-level data are less
common.
7Also, Gilchrist and Gertler (1994) investigate eects of a tightening of monetary policy for large and small
manufacturing rms. Small manufacturing rms, who are more limited access to credit market, cut back on
their inventories more during a tightening of monetary policy.
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Using rm-level data on small business, we investigate whether small businesses in Japan
struggled because of these critical banking problems. We rst employ simple observations on
short- and long-term borrowing by small businesses in Japan. Based on these observations, we
do nd that banks did not decrease loans for many small businesses during this period, with a
median growth rate of short- and long-term borrowing of zero. Next, we apply the dierence-
in-dierences (DID) approach, similarly to previous work in other countries (for example,
Kroszner et al., 2007 and Love et al., 2007). If negative shocks to nancial institutions
harmed economic activities during this period, bank-dependent small rms faced serious
negative shocks. In contrast, bank-independent rms were not as seriously damaged because
they used less bank credit. If our data support dierences in rm performance between bank-
dependent and bank-independent rms, we can conclude that banks squeezed credit supplies
during the shock. If not, the decline in rm performance was merely the result of business
cycles, not of nancial shocks.
Our ndings from the econometric analysis are as follows. First, we nd that tangible
xed assets and cash holdings of bank-dependent rms are lower during the shock period if
they depend on banks. These results imply that they may face constraints on their activ-
ities because of the nancial shock. Second, the negative eects of nancial shocks on the
performance (measured as rm sales growth or protability) for bank-dependent (or small
bank-dependent) rms are insignicant. If the nancial shock is severe, these negative eects
should only appear in bank-dependent small businesses. However, we do not nd negative
eects on the performance of bank-dependent rms. In fact, they performed better than
bank-independent rms.
As in Hoshi and Kashyap (2004), most existing studies in Japan conclude there is strong
evidence that a weakened nancial system lowers economic performance. Unfortunately,
because rm-level data on small business is generally unavailable, many of these studies
have depended on the aggregate diusion index of nancial institution lending attitudes
(hereafter called \nancial DI") from the Bank of Japan's TANKAN survey (Short-term
Economic Survey of Enterprises) as evidence of a credit crunch for small business. Therefore,
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the results in this analysis dier from previous work in this area. The TANKAN survey
questions rms about their business conditions, with one question that concerns the lending
attitude of nancial institutions. Financial DI represents the \accommodative" minus the
\severe" percentage points regarding the present lending attitude of nancial institutions.
The nancial DI was negative in the last quarter of 1997 and dropped from {1 to {19 in the
rst quarter of 1998. Ogawa (2003) uses this to argue that lending attitudes became more
severe in the last quarter of 1997, Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) estimate the investment
function and show an inverse relationship between nancial DI and the level of investment,
and Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Watanabe (2007) use the nancial DI as evidence of a
credit crunch.
However, some of the evidence from the TANKAN survey is open to question. First, the
main shortcoming is that previous work ignores the ratio of rms responding \not so severe."
For instance, more than 60 percent of rms responded \not so severe" about the lending
attitude of nancial institutions and only 16 percent of rms regarded the lending attitude
of nancial institutions as \severe," even during the height of the nancial shock. Once the
most frequent response is incorporated, the nancial DI hardly supports the contention that
banking problems led to a credit crunch. Second, the survey does not investigate the reasons
for a \severe" response, so we cannot appreciate whether the more severe lending attitude
resulted from rms' worsening credit risk or from a decline in the available credit supply from
banks. Importantly, if rm credit risk worsened the already severe lending attitude, we can
argue that the credit squeeze in Japan did not take place until after 1998.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 uses macro and small
business data to show Japan in the late 1990s. This section also describes our data set and
provides some simple summary statistics. We discuss the empirical results in Section 5.3.
Section 5.4 concludes.
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5.2 An Overview of the Financial Shock
5.2.1 Aggregate Data Evidence
In Section 5.2.1, we provide the aggregate data used in many of the previous studies that
support evidence of a credit crunch in Japan. Figure 5.1 depicts the growth rate of loans for
small businesses from 1994 to 1999. The growth rate of bank loans for small businesses was
1.77 percent in 1994 and 1.15 percent in 1995, suggesting that banks increased lending for
small businesses during 1994 and 1995. The growth rate of loans became negative starting in
1996: {0.61 percent in 1996 and {1.29 percent in 1997. After 1998, outstanding loans for small
businesses fell dramatically, with growth rates of {3.06 percent in 1998 and {7.41 percent in
1999. The decrease in loans from city banks was especially severe. However, despite negative
loan growth after 1996, we cannot specically identify whether supply or demand eects
were the main cause of the decline in loans. For instance, the decline may have resulted
from a lower demand for bank loans as rms had fewer opportunities for investment during
the recession. To overcome these problems, many studies rely on the TANKAN survey with
regard to the diusion index for nancial institution lending attitude.
The TANKAN survey investigates rm business conditions in Japan, and it is con-
ducted quarterly in March, June, September, and December.8 The Bank of Japan sends
the TANKAN questionnaires to rms with 50 or more workers. The target rms are ran-
domly sampled using data from the Establishment and Enterprise Census conducted by the
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications. In 1999, the number of target rms was
9,433 with a 93.9 percent response rate. The survey questions follow this format: \Please
choose one of the three alternatives that best describes the current (from three months ear-
lier) and forecasted9 survey, excluding seasonal factors." One survey item also concerns the
lending attitudes of nancial institutions, with respondents selecting one option from these
three: 1) accommodative; 2) not so severe; or 3) severe.10 The diusion index is dened
as the percentage of rms selecting \accommodative" less the percentage of rms selecting
8See http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/stat/tk/extk.htm for details.
9The survey included forecasted changes until September 2007.
10A sample form is available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/stat/tk/extk01.htm.
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Figure 5.1: Growth Rate of Bank Loans for Small and Medium Enterprises
(as at end of December)
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Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan ;
Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
Note: According to the website of Japanese Bankers Association, city banks are \large in size, with head-
quarters in major cities and branches in Tokyo, Osaka, other major cities, and their immediate suburbs."
Regional banks are \usually based in the principal city of a prefecture and they conduct the majority of
their operations within that prefecture and have strong ties with local enterprises and local governments." See
http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/banks/principal/index.html for details.
\severe."
As argued, we cannot readily identify whether the decline in bank loans is on the supply
side or the demand side. Nonetheless, most previous studies use the nancial DI as a proxy
for the supply of bank loans. Figure 5.2 plots the nancial DI for the period 1994 to 2003.
On this basis, Ogawa (2003) argues that \[I]t is clear that the lending attitude becomes very
severe in the last quarter of 1997."11 This is because the proportion of \severe" respondents
exceeded that of \accommodative" respondents starting in the rst quarter of 1998. IMF
(1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001), Fukao (2003), and Watanabe (2007) also use the diusion
index as their primary evidence for a credit crunch.12 Many studies, however, focus only on
the dierence in the ratio of \accommodative" and \severe" responses, thereby eectively
11As Miwa (2008) counters, the nancial DI has fallen several times since it began, so the decline in the
nancial DI after 1997 is not necessarily out of the ordinary.
12Gibson (1997) uses the diusion index to study the Japanese nancial shocks of the early 1990s.
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Figure 5.2: Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions, Diusion Index
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Source: Bank of Japan, Short-term Economic Survey of Principal Enterprises (TANKAN)
Note: Diusion Index: Percentage of rms responding \accommodative" minus percentage of rms responding
\severe". The data frequency is quarterly.
ignoring the \not so severe" responses. The exclusion of this large portion of the responses is
potentially misleading as some observers have misinterpreted the nancial DI as indicating
that more than half of the responses were \severe."13
In Figure 5.3, we show the percentages of responses for each item. At more than 60
percent, the percentage of \not so severe" responses is highest for all years. In the rst
quarter of 1998, 71 percent of small rms responded \not so severe" or \accommodative,"
suggesting that many rms did not face tight nancial conditions, even during the credit
crunch. Therefore, the TANKAN survey does not imply that lending attitudes toward many
small businesses became severe after 1998. Indeed, the survey evidences only 29 percent of
lending attitudes toward small business as being severe in the rst quarter of 1998, with 71
13For example, Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei), a leading economic newspaper in Japan, reports that more
than 50 percent of small rms in the last quarter of 1997 responded that the lending attitude of nancial
institutions was \severe" (p. 3 in the morning issue of 15 December, 1997). This suggests that the response of
\not so severe" is eectively ignored and that the nancial DI is even misinterpreted by the leading economic
media in Japan.
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Figure 5.3: The Percentage of Accommodative, Not so Severe, and Severe
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Source: Bank of Japan, Short-term Economic Survey of Principal Enterprises (TANKAN)
Note: The data frequency is quarterly.
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percent not severe. In addition, in the rst quarter of 1997, 87 percent of small businesses
responded that lending attitudes were \accommodative" or \not so severe," with only 13
percent responding as \severe." Thus, only an additional 16 percent of small businesses
believed that the lending attitude of nancial institutions was more severe in the rst quarter
of 1998 than in the rst quarter of 1997 if the small rms responding \severe" in the rst
quarter of 1997 did not respond as \not so severe" or \accommodative" in the rst quarter
of 1998. Lending attitudes towards 84 percent of small businesses were unchanged in 1998.
Moreover, we cannot construe from Figure 5.3 that the loan supply for 16 percent of small
rms fell in 1998.14 The TANKAN statistics may be biased for the following reasons. First,
the nancial DI largely depends on the subjective viewpoints of small business owners. As the
TANKAN survey does not request information about the level of borrowings or interest rates,
it cannot check whether or not the small business owners responding \severe" actually faced
severe lending attitudes. Second, the media, governments, and politicians may inuence the
survey results. As we have argued, in November 1997, Yamaichi Shouken, one of the largest
securities trading rms in Japan, and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of Japan's largest
banks, went bankrupt. Furthermore, many nonnancial rms struggled with the economic
downturn and the number of rms declaring bankruptcy increased. During this period, many
policymakers and politicians also expressed concern that credit supplies had fallen because
of nancial institution bankruptcies. They also suggested that the severe nancial conditions
had had a negative eect on small business activity, without providing any evidence of a
decreasing bank credit supply. In turn, this information may have inuenced the choices
made by respondents in the TANKAN survey.
Finally, we do not have any information about the reasons for a \severe" response. It
is well known that nancial institutions reduce loan supplies as the credit risk of borrowers
worsens. Further, as rms struggle with a deepening recession and the number of bankrupt-
cies increases, the credit risks for many small businesses worsen. Importantly, according to
Bernanke and Lown (1991), a credit crunch is a leftward shift in the supply curve, holding
14We do not have rm-level data from the TANKAN survey, so we cannot provide the actual number of
responses that were unchanged in 1997-1998.
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constant the quality of borrowers. If the worsening credit risks caused more severe lending
attitudes, then the data on lending attitudes may reect a demand shift rather than a true
credit supply crunch.
5.2.2 Firm-level Data on Small Business: The Credit Risk Database
As discussed, the empirical evidence drawn from the aggregate data is insucient to support
the presence of a credit crunch in Japan. To check in more detail whether or not the credit
crunch took place, we use micro data on small businesses in Japan from 1996 to 2001. The
data are from the Credit Risk Database for Small and Medium Enterprises (CRD).
The data set used in this study includes only corporations that existed for more than two
consecutive past years in the CRD, from 1996 to 2001.15 To compare the pre- and postshock
period, we limit our sample to rms whose nancial data in 1996 and 1997 is available.
We omit nancial and small farm businesses. Data is collected on 143,108 rms including
their balance sheets and prot and loss statements.16 The rst quartile of employees is 3,
the median is 7, and the third quartile is 16. The distribution of employees suggests that
CRD data includes many micro rms; these are typically more informationally opaque and
vulnerable to credit crunches. The 99 percentile of employees is 214, so our sample also
includes some larger small businesses. The numbers of rms in each year of the sample are
74,986 in 1996; 143,108 in 1997; 134,092 in 1998; 124,757 in 1999; 115,759 in 2000; and
105,930 in 2001. Given that the number of rms from 1995 in the CRD is low, we begin our
sample with the 74,986 rms in 1996.
As the CRD is a database of bank clients, we are somewhat concerned that it includes
only satisfactorily performing rms, because poorly performing rms usually cannot borrow
from banks and therefore are excluded. To check whether the CRD is sample biased, in Table
5.1 we compare the ratio of operating income to total assets and the ratio of total borrowings
to total assets in the CRD,17 to the statistics on the nancial statement of corporations by
15This is because we employ lagged variables and growth rates in the descriptive and econometric analysis.
16According to Sakai et al. (2010), CRD covers about 60 percent of small incorporated rms in Japan in
2001. As we limit to rms whose nancial data in 1996 and 1997 is available, the number of sample in our
paper is smaller than the number of full sample collected in CRD.
17To compare the CRD and MOF data in Table 5.1 we dene the ratio of operating income to total assets as
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Table 5.1: Comparison of CRD with Financial Statements Statistics
of Corporations by Industry
Operating Income/Total Assets
Total < 10M 10M{50M 50M{100M > 100M
MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD
1996 0.026 0.027 0.010 0.009 0.024 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.031 0.032
1997 0.026 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.025 0.032 0.032
1998 0.025 0.022 0.007 0.002 0.019 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.031 0.027
1999 0.019 0.019 {0.007 {0.004 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.026 0.026
2000 0.023 0.024 {0.012 0.002 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.030 0.029
Total Borrowings/Total Assets
Total -10M 10M{50M 50M{100M 100M-
MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD MOF CRD
1996 0.477 0.544 0.637 0.831 0.528 0.599 0.523 0.574 0.416 0.478
1997 0.470 0.543 0.629 0.837 0.545 0.597 0.509 0.574 0.408 0.473
1998 0.473 0.554 0.617 0.845 0.558 0.610 0.493 0.581 0.412 0.482
1999 0.484 0.563 0.655 0.864 0.593 0.628 0.463 0.591 0.412 0.483
2000 0.449 0.556 0.637 0.869 0.506 0.625 0.548 0.588 0.390 0.479
Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (Houjin Kigyou
Toukei Nenpou).
Note: We divide the sample into four groups by the level of capital: less than 10 million yen (\<10M"),
10 to 50 million yen (\10M{50M"), 50 to 100 million yen (\50M{100M"), and more than 100 million yen
(\>100M").
industry conducted by the MOF. This Table shows that the operating income ratios in both
data sets are similar. For example, the 1996 operating income ratio in the CRD is 0.026, and
is 0.027 in the MOF data. The dierence in the operating income ratio between the CRD
and MOF data is not large in any one year, suggesting that the rms in the CRD sample
do not systematically perform better than the rms in the MOF data sample. However,
the total borrowings to total assets ratio is larger in the CRD than in the MOF data. As
discussed, banks provide data to the CRD, so that rms that do not borrow from banks are
underrepresented in the sample.
5.2.3 Simple Observations from Firm-level Data
Short- and Long-term Borrowings
In Section 5.2.3, we provide some simple summary statistics using rm-level data. If banks
reduced their supply of loans from the end of 1997, the growth rates of short- and long-term
ni=1Operating Incomei=
n
i=1Total Assetsi. Similarly, we dene the ratio of total borrowings to total assets
as ni=1Total Borrowingsi=
n
i=1Total Assetsi, where n is the sample number.
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borrowings18 in 1998 should have dramatically fallen in many small rms. We dene the
short-term borrowings growth as (Short-term Borrowingst { Short-term Borrowingst 1)/Total
Assetst 1, where t indicates the years from 1996 to 2001.19 Table 5.2 includes the quartiles
of the short-term borrowing growth rates after 1996. For each year, the median growth rate
of short-term borrowing is 0.00 percent.20 We also provide the quartiles of the growth rates
after dividing the sample into three groups by the level of employees in 1997: 5 or fewer
employees (very small rms), 6{20 employees (small rms), and more than 20 employees
(middle-sized and large rms). These results are unchanged when we divide the sample by
rm size, implying that rms can generally roll over their short-term debt, even during the
period of the nancial shock. The rm-level data thus suggests that loans for the average
small business were not cut back following the credit-crunch period in 1998.
If we focus on short-term borrowing growth for the rst quartiles, we see that the growth
rates in 1998 ({2.46 percent) and in 1999 ({3.32 percent) were smaller than in 1997 ({2.08
percent). Similarly, short-term borrowing growth in the third quartiles for 1998 and 1999
were smaller than in 1997. The data suggests, then, that at least some rms reduced their
short-term 1998{1999 borrowings, and that this nding is invariant to rm size. We also
focus on the interquartile range (IQR): If some rms suered from the credit crunch and
greatly reduced the level of their borrowings after 1998, the dierence between rms should
become larger. However, according to Table 5.2, the IQR is smaller after 1997.21
18Short-term borrowings are loans that a rm needs to repay within a year. Long-term borrowings are loans
that a rm needs to repay over more than a year.
19The growth rate is not normalized by the level of borrowings in t-1 because the level of borrowings in
some rms is sometimes zero.
20In comparison, trade payables for manufacturing rms fell in 1998 and 1999. The median trade payables
growth rates in manufacturing are {0.71 percent in 1998 and {0.40 percent in 1999. The rst quartiles of the
growth rates are also smaller in 1998 and 1999. These results imply an obvious contraction in trade payables,
unlike short- and long-term borrowings.
21If our sample is divided by industry and year, the median growth rate of short-term borrowings is 0.00
percent across all industries.
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In Table 5.3, we focus on the long-term borrowing growth rate. We dene the long-term
borrowings growth as (Long-term Borrowingst { Long-term Borrowingst 1)/Total Assetst 1,
where t indicates the years from 1996 to 2001. Similar to our ndings for short-term borrow-
ings, our observations do not support the contention that banks cut lending and that small
rms reduced their borrowings. The median growth rate of long-term borrowings in 1998 is
0.00 percent. The data suggests, then, that long-term loans for small rms were not generally
cut back, despite the 1997 median growth rate being negative.22 In addition, the results of
the rst and third quartiles of long-term borrowing growth rates do not support the notion
that small rms reduced their borrowings after 1998.23
On the contrary, rms tended to reduce their long-term borrowings only after 2000. The
median growth rates of long-term borrowings are {0.99 percent in 2000 and {0.85 percent in
2001. The IQR range of long-term borrowing growth rates is large in 1999, primarily because
the third quartile is extremely large in 1999, due to the Special Credit Guarantee Program for
Financial Stability commencing in October 1998.24 In this program, government and credit
guarantee corporations provided credit guarantees of 20 trillion yen. Financial institutions
could then expand their loans without credit risk because they could oer loans to small
businesses with public credit guarantees. Similarly to Table 5.2, we also divide the sample
into three groups by the level of employees. When we focus on very small and small rms,
we see that the median long-term growth rates are 0.00 before 1998. In contrast, median
long-term borrowings growth for large and middle-sized rms is negative, apart from 1999.
This suggests that large and middle-sized rms tended to reduce their long-term borrowings
more in the late 1990s.
Table 5.4 provides the ratios of rms with decreasing short- or long-term borrowings as
compared with the previous year. If the credit crunch was serious after 1997, these ratios
should increase after 1998. However, our data is inconsistent with this hypothesis. The
22If we divide the sample into six industries, the results are broadly similar. Apart from the real estate
industry, the median growth rates of long-term borrowings after 1998 are not smaller than in 1997.
23Miwa (2008), using rm-level quarterly nancial data from the Hojin Kigyo Tokei Kiho (Corporate En-
terprise Quarterly Statistics), nds no clear evidence of a credit crunch. Similar to our ndings, they conclude
that the average level of short- and long-term borrowings did not decline during the period of the credit
crunch.
24See Uesugi et al. (2010) for details.
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Table 5.4: Fraction of Firms with Decreasing Short-term Borrowings, Long-term Borrowings,
or Trade Payables, 1996{2001
All Samples Very Small Firms
Short-term Long-term Trade Short-term Long-term Trade
Borrowings Borrowings Payables Borrowings Borrowings Payables
1996 0.376 0.482 0.405 0.377 0.460 0.375
1997 0.346 0.490 0.409 0.335 0.452 0.366
1998 0.356 0.460 0.496 0.333 0.436 0.431
1999 0.385 0.360 0.462 0.342 0.356 0.406
2000 0.329 0.505 0.390 0.304 0.477 0.353
2001 0.328 0.491 0.405 0.305 0.474 0.360
Small Firms Middle and Large Firms
Short-term Long-term Trade Short-term Long-term Trade
Borrowings Borrowings Payables Borrowings Borrowings Payables
1996 0.381 0.474 0.419 0.367 0.529 0.430
1997 0.350 0.482 0.425 0.354 0.548 0.445
1998 0.360 0.452 0.514 0.383 0.509 0.568
1999 0.394 0.333 0.483 0.442 0.409 0.524
2000 0.335 0.509 0.411 0.369 0.551 0.426
2001 0.336 0.495 0.431 0.365 0.518 0.455
Note: We dene the ratio of rms with decreasing short- (long-)term borrowings as [Number of rms whose
(Short- (Long-)term Borrowingst { Short-term Borrowingst 1) is negative]/[Total number of rms] in each
year. Similarly, the ratio of rms with decreasing trade payables is the [Number of rms whose (Trade
Payablest { Trade Payablest 1) is negative]/[Total number of rms].
ratio of rms with decreasing short-term borrowings to all rms in 1997 is 0.346. While this
ratio increased in 1998 to 0.356, the dierence is not great. If we compared the ratio of
decreasing short-term borrowings in 1998 with the ratio of decreasing short-term borrowings
in 1996, the ratio in 1998 is lower. This suggests that the period after 1998 is not special. For
comparison, we also provide, in Table 5.4, the ratio of rms with decreasing trade payables.
These are higher than the ratio with decreasing short-term borrowings, suggesting that more
rms decreased their trade payables than their short-term borrowings. The ratios of rms
with decreasing long-term borrowings are lowest in 1999 and second lowest in 1998: this also
implies that many rms did not decrease their long-term borrowings during the shock period.
In Table 5.4, we divide the subsample by rm size. For the group of very small and
small rms, the ratios for decreasing short- or long-term borrowings do not increase after
1998. However, the ratios for decreasing short-term borrowings for large and middle-sized
rms increased during the shock period in 1998 and 1999. On the other hand, the ratio of
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decreasing long-term borrowings is lowest in 1998 and 1999 for large and middle-sized rms.25
Consistency Between the Aggregate Data and the CRD
We have shown that short- and long-term borrowings of many small rms did not decrease
during the shock period. However, this nding is inconsistent with the trends in the aggregate
data shown in Figure 5.1. To explain the gap between CRD and aggregate data, in Table
5.5 we calculate the growth rate of total borrowings. We divide the sample into four groups
according to the total borrowings outstanding in the previous year: 0.1 billion yen or less,
between 0.1 and 0.5 billion yen, between 0.5 and 1 billion yen, and more than 1 billion yen.
We show the percentage of the total samples for each group and year in parentheses. This
ratio is higher for the group of smallest total borrowings outstanding, accounting for just
over half the sample. According to this Table, rms with large total outstanding borrowings
reduced their borrowings more after 1998. For example, the median growth rates of total
borrowings for the group of rms with borrowings in excess of 1 billion yen are {1.32 percent
in 1997, {1.66 percent in 1998, and {2.43 percent in 1999. In contrast, the rates for the group
of rms with borrowings of 0.1 billion yen or less are positive until 1999. The trends in the
rst and third quartiles are similar to those found at the median. Together, these suggest
that while many rms did not reduce their borrowings, even during the shock period, other
rms with larger total outstanding borrowings reduced their borrowings relatively more after
the shock period.
25We calculate the ratio of rms with decreasing short-term borrowings by industry. In 1998, these are 0.369
in construction and 0.366 in manufacturing, representing less than half the number of rms in the sample. In
addition, the ratios in other industries are between 0.32 and 0.35, suggesting that the number of rms with
decreasing short-term borrowings is not large. Apart from the real estate industry, the ratios for decreasing
long-term borrowings are also similar during the shock period.
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As small rms with large total outstanding borrowings reduced their borrowings from
banks, the average level of total borrowings in the data decreased after 1999. The average
amount of rm borrowings in our sample is 519.30 million yen in 1997, 519.93 million yen in
1998, 505.98 million yen in 1999, and 483.75 million yen in 2000. In Figure 5.4, we compare
the growth rate of aggregate bank loans for small businesses (the same data depicted in Figure
5.1) and the growth rate of average total borrowings in the CRD. In general, the accounting
period for most Japanese rms ends in March, so we plot the growth rate of total borrowings
in the CRD data for March and the aggregate data for December. As shown in Figure 5.4, the
trends in the growth rates in the CRD and aggregate bank loan data correspond. However,
as our data includes fewer larger-sized small businesses, the growth rate of average total
borrowings is higher than the growth rate for the aggregate data.
Interest Payments
If the supplies of bank loans shrunk and the credit crunch was serious after 1997, the interest
payments of small business must have increased in 1998.26 In our database, all quartiles of
interest rates decline.27 For example, the median interest rate across all samples in 1997 is
2.865 percent and 2.667 percent in 1998. As the prime rate did not change for 1997{1998,
these changes were not the result of monetary relaxation.28 Using other aggregated data, the
MOF's Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (one of the most reliable
aggregate rm databases in Japan), also shows that interest rates decreased in all industries
except real estate.29 Moreover, the interest rate trend in the MOF data is similar to the
trend in the CRD. These results again suggest that the supply of bank loans did not contract
in 1998.
26Domac and Ferri (1998) examine the real impact of nancial shocks in Korea and show that the interest
spread is larger for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
27We dene the interest rate as the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term
debt and discounted notes receivable.
28According to the Bank of Japan's Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly, the prime rate at the end
of March was 1.625 percent for the period 1996-1998, 1.500 percent in 1999 and 2001, and 1.375 percent in
2000.
29For example, the level of interest rates in the manufacturing sector is 3.0 percent in 1997, 2.7 percent in
1998, and 2.5 percent in 1999.
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Figure 5.4: Growth Rate of Average Total Borrowings in the CRD and Aggregate Bank
Loans for Small and Medium Enterprises

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
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Note: To facilitate comparison of the CRD and aggregate data, we use the aggregate bank loan data for small
and medium enterprises at the end of December. As the accounting period for many Japanese rms ends in
March, we plot the growth rate of total borrowings in the CRD data.
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan ;
Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
5.3 Econometric Analysis
5.3.1 Hypothesis
In Section 5.2, using simple summary statistics, we show that loans for many rms were not
cut back. These results generally imply that small businesses were not seriously harmed after
late 1997. Using econometric methods, Section 5.3 investigates whether the performance
of bank-dependent rms suered after 1997. As argued in previous studies (for example
Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008), the decline in output and the contraction in credit took place
simultaneously. This potential endogeneity problem is serious when considering whether the
banking shock has real eects on small business. To mitigate this problem, we use the DID
approach of Kroszner et al. (2007), Love et al. (2007), and Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) when
investigating the real eects of nancial shock. For example, using rm-level data, Love
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et al. (2007) investigate the eects of precrisis indicators of a rm's vulnerability to nancial
shocks. On this basis, they conclude that rms with more vulnerable nancial positions were
damaged relatively more by large nancial shocks.
Following previous studies (for example, Kang and Stulz, 2000), we use the ratio of
bank dependence in the preshock period as a proxy for a rm's vulnerability to the nancial
shock. Samples of bank-dependent rms in the preshock period are treatment groups. As
argued by Petersen and Rajan (1994), some small rms have long-term relationships with
banks, so they cannot switch banks easily. As a result, small rms that depend on banks
do not have access to sucient nancing when banks reduce their credit supplies. If bank
credit supplies fell in late 1997, only bank-dependent rms would then suer from the credit
contraction. For example, rms may halt plans for capital investment because of severe
nancial constraints. In addition, rms can draw on other nancial sources when there is a
decline in credit. One of these is the reduction of cash holdings. According to Opler et al.
(1999), rms use their cash holdings to nance activities and investment if other nancial
sources are not available. To alleviate the nancial shortage, rms may have reduced their
cash holdings to compensate for the credit decline. Moreover, if the decline in bank lending
caused output to fall, bank-dependent rms would suer large losses. As an alternative, if
the credit decline after 1998 did not matter for rm performance, the dierence between
bank-dependent and bank-independent rms would be statistically insignicant.
To check whether or not the credit supply of bank loans declined, we test several hypothe-
ses. First, if banks reduced their credit supplies, bank-dependent small rms would be unable
to increase their capital investment. As a result, tangible xed assets for bank-dependent
rms should decrease more during the shock period, and the ratio of tangible xed assets to
total assets should be statistically smaller for bank-dependent rms. Second, small rms can
employ various nancial sources, including internal nance.30 To compensate for the reduc-
tion of bank loans, bank-dependent small rms may use up their cash holdings. As a result,
the ratio of cash holdings should be statistically smaller for bank-dependent small businesses.
30Small businesses can also use trade credit. To compensate for the reduction in bank loans, they can
increase trade payables or cut back on trade receivables (Tsuruta, 2008).
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Finally, if the activities of bank-dependent small rms were limited because of the reduction
in bank loans, they would lose growth opportunities and their prots would then decrease.
We predict that the performance of bank-dependent small businesses is statistically lower if
nancial shocks have negative eects for the real sector.
5.3.2 Eects on Short- and Long-term Borrowings
Before estimating the eects on rm activities and performance, we investigate the eects of
the nancial shock on the short- and long-term borrowings of rms. We regress the following
equation.
Firm Borrowingsi;t = 1Bank Dependencei  Shock Period Dummyt
+ 2Bank Dependencei  Post Shock Period Dummyt
+ 3Y ear Dummyt + 4Xi;t + i + i;t (5.1)
where Xi;t is a matrix of control variables, i is the time-invariant eects of each sample,
and i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from 1996 to 2001. It is argued that the credit
crunch began after this period, as the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities
went bankrupt in November 1997. As this shock took place in late 1997, the negative eects of
the credit crunch appeared in rm nancial statements after 1998. However, some previous
studies have argued that the credit crunch problem corrected itself after 2000. Thus, the
period 1998{1999 is dened as the shock period. We dene the Shock Period Dummyt as one
if the year is 1998 or 1999; zero otherwise and the Post Shock Period Dummyt as one if the
year is 2000 or 2001; zero otherwise. The proxy for bank dependence is the ratio of the rm's
total borrowings to total assets in the preshock year 1996. Given that Bank Dependencei in
the preshock year is not a time-varying variable, the level of Bank Dependencei is subsumed
into the xed eect (i). Thus, we include only the interactions of Bank Dependencei and
the shock and postshock period dummies for each year.31
31Love et al. (2007) also include only interaction variables with the crisis dummy.
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We specify the ratios of short- and long-term borrowing to total assets and the growth
rates of short- and long-term borrowings as dependent variables. The control variables are
the natural log of (1+rm age) in year t-1; the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year t-1; the
annual growth rate of rm sales (Sales Growth); the ratio of a rm's earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets in year t-1 (EBITDA); and the ratio of
current-assets to total assets in year t-1 (Current-Assets Ratio). We also estimate the eect
of the crisis on rms' average interest rates. In the interest rate regression, we also include
rm leverage, the ratio of cash holdings to total assets (Cash Holdings Ratio), and the ratio
of short-term borrowings to total borrowings (Short{Long-term Borrowings Ratio) as control
variables. The denitions of each variable are given in the notes for each Table. As we do
not have all of the information that determines rm borrowings, the problem of unobserved
eects may be serious. Accordingly, because we employ panel data, we estimate a xed eects
model to eliminate any time-invariant unobserved eects.
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Table 5.6 provides the summary statistics. As shown, the wide distribution of bank de-
pendence indicates that our data includes sucient observations to compare bank-dependent
and bank-independent rms. Table 5.7 reports the median of each variable before and after
the shock period, divided by bank dependence. We dene \bank-dependent" groups as rms
with above-median bank dependence in the preshock year of 1997, and \bank-independent"
groups otherwise. These simple comparisons show that dierences in bank dependence are not
correlated with rm performance. For example, the operating incomes for both groups are ap-
proximately equal. The sales growth of bank-dependent rms is lower than bank-independent
rms, but the dierences are small. However, ordinary incomes for bank-dependent rms are
lower than for bank-independent rms because this measure of income is lower when interest
payments are higher. Therefore, the dierences in ordinary income between both groups of
rms do not reect dierences in rm performance. Table 5.7 also shows that the short- and
long-term borrowings ratio, the interest rate, the tangible xed assets ratio, and leverage
are higher in the bank-dependent group. Conversely, long-term borrowings growth, sales,
the current-asset ratio, net working capital, EBITDA, and cash holdings are lower in the
bank-dependent group.
Table 5.8 includes the estimated results of Equation (5.1). The coecients of bank de-
pendence*shock period dummy are statistically negative for the short-term borrowings ratio
and growth, suggesting that short-term borrowings for bank-dependent rms decreased dur-
ing the shock period (columns 1 and 3). However, we do not observe any negative eect
for long-term borrowings. The coecients of bank dependence*shock period dummy for the
long-term borrowings ratio and growth are statistically insignicant. This means that bank-
dependent rms did not reduce their long-term borrowings during the shock period (columns
2 and 4). Together, these ndings suggest that the negative eect of the nancial shock for
bank-dependent rms only holds for short-term borrowings. The eect of the current-assets
ratio is statistically negative for both the short- and long-term borrowings ratios, suggesting
that rms with more liquidity borrow less from banks. Similarly, sales growth has a nega-
tive eect on the short- and long-term borrowing ratios and growth, because rms that are
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Table 5.7: Median Firm Performance, Activities, and Characteristics
by Bank Dependence
Bank-dependent Bank-independent
Group Group
Before After Before After
Variable Shock Shock Shock Shock
Operating Income Ratio 0.0170 0.0133 0.0187 0.0108
Ordinary Income Ratio 0.0047 0.0037 0.0168 0.0090
Sales Growth 0.0000 {0.0399 0.0196 {0.0347
Short-term Borrowings Ratio 0.2026 0.1719 0.0893 0.0906
Long-term Borrowings Ratio 0.5216 0.5540 0.1913 0.2483
Short-term Borrowings Growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Long-term Borrowings Growth {0.0084 {0.0092 0.0000 0.0000
Interest Rate 1.4196 1.1198 1.2625 0.9503
Tangible Fixed Assets Ratio 0.3737 0.4060 0.2298 0.2522
Bank Dependence 0.7686 0.7664 0.3498 0.3518
Log (1+Firm Age) 3.0445 3.2581 3.2581 3.2581
Log (1+Sales) 11.9447 11.8776 12.5532 12.5062
Current-Assets Ratio 0.5040 0.4733 0.6723 0.6442
Net Working Capital {0.0917 {0.0786 {0.0587 {0.0399
EBITDA 0.0366 0.0354 0.0477 0.0344
Short{Long-term Borrowings Ratio 0.2803 0.2412 0.2956 0.2695
Leverage 0.9606 0.9576 0.7710 0.7743
Cash Holdings 0.1072 0.0982 0.1673 0.1613
Note: We dene the \bank-dependent" group as rms with above-median bank dependence in the preshock
year 1997; otherwise, \bank-independent" group. \Before Shock" years are 1996 and 1997, and \After Shock"
years are 1998-2001. The denitions of each variable are given in the note of Table 5.6.
growing and rms with more cash ow have more internal cash and therefore need fewer
bank loans. The coecients of EBITDA for the growth rate are negative in columns 1 and
2. However, the coecients of EBITDA for the growth rate are positive in columns 3 and 4,
because protable rms may have better growth opportunities and require additional funds
for this purpose.
Column 5 in Table 5.8 shows the eect of the shock on rm interest rates. The results
of the year dummies are that all coecients are negative and statistically signicant at the
1 percent level. The coecient for the interactive variable of bank dependence and shock
period dummy is positive and statistically signicant, suggesting that bank-dependent rms
pay higher interest costs during the shock period. However, the magnitude of the coecient
is not large. For example, while rms with 100 percent bank dependence pay 0.1141 percent
more in terms of interest rates during the shock period, average interest rates decreased by
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Table 5.8: Bank Dependence, Firm Borrowings, and Interest Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Interest
Ratio Ratio Growth Growth Rate
Bank Dependence {0.0273 {0.0018 {0.0038 0.0017 0.1141
*Shock Period (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0082)
Bank Dependence {0.0444 {0.0114 0.0055 {0.0120 0.0942
*Postshock Period (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0090)
Log(1+Firm Age) 0.0003 0.0132 {0.0023 {0.0043 {0.0028
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0059)
Log (1+Sales) {0.0273 {0.0345 {0.0050 {0.0108 0.1846
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0045)
Sales Growth {0.0220 {0.0377 {0.0177 {0.0067 0.0641
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0056)
EBITDA {0.1216 {0.1668 0.0045 0.0378
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0024)
Current-Assets Ratio {0.0052 {0.1028 {0.0479 0.1266
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0029)
Short{Long-term -0.1507
Borrowings Ratio (0.0084)
Leverage 0.0101
(0.0081)
Cash Holdings Ratio {0.5141
(0.0208)
Year Dummy (1997) 0.0023 0.0082 0.0009 {0.0048 {0.3477
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0049)
Year Dummy (1998) 0.0197 0.0233 {0.0038 {0.0020 {0.5941
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0072)
Year Dummy (1999) 0.0086 0.0597 {0.0128 0.0307 {0.5986
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0073)
Year Dummy (2000) 0.0211 0.0666 {0.0090 {0.0118 {0.5334
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0076)
Year Dummy (2001) 0.0240 0.0663 {0.0112 {0.0142 {0.7416
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0078)
Observations 691,176 691,722 691,186 691,458 685,096
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04
Note: This Table presents estimates of xed eects regressions with Short-term Borrowing Ratio (Column 1), Long-
term Borrowing Ratio (Column 2), Short-term Borrowing Growth (Column 3), Long-term Borrowing Growth (Column
4), and Interest Rate (Column 5) as dependent variables. Short- (Long-)term Borrowing Ratio is the ratio of a rm's
short- (long-)term borrowings to total assets in year t. Short- (Long-)term Borrowing Growth is the annual growth rate
of a rm's short- (long-)term borrowings [(short- (long-)term borrowingst { short- (long-)term borrowingst 1)/total
assetst 1]. Interest rate is the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and
discounted notes receivable for each year in year t. Firm Age is the natural log of rm age in year t-1. Log(1+Sales)
is the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year t-1. Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of a rm's sales [(salest {
salest 1)/salest 1]. EBITDA is the ratio of a rm's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to
total assets in year t-1. Current-Assets Ratio is the ratio of a rm's current assets to total assets in year t-1. Short{
Long-term Borrowings Ratio is the ratio of a rm's short-term borrowings to total borrowings in year t-1. Leverage is
the ratio of a rm's book value of total debts to book value of total assets in year t-1. Cash Holdings Ratio is the ratio
of a rm's cash holdings to total assets in year t-1. Shock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1998
or 1999; zero otherwise. Postshock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2000 or 2001; zero otherwise.
Year Dummy(t) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the year is t; zero otherwise. The reference year is 1996.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level; 
signicant at the 1 percent level.
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0.5941 percent in 1998. In sum, interest rates for both bank-dependent and independent
rms decreased during the shock period. The eect on the short{long-term borrowings ratio
is negative. In general, the interest rate for short-term loans is relatively lower, so rms with
debt of a shorter maturity pay less interest. Firms with a higher cash holdings ratio also pay
less interest, as these rms are more creditworthy with more collateral assets. The eect of
sales growth is positive, suggesting that rms facing a decrease in sales may delay paying
interest, because they have inadequate income.32
5.3.3 Eects on Firm Activity
Estimation Strategy
We investigate whether rm activities were limited during the shock period. To check this
hypothesis, we estimate the following regression.
Firm Activityi;t = 1Bank Dependencei  Shock Period Dummyt
+ 2Bank Dependencei  Post Shock Period Dummyt
+ 3Y ear Dummyt + 4Yi;t + i + i;t (5.2)
where Yi;t is a matrix of control variables, i is the time-invariant eects of each sam-
ple, and i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from 1996 to 2001. The denitions of
Bank Dependencei, Shock Period Dummyt, and the Post Shock Period Dummyt are iden-
tical to those described in Section 5.3.2. If banks reduce their credit supplies and rms
encounter severe nancial constraints, bank-dependent rms face relatively more severe con-
straints on their activities because of the shock. We predict that 1 will be statistically
negative if banks reduce their credit supplies. We employ two proxies of rm activity: the
ratios of tangible xed assets and cash holdings to total assets.
32Our data does not include contractual interest rates, so the average interest rate is lower if the rm does
not pay interest.
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Tangible Fixed Assets
Table 5.9 shows the result using the tangible xed assets ratio (tangible xed assetst/total
assetst) as the dependent variable. We predict that 1 is negative if tangible xed assets
for bank-dependent rms are lower during the shock period. We also include several control
variables: leverage, sales growth, the natural logarithm of sales, the natural logarithm of rm
age, and EBITDA normalized by total assets in year t-1. In general, more highly leveraged
rms can draw on larger amounts of external funds and invest more in tangible xed assets.
Therefore, we predict that the eects of leverage are positive. Firms with higher sales growth
and EBITDA earn more cash ow and have more current assets. As a result, the ratio of
tangible xed assets to total assets is lower. We predict that the eects of sales growth
and EBITDA are negative. We again estimate using a xed eects model to eliminate any
time-invariant unobserved eects.
In column 1 of Table 5.9, we estimate Equation (2) using the full sample. The eects
of the interactions of bank dependence and the shock period dummy are negative and sta-
tistically signicant, suggesting that bank-dependent rms reduce their tangible xed assets
more during the shock period. Moreover, the negative eects of these interactions are sta-
tistically signicant in the postshock period. The results in column 1 suggest, then, that
bank-dependent rms faced constraints on their activities during the shock period. We also
estimate heterogeneous eects by rm size. In columns 2-4 of Table 5.9, we divide the sample
into three groups by the level of employees in 1997, comprising very small, small, and middle-
sized and large rms. According to the results in this table, the impact of bank dependence is
heterogeneous with respect to rm size. In column 2, we specify the subsample of very small
rms. As shown, the interaction between bank dependence and the shock period dummy
has a negative eect on the tangible xed assets ratio. These imply that bank-dependent
rms reduced their tangible xed assets more during the shock period. When we focus on
the estimated results for the sample of small, middle and large rms, we see that negative
eects of the interaction of bank dependence and the shock period dummy are also found.
These negative eects are statistically signicant in the postshock period. In addition, the
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Table 5.9: Bank Dependence and Tangible Fixed Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Tangible Fixed Asset Ratio
Firm Size All Very Small Small Middle and Large
Bank Dependence {0.0061 {0.0051 {0.0079 {0.0074
*Shock Period (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Bank Dependence {0.0061 {0.0063 {0.0071 {0.0085
*Postshock Period (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Log(1+Firm Age) {0.0004 {0.0009 {0.0007 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Log (1+Sales) {0.0152 {0.0106 {0.0224 {0.0177
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Leverage 0.0160 0.0117 0.0172 0.0397
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0017)
Sales Growth {0.0139 {0.0115 {0.0141 {0.0209
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008)
EBITDA {0.0309 {0.0276 {0.0309 {0.0467
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0029)
Year Dummy (1997) 0.0050 0.0057 0.0046 0.0045
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Year Dummy (1998) 0.0160 0.0169 0.0161 0.0151
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Year Dummy (1999) 0.0161 0.0176 0.0150 0.0157
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Year Dummy (2000) 0.0188 0.0218 0.0181 0.0174
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Year Dummy (2001) 0.0222 0.0258 0.0216 0.0201
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Observations 695,265 232,024 260,502 197,417
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Note: This Table presents estimates of xed eects regressions with Tangible Fixed Asset Ratio as the dependent
variable. Tangible Fixed Assets Ratio is the ratio of a rm's tangible xed assets (the sum of the book value of
buildings and land) to total assets in year t. Bank Dependence is the ratio of a rm's total loans to total assets in
1996. Firm Age is the natural log of rm age in year t-1. Log(1+Sales) is the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year
t-1. Leverage is the ratio of a rm's book value of total debts to book value of total assets in year t-1. Sales Growth is
the annual growth rate of a rm's sales [(salest { salest 1)/salest 1]. EBITDA is the ratio of a rm's earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets in year t-1. Shock Period is a dummy variable equal to
one if the year is 1998 or 1999; zero otherwise. Postshock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2000 or
2001; zero otherwise. Year Dummy(t) is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is t; zero otherwise. The reference
year is 1996. Very Small Firm is dened as a rm with 5 or fewer workers in 1997. Small Firm is dened as a rm with
6{20 workers in 1997. Middle and Large Firms are dened as rms with 21 or more workers in 1997. As the number
of workers in some rms is unavailable, these observations are removed from the sample. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level;  signicant at the 1 percent
level.
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magnitudes of the coecients of the interaction variables with the shock-period dummy are
smaller for the subsample of very small rms. This indicates that rms with greater bank
dependence reduced their tangible xed assets more, both during and after the shock pe-
riod, and that these negative impacts are less if the rm size is very small. The results for
the control variables are consistent with our hypotheses. As predicted, the eects of sales
growth and EBITDA on the tangible xed assets ratio are statistically negative, while those
of leverage are positive.
Cash Holdings
In Table 5.10, we specify the cash holding ratio (cash holdingst/total assetst) as the dependent
variable. Following Opler et al. (1999), we also include EBITDA, net working capital (both
normalized by total assets), and leverage. The cost of additional funds for more highly
leveraged rms is greater, and they use more internal cash. We predict that the eect of
leverage is negative for the cash-holding ratio. EBITDA is a proxy of cash ow, which has a
positive eect on the cash-holding ratio. The ratio of net working capital to total assets is a
proxy for liquid asset substitutes. Firms with higher liquid assets can use these assets in the
presence of a nancial shortage, so they then need fewer cash holdings. We predict that net
working capital has negative eects for the cash-holding ratio. We control for the eects of
the characteristics of rm size and age.
As shown in Table 5.10, the eects of the interactive variables for bank dependence and
the shock period dummies are negative and statistically signicant if we include the full
sample (column 1). We nd similar results if the sample is limited to small rms or small
businesses of middle and large sizes (columns 3 and 4). However, the interactive variables of
the shock period dummy and bank dependence are statistically insignicant for very small
rms (column 2). These results imply that cash holdings for bank-dependent rms, excluding
very small rms, are lower during the shock period. The estimated results for the control
variables are consistent with our predictions. The coecients for leverage and net working
capital are statistically negative while those for EBITDA are statistically positive.
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Table 5.10: Bank Dependence and Cash Holding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Cash Holding Ratio
Firm Size All Very Small Small Middle and Large
Bank Dependence {0.0027 {0.0004 {0.0023 {0.0118
*Shock Period (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Bank Dependence {0.0076 {0.0025 {0.0070 {0.0217
*Postshock Period (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Log(1+Firm Age) 0.0005 0.0019 {0.0000 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Log (1+Sales) 0.0084 0.0060 0.0143 0.0072
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Leverage {0.0252 {0.0162 {0.0314 {0.0509
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0016)
EBITDA 0.0317 0.0278 0.0350 0.0373
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0024)
Net Working Capital {0.0195 {0.0125 {0.0230 {0.0374
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Year Dummy (1997) {0.0055 {0.0058 {0.0049 {0.0061
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Year Dummy (1998) {0.0050 {0.0068 {0.0037 {0.0019
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Year Dummy (1999) {0.0021 {0.0042 {0.0003 0.0010
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Year Dummy (2000) {0.0048 {0.0101 {0.0044 0.0040
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Year Dummy (2001) {0.0058 {0.0114 {0.0058 0.0038
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 695,414 232,752 260,014 197,326
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: This Table presents estimates of xed eects regressions with Cash Holding Ratio as the dependent variable.
Cash Holdings Ratio is the ratio of a rm's cash holdings [(cash holdingst)/total assetst]. Bank Dependence is the
ratio of a rm's total loans to total assets in 1996. Log(1+Firm Age) is the natural log of (1+rm age) in year t.
Log(1+Sales) is the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year t. Leverage is the ratio of a rm's book value of total debts to
book value of total assets in year t-1. Net Working Capital is the ratio of a rm's net working capital (current assets
minus current liabilities minus cash) to total assets in year t-1. EBITDA is the ratio of a rm's earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets in year t-1. Year Dummy(t) is a dummy variable equal to one if
the year is t; zero otherwise. The reference year is 1996. Shock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year
is 1998 or 1999; zero otherwise. Postshock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2000 or 2001; zero
otherwise. Very Small Firm is dened as a rm with 5 or fewer workers in 1997. Small Firm is dened as a rm with
6{20 workers in 1997. Middle and Large Firms are dened as rms with 21 or more workers in 1997. As the number
of workers in some rms is unavailable, these observations are removed from the sample. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level;  signicant at the 1 percent
level.
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Implications of the Observations
According to the econometric analysis of rm activities, our results indicate that small busi-
nesses face constraints on their activities during the shock period, with bank-dependent rms
reducing their level of short-term borrowings and tangible xed assets relatively more dur-
ing the nancial shock period. Importantly, if the constraints arising from nancial shock
are severe for borrowers, they may attempt to use other sources of nance, such as cash
holdings. Our results show that bank-dependent (especially larger-sized) small businesses
reduced their cash holdings during the nancial shock period. Nevertheless, it is possible to
interpret these results in several ways. For example, many rms in the 1990s struggled with
the burden of debt from overinvestment during the bubble economy of the late 1980s. In
these circumstances, bank-dependent rms may well have used internal cash to pay o bank
loans to lessen their inherited debt burden. Likewise, small businesses may have needed to
engage in asset restructuring, so they reduced their level of tangible xed assets during the
shock period. Unfortunately, our results do not permit us to identify whether bank-dependent
rms needed to reduce their short-term borrowings, tangible xed assets, or cash holdings.
If they needed to reduce their assets and debts, the performance of bank-dependent rms
would be enhanced during the shock period. Conversely, if bank-dependent rms are forced
to reduce their debt and assets below the optimal level, their performance worsens during
the shock period. Therefore, in the next section, we rerun our regressions using proxies for
rm performance.
5.3.4 Eects on Firm Performance
Estimation Strategy
In this section, we investigate whether the performance of bank-dependent rms is lower
during the shock period. We employ the following regression.
Firm Performancei;t = 1Bank Dependencei  Shock Period Dummyt
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+ 2Bank Dependencei  Post Shock Period Dummyt
+ 3Y ear Dummyt + 4Zi;t + i + i;t (5.3)
where Zi;t is a matrix of control variables, i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from
1996 to 2001, and i are the unobserved time-invariant eects for rm i. If banks reduced
their credit supplies and rms encountered severe constraints, bank-dependent rms expe-
rienced lower performance because of the shock. Therefore, we predict that 1 is statisti-
cally negative if banks reduce their credit supplies. The denitions of Bank Dependencei,
Shock Period Dummyt, and the Post Shock Period Dummyt are identical to the variables
specied in Equations (5.1) and (5.2).
Our sample is comprised of data on unlisted small businesses, so we cannot obtain stock
price data. Consequently, performance data using stock returns or Tobin's q are unavailable.33
Instead, we use accounting prot as a proxy for rm performance. We employ two proxies
for rm performance: the ratio of operating income to total assets and the ratio of ordinary
income to total assets. Ordinary income includes net nancial income and expenses, so this
measure of income is naturally lower when interest payments are large. We also use the
growth rate of annual sales as a proxy for rm performance. From a textbook viewpoint,
the purpose of rms is to maximize prots, so an increase in sales is not always consistent
with prot maximization. However, many previous studies (for example Kroszner et al.,
2007) use real growth in total sales as a proxy for rm performance. To conrm robustness,
we employ the sales growth rate normalized by total sales for the previous year ([salest {
salest 1]/salest 1) as a proxy for rm performance. We also specify rm scale, rm age,
leverage, and the current assets to total assets ratio in year t-1 as control variables. We
include rm scale and rm age to control for rm characteristics, and we use leverage as a
proxy for capital structure. We use the ratio of current assets to total assets as our proxy for
liquidity.
As with the estimation for rm activity and borrowing, we lack all of the information that
33For example, Kang and Stulz (2000) and Ongena et al. (2003) specify stock returns as a proxy for rm
performance as they concern listed rms.
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Table 5.11: Ratio of Truncated Firms in 1998 and 2000
by Level of Operating Income Ratio and Bank Dependence
Panel A: The Ratio of Truncated Firms in 1998
Quantiles of Operating Income
Level of Ratio in Preshock Year 1997
Bank Dependence Very Low Low High Very High Total
0.25 or less 8.52 6.45 5.64 6.70 6.43
Over 0.25 to 0.5 7.43 5.32 5.74 5.33 5.65
Over 0.50 to 0.75 7.94 5.91 5.54 5.62 5.98
Over 0.75 to 1.00 8.57 6.58 6.05 6.53 6.54
Over 1.00 13.80 9.10 8.71 9.36 8.71
Total 8.86 6.07 5.87 6.33 6.30
Panel B: The Ratio of Truncated Firms in 2000
Quantiles of Operating Income
Level of Ratio in Preshock Year 1997
Bank Dependence Very Low Low High Very High Total
0.25 or less 23.53 19.66 18.65 19.48 19.96
Over 0.25 to 0.5 20.43 16.66 16.77 16.64 17.31
Over 0.50 to 0.75 22.42 17.77 17.42 16.69 18.29
Over 0.75 to 1.00 23.08 19.32 18.01 18.41 19.38
Over 1.00 32.39 25.47 23.68 23.92 25.49
Total 23.66 18.33 17.83 18.32 19.11
Note: We dene the ratio of truncated rms in year t as 1 { (Number of Existing Firms in year t/Number of
Firms in 1997). Ratios are expressed as percentages.
aects the determinants of rm performance, some of which are important determinants, such
as, the owner's characteristics and abilities. As owner abilities can be correlated with bank
dependence, we need to counter the potential problem of omitted variables. As we employ
panel data, we can estimate rm performance using a xed-eects model to eliminate the
time-invariant unobserved eects.
Truncated Samples
Before we estimate the econometric models, we need to check what types of rms are trun-
cated during and after the shock period. This is because if poorly performing and highly
bank-dependent rms are truncated before the shock period, the results of the DID estima-
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tion using the simple xed eects model are biased. Table 5.11 shows the ratio of truncated
rms in 1998 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B).34 Panel A shows that the ratio of truncated
rms in the total sample is 6.30 percent in 1998, suggesting that the problem of truncated
samples is not serious. However, the ratio of truncated rms in rm groups with very low
operating income and with measures of bank dependence exceeding 1.00 is 13.80 percent.
This means that rms with very low operating income and high levels of bank dependence
are more likely to be truncated, and this may cause biased results. These rms are also
nancially and economically distressed, so banks are also more likely to cease transactions
with them. Excluding the groups of rms with measures of bank dependence over 1.00, rms
with \Between 0.75 and 1.00" and \0.25 or less" bank dependence are more truncated in
the groups of rms with very low operating income. This implies that, excluding nancially
distressed rms, rms with higher bank dependence and lower operating income are not more
truncated and the problem of truncated samples is not so serious. When we focus on other
groups for operating income, we get similar observations.
As shown in Panel B, poorly performing and highly bank-dependent rms are not more
truncated after excluding nancially distressed rms. However, 19.11 percent of rms are
truncated in 2000, which suggests that more rms are truncated after the nancial shock.
As we see from the observations in Table 5.11, the attrition bias may then be serious in
estimating Equation (5.3). Therefore, we estimate Equation (5.3) using the xed eects
model and employ the Heckman selection model as a means of mitigating the attrition bias.
Fixed-Eects Model
Table 5.12 provides the results obtained using the full sample. In column 1, the proxy for
rm performance is the ratio of operating income to total assets. The coecient for bank
dependence*shock period is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. The
results are similar if we specify ordinary income to total assets ratio as the proxy for rm
performance and sales growth, suggesting that bank-dependent rms increased their sales
34We dene the ratio of truncated rms in year t as 1 { (number of existing rms in year t/number of rms
in 1997).
164
Table 5.12: Bank Dependence and Firm Performance (All Firms)
Dependent Variable Operating Income Ordinary Income Sales Growth
Ratio Ratio
Bank Dependence 0.0126 0.0158 0.0207
*Shock Period (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0020)
Bank Dependence 0.0099 0.0164 0.0194
*Postshock Period (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0022)
Log(1+Firm Age) {0.0022 {0.0025 {0.0177
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0014)
Log (1+Sales) 0.0483 0.0441 0.3327
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010)
Leverage 0.1176 0.1230 0.1971
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0021)
Current-Assets Ratio {0.0403 {0.0355 {0.1877
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0043)
Year Dummy (1997) {0.0004 0.0006 {0.0115
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Year Dummy (1998) {0.0203 {0.0203 {0.0861
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Year Dummy (1999) {0.0295 {0.0294 {0.0837
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Year Dummy (2000) {0.0214 {0.0227 {0.0247
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0018)
Year Dummy (2001) {0.0175 {0.0197 {0.0231
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0019)
Observations 698,632 697,544 695,437
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.2
Note: This Table presents estimates of xed eects regressions with Operating Income Ratio, Ordinary Income Ratio,
and Sales Growth as dependent variables. Operating Income Ratio is the ratio of a rm's operating income to total
assets in year t. Ordinary Income Ratio is the ratio of a rm's ordinary income to total assets in year t. Sales Growth
is the annual growth rate of a rm's sales [(salest { salest 1)/salest 1]. Bank Dependence is the ratio of a rm's total
loans to total assets in 1996. Firm Age is the natural log of rm age in year t-1. Log(1+Sales) is the natural log of
(1+rm sales) in year t-1. Leverage is the ratio of a rm's book value of total debts to book value of total assets in year
t-1. Current-Assets Ratio is the ratio of a rm's current assets to total assets in year t-1. Year Dummy(t) is a dummy
variable equal to one if the year is t; zero otherwise. Shock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1998
or 1999; zero otherwise. Postshock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2000 or 2001; zero otherwise.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent level; 
signicant at the 1 percent level.
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and enjoyed higher incomes during the shock period. In addition, the performance of bank-
dependent rms is higher after the shock period. The coecients of bank dependence*
postshock period dummy are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for
all proxies of rm performance. These results imply that bank-dependent rms are better
performing after the shock period.
The coecients of ln(1+rm age) are negative, suggesting that older rms performed
relatively worse than younger rms. The eects of ln(1+sales) are positive, evidencing that
larger rms performed better than smaller rms. Leverage has a positive eect on rm per-
formance. From a textbook viewpoint, rm performance and capital structure are irrelevant,
so this observation of a positive relationship remains a puzzle. However, some studies suggest
that capital structure could have either positive or negative eects on rm performance.35
The eects of current assets are negative, suggesting that rms with lower current assets
performed better. Some studies, for example Kang and Stulz (2000), show that rms with
higher liquidity have better performance because they do not face liquidity constraints. Our
results suggest that the positive relationship between rm performance and liquidity is not
supported for small businesses. The estimated coecients for the year dummies are negative
after 1998, and this ts with trends in the business cycle at the time.
In Table 5.13, we rerun the specication for the subsample of very small, small, and rms
of middle and large sizes. After controlling for rm characteristics, leverage, current assets,
and time-invariant rm heterogeneity, the interactions of bank dependence with the shock
period dummy are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for the operating
income ratio (columns 1-3). In addition, the positive relationship between bank dependence
and rm performance is statistically signicant if we change the performance proxy to the
ordinary income ratio (columns 4-6) or sales growth (columns 7-9). This also suggests that
bank-dependent rms did not experience lower performance during the credit crunch period.
On the contrary, bank-dependent rms performed better after the nancial shock. When we
focus on the magnitude of the interaction variables with the shock period dummy, we see
that the coecients for operating and ordinary income ratios are larger for rms of middle
35See Myers (2001) for a discussion of the impact of capital structure.
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Table 5.13: Bank Dependence and Firm Performance, Divided by Firm Size
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Operating Income Ratio
Samples Very Small Small Middle and Large
Bank Dependence 0.0153 0.0147 0.0171
*Shock Period (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Bank Dependence 0.0112 0.0127 0.0202
*Post-shock Period (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Number of Observations 234,340 261,197 197,710
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.06
(4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Ordinary Income Ratio
Samples Very Small Small Middle and Large
Bank Dependence 0.0184 0.0178 0.0202
*Shock Period (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Bank Dependence 0.0174 0.0199 0.0262
*Post-shock Period (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Number of Observations 233,728 260,833 197,608
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10 0.06
(7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable Sales Growth
Samples Very Small Small Middle and Large
Bank Dependence 0.0189 0.0227 0.0183
*Shock Period (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Bank Dependence 0.0198 0.0300 0.0036
*Post-shock Period (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0039)
Number of Observations 232,101 260,561 197,436
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.23 0.18
Note: This Table presents estimates of xed eects regressions with Operating Income Ratio, Ordinary Income Ratio,
and Sales Growth as dependent variables. Operating Income Ratio is the ratio of a rm's operating income to total
assets in year t. Ordinary Income Ratio is the ratio of a rm's ordinary income to total assets in year t. Sales Growth
is the annual growth rate of a rm's sales [(salest { salest 1))/total assetst 1]. Bank Dependence is the ratio of a
rm's total loans to total assets in 1996. Shock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1998 or 1999;
zero otherwise. Postshock Period is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2000 or 2001; zero otherwise. Similar
to the regression in Table 5.12, all regressions include Firm Age, Log(1+Sales), Leverage, Current-Assets Ratio, and
Year Dummy(t). We do not present the estimated coecients of these variables. Very Small Firm is a rm with 5 or
fewer workers in 1997. Small Firm is a rm with 6{20 workers in 1997. Middle and Large Firms are rms with 21 or
more workers in 1997. As the number of workers in some rms is unavailable, these observations are removed from the
sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant at the 5 percent
level;  signicant at the 1 percent level.
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and large sizes, which implies that these rms enjoyed better performance than did smaller
rms.
Sample-Selection Model
Our small business data comprises the client data of banks, so we have to consider attrition
bias. The CRD data includes only rms with transactions with banks. As we showed, poorly
performing rms are more likely to drop from the CRD data, because they are more likely
to default and banks will not oer them further credit. Furthermore, as protable rms have
sucient internal cash, they do not need to borrow money and thus are also more likely to
be dropped from the database.36 To correct for the attrition bias, we estimate the Heckman
selection model following Wooldridge (2010).
FirmPerformancei;t = 1BankDependencei  ShockPeriodDummyt
+ 2BankDependencei  PostShockPeriodDummyt
+ 3Y earDummyt +Zi;t4 +i;t (5.4)
si;t = 1[!i;t + vi;t] (5.5)
where Zi;t is a matrix of control variables and i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from
1996 to 2000. si;t is the selection indicator for each year t, where si;t = 1 if the dependent and
independent variables in t are observed. To remove the unobserved time-invariant individual
eects, we rst dierence all variables in Equation (5.4). We assume that Cov(i;t; vi;t) = ,
where  is not equal to zero. wi;t includes all undierenced independent variables in t-1, the
level of average interest rates, the short{long-term borrowings ratio, and seven industry
dummies.37
36Love et al. (2007) mitigate the attrition bias using balanced panel data. If we estimate using balanced
panel data, we obtain similar results.
37Ongena and Smith (2001) estimate the duration of banking relationships with rms. They show that
sales, age, protability, Tobin's Q, and leverage aect the duration of bank{rm relationships. To estimate
the selection variable, we include these variables, except for Tobin's q as it is unavailable. The seven industries
are construction, transportation and communication, wholesale trade, retail trade, restaurant, real estate, and
service. We use a manufacturing industry as a benchmark.
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Column 1 in Table 5.14 provides the estimates of Equation (5.5). Firm age and sales have
positive eects on the selection indicator, while leverage, the current-assets ratio, interest
rates, and the short{long-term borrowings ratio have negative eects. This means that highly
leveraged rms are more likely to be dropped from the database, which suggests that banks
cease transactions with these rms because they are more likely to be nancially distressed.
Firms with large current assets also have enough internal cash, so credit demand for these
rms is considered to be low. As a result, these rms are more likely to be truncated. Firms
with higher interest rates are more likely to be dropped, because they have an incentive to pay
o bank loans to save on the high interest costs. The short{long-term borrowings ratio is the
proxy for maturity. Firms with a higher short-term borrowing ratio have a shorter maturity
period, and so are more likely to pay o the loans. Thus, we suggest that the results of the
selection model are reasonable. After controlling for these variables, the interaction beteween
bank dependence and the shock period dummy is positive for the selection indicator. This
suggests that bank-dependent rms are less truncated during the shock period. The estimated
 is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, so the assumption of a selection model is
also supported.
Columns 2{4 in Table 5.14 provide the results of Equation (5.4). The denition of the
dependent variables in each column is the same as in Table 5.12. The coecients for bank
dependence*shock period are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, irre-
spective of the specication of the dependent variable. On the other hand, the coecients for
bank dependence*postshock period are statistically insignicant after correcting for attrition
bias, if we specify the operating income ratio as the proxy of rm performance. According to
these results, bank-dependent rms are better performing, even in the banking shock period
and after correcting for the attrition bias.
Discussion
We interpret these estimation results as meaning that highly bank-dependent rms enjoyed
better performance during the shock period and that the negative eects of the nancial shock
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Table 5.14: Bank Dependence and Firm Performance
(Heckman Selection Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Selection Operating Ordinary Sales
Income Income Growth
Bank Dependence 0.0631 0.0068 0.0083 0.0292
*Shock Period (0.0057) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0033)
Bank Dependence 0.0926 0.0009 0.0046 0.0371
*Postshock Period (0.0058) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0045)
Log(1+Firm Age) 0.0835 0.0009 0.0006 {0.0027
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0020)
Log(1+Sales) 0.0325 0.0582 0.0543 0.6599
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0151)
Leverage {0.0821 0.2615 0.2940 0.2997
(0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0064)
Current-Assets Ratio {0.0132 {0.0745 {0.0760 {0.2671
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0091)
Interest Rate {0.0712
(0.0030)
Short{Long-term {0.0150
Borrowings Ratio (0.0032)
Year Dummy (1997) 0.0125 0.0049 0.0066 {0.0222
(0.0044) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0014)
Year Dummy (1998) {0.0359 {0.0081 {0.0063 {0.0854
(0.0044) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Year Dummy (1999) {0.0662 {0.0152 {0.0134 {0.0605
(0.0044) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Year Dummy (2000) {0.1534 {0.0050 {0.0041 {0.0030
(0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Estimated  {0.02 {0.01 0.16
Observations 582,468 582,468 581,699 579,669
Log Likelihood 279,994.2 287,962.0 287,962.0
Note: This table presents estimates of Heckman selection regressions with Operating Income Ratio, Ordinary
Income Ratio, and Sales Growth as the dependent variables. All variables in columns (2), (3), and (4) are
rst dierences. Column (1) shows the results of the selection equation for the estimation in column (2).
Short{Long-term Borrowings Ratio is the ratio of a rm's short-term borrowings to total borrowings in year
t-1. Interest rate is the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and
discounted notes receivable for each year in year t-1. Other denitions of each variable are given in the note
of Table 5.12. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  signicant at the 10 percent level;  signicant
at the 5 percent level;  signicant at the 1 percent level.
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on small business were insignicant. However, if the dierences in rm performance between
bank-dependent and bank-independent rms in the preshock period are large, the treatment
and control groups in our analysis cannot be identical. This will cause biased results, even if
we correct for attrition bias. For example, as potentially good rms can borrow more, they
perform better than rms that cannot borrow much. Therefore, the dierence in performance
between highly bank-dependent and bank-independent rms can be even larger in a recession
than in a boom. However, these better performing rms in the shock period are not better
performing in the preshock period, as shown in Table 5.7. Given the median operating income
of bank-dependent and bank-independent rms is 0.0170 and 0.0187 in the preshock year of
1997, suggesting that the dierences in rm performance are small.
Another possibility is the \zombie lending" hypothesis.38 Under this hypothesis, highly
bank-dependent rms can borrow more in the crisis period, possibly because banks do not
let them go bankrupt. This may result in the better performance of bank-dependent rms
in the shock period. As Table 5.11 shows, however, highly bank-dependent rms with low
operating income are more likely to be truncated. These rms are economically and nancially
distressed, so banks are more likely to cease transactions with risky and indebted rms.
Thus, our database does not support the presence of zombie lending for Japanese small
businesses.39 From these observations, highly bank-dependent and bank-independent rms
should be identical in every aspect of rm performance in the preshock period.
5.4 Conclusion
We investigated whether or not the Japanese nancial shocks of the late 1990s had negative
eects on small and bank-dependent businesses using rm-level data. We report three broad
ndings. (i) Short and long-term loans were not cut back for the typical small business,
despite the nancial DI worsening during the shock period. (ii) The DID estimations indicate
that bank-dependent rms saw relative declines in short term borrowing ratio, proportion of
tangible xed assets, and cash holdings to assets ratio (and an increase in interest rate). These
38See Caballero et al. (2008) for detailed information about zombie lending.
39Using a CRD sample, Sakai et al. (2010) also reject the zombie lending hypothesis.
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ndings imply that the bank dependent establishments faced some worsening of their external
credit situation, and had to rely more on internal resources. (iii) But, most importantly, we do
not nd any worsening of rm performance (measured as rm sales growth or protability) for
bank-dependent (or small bankdependent) rms; on the contrary, we nd evidence that they
performed better relative to other rms. Thus, we conclude the credit crunch of 1998-2001
did not impose severe nancial constraints on most rms.
172
Chapter 6
Bank Loan Availability and Trade
Credit for Small Businesses during
the Financial Crisis
This study was published in Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 55(1) (Tsuruta, 2015a).
The nal form is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2014.09.004. The author would like to thank
the editor (Narcs Boubakri) and three anonymous referees for their many useful comments and suggestions.
This research is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science.
173
Abstract
Using small business data, we investigate the relationship between bank loan availability and
trade credit in Japan during the recent global nancial crisis. Previous studies argue that the
relationship between trade payables and bank loan availability is negative because trade credit
is an inferior nancial resource for rms. In addition, rms with better credit availability
oer more trade credit to their customers. Specifying the credit guarantee program for small
businesses introduced in Japan after October 2008 as an exogenous shock that enhanced
credit availability, we nd that small businesses increase trade credit (both payables and
receivables) if bank loan availability improves. This implies that the relationship between
trade payables and bank loans for small businesses is complementary. Furthermore, small
businesses with enhanced credit availability oer more trade credit to their customers.
JEL classication: G21; G23; G33
Keywords: Trade credit; Bank credit; Financial crisis; Small business
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6.1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the eects of the availability of bank loans on trade credit
for small businesses. Trade credit is one of several nancial resources available to small
businesses. This is because when rms purchase goods and services from their suppliers and
sell goods and services to their customers, they generally delay payment to their suppliers,
while their customers delay payment to the rm. Examination of rm balance sheets shows
that trade payables appear with the former, and trade receivables arise with the latter.
Trade credit serves both nancial and transaction motives. The transaction motive for
trade credit is to avoid the transaction costs of paying cash (Ferris, 1981) and those associ-
ated with inventory holding (Emery, 1987; Bougheas et al., 2009; Daripa and Nilsen, 2011).
For example, Ferris (1981) argues that if buyers are to pay bills every time goods are de-
livered, they must have sucient liquidity. To reduce these transaction costs, buyers and
sellers use trade credit. This implies that rms with more frequent transactions tend to use
larger amounts of trade credit. Elsewhere, Emery (1987) suggests that if there are strong
seasonalities in demand for a rm's products, rms need to maintain larger inventories as a
means of smoothing production cycles. To save this inventory cost, rms oer trade credit
and sell the product to reduce the amount of inventories. This implies that the amount of
trade credit is larger in rms that sell or purchase products with strong seasonal components.
In addition, Daripa and Nilsen (2011) maintain that an upstream rm oers trade credit to
a downstream rm to reduce inventory holding costs, which in turn help mitigate the lost
sales of the upstream rm. Furthermore, Bougheas et al. (2009) conclude that rms facing
uncertain demand for their products have an incentive to extend trade credit in order to
promote sales, and thereby mitigate the cost of maintaining inventories of nished goods.
For the most part, the literature on nancial motives focuses on the relationship between
bank loans and trade credit, with many studies arguing that rms receive trade credit if
they face diculty in obtaining bank loans (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Danielson and
Scott, 2004; Demiroglu et al., 2012). For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) show
that small businesses with short-lived banking relationships receive more trade credit, as
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banks do not typically oer them sucient credit because of the presence of information
asymmetry.1 Other studies focus on the relationship between bank credit and the behavior
of trade creditors during nancial shocks. For example, Nilsen (2002), Atanasova and Wilson
(2004), Choi and Kim (2005), and Mateut et al. (2006) nd that small rms increase their
trade credit when it is received as a substitute form of credit during monetary contractions.2
In examining the recent subprime shock, several studies (Yang, 2011a; Carbo-Valverde
et al., 2016) support the substitute hypothesis concerning the relationship between trade
credit received and bank loans.3 These studies assert that because the cost of trade credit
can be very high, sometimes involving annual interest rates in excess of 40%, rms use trade
credit to compensate for the reduced availability of bank loans (Smith, 1987; Petersen and
Rajan, 1994). Focusing on the oering of trade credit, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013) argue that suppliers with access to readily available inexpensive bank loans
or those with sucient liquidity can oer more trade credit at higher interest rates to their
customers.
We argue that while many existing studies have empirically investigated the relationship
between bank loans and trade credit, these have signicant shortcomings because the em-
pirical relationships between bank loan availability and trade credit involve problems with
endogeneity and spurious correlations. This assumption concerning the exogeneity of bank
loan availability is based on the pecking order theory described by Petersen and Rajan (1994),
which argues that rms rst use relatively inexpensive bank loans and then expensive trade
credit after bank loans become unavailable. Because of the high cost of trade credit, previous
1In addition, Demiroglu et al. (2012) show that rms without lines of credit receive more trade credit
when bank lending standards are tight. Danielson and Scott (2004) nd that small businesses that have
applications for bank loans rejected receive trade credit. Some studies also argue that rms in countries with
poorly developed nancial institutions receive more trade credit because they cannot borrow suciently from
nancial institutions when they require external nance (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Fisman and Love, 2003).
2In addition, Love et al. (2007) nd that rms with high levels of short-term debt, which are vulnerable to
nancial crises, reduce the provision of trade credit during periods of contraction in bank credit. In contrast,
however, using Italian data, Marotta (1997) shows that small rms did not receive trade credit sucient to
compensate for the decline in bank loans during a monetary squeeze. As a result, as Yang (2011b) has argued,
the relationships between trade credit and bank loans can be either complementary or substitutionary.
3Yang (2011a) shows that accounts payable and bank credit for small rms are negatively associated,
whereas accounts receivable and bank credit are positively related. Using Spanish data, Carbo-Valverde et al.
(2016) show that credit-constrained small businesses increased trade credit received as a substitute for bank
loans during the nancial crisis after 2007.
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studies have also argued that rms receive trade credit as a last resort during a liquidity
shock or during periods of nancial distress (Wilner, 2000; Cunat, 2007).
However, some studies (Marotta, 2005; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2008; Uesugi et al., 2009)
show that the cost of trade credit is not necessarily higher than that of bank loans. The results
of these studies thus suggest that the assumption of the exogeneity of bank loan availability
may be invalid. In addition, as some studies (for example, Biais and Gollier, 1997; Jain,
2001; Aktas et al., 2012) assert, suppliers may have an information advantage over banks,
such that the lending attitude of banks can be determined by the availability of trade credit.
Empirically, Atanasova (2012) nds that trade credit has positive eects for bank loans for
rms with high agency costs, which supports the signaling role of trade credit provision.4
To overcome the endogeneity problem, some studies (for example, Garcia-Appendini and
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Love et al., 2007) treat declines in the availability of bank loans
during a nancial shock period as an exogenous shock. In this paper, we use an alternative
identication strategy; namely, the exogenous change in the availability of bank loans result-
ing from the emergency credit guarantee (ECG) program established in Japan on October 31,
2008.5 Under the public credit guarantee program, local government-aliated credit guar-
antee corporations oered credit guarantee services to credit-constrained small businesses in
exchange for an annual credit guarantee fee of about 0.45% to 1.90%. The credit guaran-
tee corporations then ensured the repayment of any defaulting guaranteed loans. Japanese
banks were then in the position of being able to oer risk-free loans to small businesses in
the presence of a guarantee from a credit guarantee corporation. Consequently, banks did
not ration credit to notionally informationally opaque small businesses.
At the end of October 2008, the public credit guarantee corporations commenced the
ECG program, which would eventually provide new guarantees of 9.181 trillion yen in to-
4Some studies investigating bank loans and trade credit (For example, Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Danielson
and Scott, 2004; Yang, 2011a) use proxies for the availability of bank loans (for example, the amount of bank
loans, the duration of banking relationships, and dummy variables indicating the denial of credit at the last
loan request) as independent variables and trade credit as the dependent variable. However, causality can
operate in the opposite direction. That is, the proxies for trade credit can also be independent variables, while
the proxies for bank loan availability may also be dependent variables.
5The ECG program concluded at the end of March 2011. See The 2009 White Paper on Small and Medium
Enterprises in Japan for details of the ECG program.
177
tal by March 2009. Small businesses that satised the requirements for the ECG program
could obtain new guaranteed loans. Therefore, for small businesses that satised the ECG
program requirements, credit availability improved after October 2008. This policy change
in the public credit guarantee system is then an exogenous change that enhanced bank loan
availability for small businesses. Identifying this policy change as an exogenous shock, we
thus check whether the availability of bank loans exerted negative eects on trade payables
and positive eects on trade receivables using the dierence-in-dierences (DID) approach.
As small businesses were more vulnerable to the evolving nancial crisis and faced severe
credit constraints, we use rm-level data on small businesses instead of that for listed rms.
If (relatively expensive) trade payables are substitutes for bank loans, small businesses
satisfying the ECG program requirements would have decreased their trade payables because
they could obtain new guaranteed inexpensive bank loans instead. However, we nd that
these small businesses did not decrease their trade payables at this time. Instead, they
increased the amount of trade payables following the establishment of the ECG program,
which suggests that trade credit and bank loans are complementary rather than substitutes.
This result implies that trade credit is not inferior to bank loans and that trade credit then
does not serve as a substitute when there is less availability of bank loans. We also estimate
the relationship between trade payables and bank loans using a dummy variable (which has
a value of one if the rm satises the requirements of the ECG program) as an instrumental
variable. We nd that the bank loans to total assets ratio has positive eects on the trade
payables to total assets ratio. These results are similar if we alternatively specify the growth
rate of trade payables and bank loans. These additional results also support our nding that
trade payables and banks loans are complementary.
Although many studies assert that trade credit received is a substitute for bank loans,
these sources of credit can be complementary. As previous studies (for example, Wilner,
2000) argue, suppliers are unsecured lenders, whereas banks are secured lenders, so suppliers
suer large losses when customers do not repay trade credit. If bank loan availability for
rms increases, the probability of the postponement of the repayment for trade debts falls.
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Therefore, the ECG program improved the level of credit risk associated with small businesses,
and this contributed to an increase in the supply of trade credit. Furthermore, as Miwa and
Ramseyer (2008) have argued, given that suppliers know the industry well, they have an
information advantage over banks. As these suppliers oer credit more quickly, borrowers
use trade credit when they face short-term unexpected exigencies. If trade credit is not a
costly nancial source, as in the situation of increasing bank loan availability, rms then
decide to receive additional trade credit because they can acquire it relatively quickly. As a
result, we observe a positive relationship between bank loan availability and trade payables,
which implies that they are complementary.
We also investigate the relationship between bank loan availability and trade receivables.
We predict that small businesses with enhanced bank loan availability increase their trade
receivables if bank loan availability has a positive eect on the supply of trade credit. Our
results also support the positive relationship between bank loan availability and trade receiv-
ables using instrumental variables regression. These results for trade receivables are consistent
with earlier studies in this area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we outline the credit
guarantee system in Japan and the ECG program established in 2008. Section 6.3 explains
our hypotheses, and Section 6.4 describes the data set. We introduce our empirical strategy
and discuss the estimation results in Sections 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. Section 6.7 concludes
the paper.
6.2 The Credit Guarantee System in Japan
6.2.1 General Credit Guarantee Program
Because the information gaps between banks and small businesses are large, small businesses
often nd it dicult to borrow sucient funds from banks, even if they have low credit risk.
To mitigate the resultant credit rationing for small businesses, 52 government-aliated credit
guarantee corporations (hereafter, CGCs) in Japan oered credit guarantees for bank loans
to credit-constrained small businesses. In the credit guarantee system, banks oer guaranteed
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loans to small businesses, and small businesses pay a guarantee fee to the CGCs. If these
guaranteed loans default, the CGCs repay the loan to the banks (referred to as subrogation).
Therefore, banks can oer guaranteed loans to risky small businesses with relatively low risk.
When CGCs make subrogated payments against default by small businesses, they collect the
debts from the defaulting small business. In this system, the ceilings on the credit guarantees
for small businesses were 80 million yen in the guarantee program without collateral and 200
million yen in the general guarantee program. The small businesses pay guarantee fees of
0.45% to 1.90%, with the exact amount determined by the rm's credit risk.
The credit guarantee system operating in Japan diers from that in other countries in
the following respects. First, the coverage rates in Japan were 100% until October 2007,
which then fell to 80% after October 2007. However, the coverage rates returned to 100%
in the ECG program, established in October 2008. Thus, the large amount of guaranteed
loans oered 100% cover for the defaulting loans. According to Uesugi et al. (2010), full
coverage in the credit guarantee systems was adopted only in Japan and Korea. Second, the
Japan Finance Corporation, which is a public corporation wholly owned by the Japanese
government, oers credit insurance for all CGCs. Coverage rates for this insurance ranged
from 70% to 80%, so the CGCs suered few losses as a result of subrogation.
6.2.2 Emergency Credit Guarantee Program from October 2008
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the rapid rise in oil prices and the
resulting nancial shocks, the protability of many Japanese small businesses deteriorated
rapidly.The 2009 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan argues that many
small businesses were confronted with liquidity shortages, which resulted from the worsening
credit constraints and the restricted supply of bank loans. To mitigate these problems, the
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency and the CGCs established the ECG program and
increased the ceiling on the amount of credit guarantees for small businesses. The ECG
program ceilings for each small business were 80 million yen in the case of a guarantee without
collateral, and 200 million yen in the case of a guarantee with collateral; these amounts were
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in addition to the ceilings on the general public guarantee program.6
The total budget for the ECG program was 20 trillion yen, targeted at some 2.6 million
small businesses. As the coverage rate represented 100% of the defaulting guaranteed loans,
nancial institutions were able to oer risk-free loans for small businesses by using the ECG
program. The guarantee rate was 0.8%, which was lower than the rate in the general guarantee
program. To access the ECG program, small businesses needed to satisfy at least one of the
following three requirements: 1) average sales in the most recent three-month period were
3% or more lower than the same period in the previous year; 2) product costs had increased
by more than 20%, and more than 20% of this increase consisted of the increased cost of oil
that the small business was unable to pass on in the sale price; and 3) the ratios of average
net prot or operating incomes to total sales in the most recent three-month period were 3%
lower than the same period in the previous year. In addition to these requirements, small
businesses had to operate in one of 760 designated industries in February 2009. The ECG
program was a temporary guarantee program that ran from the end of October 2008 to the
end of March 2011. Under the ECG program, the total amounts of guaranteed liabilities
were 9.181 trillion yen, with the acceptance of 435 million guaranteed loans (by the end of
March 2009). Although we are unable to obtain data on the acceptance rate, we assume that
small businesses that satised the requirements were rarely rejected for assistance because
acceptance rates exceeded 90% in the general guarantee program.
To illustrate the impact of the ECG program for aggregate small business lending, we
plot the annual growth rate of bank lending for small businesses during the period 2006{10
using seasonal aggregate data in Figure 6.1. As shown, the growth rates of bank lending
for small businesses declined from 2007Q2 to 2008Q3. After 2008Q4, corresponding to the
commencement of the ECG program, these growth rates returned to their precrisis levels. In
particular, the growth rates of bank lending by credit associations and credit cooperatives
increased to more than 1% after 2008Q4. Borrowers from these nancial institutions are
mainly smaller (not middle-sized) rms, which are mainly targeted in our database. This
6That is, the total ceilings are 160 million yen in the case of a guarantee without collateral, and 400 million
yen in the case of a guarantee with collateral.
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Figure 6.1: Growth Rate of Bank Loans for Small and Medium Enterprises
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Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan ;
Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
Note: The growth rate of bank loans is dened as (bank loans in year t { bank loans in year t-1)/bank loans
in year t-1 for each quarter. According to the Web site of the Japanese Bankers Association, city banks are
\large in size, with headquarters in major cities and branches in Tokyo, Osaka, other major cities, and their
immediate suburbs." Regional banks are \usually based in the principal city of a prefecture and they conduct
the majority of their operations within that prefecture and have strong ties with local enterprises and local
governments." See http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/banks/principal/index.html for details.
graph implies that general credit availability for small businesses in Japan improved with the
ECG program (2008Q4).
Moreover, Ono et al. (2013) show that the ECG program enhanced credit availability
using micro data for small businesses. This is because after the ECG program began, the
nancial constraints of many small businesses in Japan lessened because they were able to
obtain guaranteed loans more easily. However, the increase in guaranteed loans substituted
for some nonguaranteed loans. For instance, Ono et al. (2013) show that by using the ECG
program, main banks were able to reduce their nonguaranteed loans and level of credit risk
by extending ECG-guaranteed loans to borrowers.
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6.3 Hypotheses
In this analysis, we investigate whether bank loans and trade credit exhibited a negative or
positive relationship during the recent nancial crisis. In general, because of the presence
of substantial information asymmetry in the credit market, small businesses cannot readily
issue bonds or equity. Therefore, their creditors are principally limited to banks and trade
suppliers. Smith (1987) argues that trade credit is more expensive than bank loans. If this is
accurate, at least from the perspective of pecking order theory, small businesses would seek
trade credit only when the availability of bank loans declines (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
Therefore, many previous studies argue that during the nancial crisis, small businesses
sought trade credit to compensate for the decline in bank loans because the availability of
bank loans was limited. As a result, these studies generally imply that bank loans and trade
credit received are substitutes.
However, the availability of bank loans can be endogenously determined by trade credit
because the cost of trade credit is not always relatively high (Marotta, 2005; Miwa and Ram-
seyer, 2008; Uesugi et al., 2009). To mitigate this problem, we use the exogenous improvement
in bank loan availability for small businesses that occurred with the establishment of Japan's
ECG program in 2008. As we have argued, with the establishment of the ECG program,
banks were less likely to deny credit applications from small businesses that met the require-
ments of the program. If bank loans are superior to trade credit received in terms of the
cost of nancing, and if trade credit received and bank loans are substitutes, small businesses
would have switched from trade credit to bank loans during the period of the nancial shock.
Conversely, the relationship between trade payables and bank loans can be positive. As
Wilner (2000) argue, suppliers are generally unsecured lenders. Therefore, they can increase
the supply of trade credit given enhanced bank loan availability. This is because rms that
meet the requirements of the ECG program can borrow from banks more easily, and this
enhances their ability to repay trade payables. Also, as Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) assert,
suppliers possess an advantage over banks in monitoring rm activity. Therefore, suppliers
can quickly oer credit to rms when borrowers face short-term unexpected exigencies. Dur-
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ing the nancial shock, rms and creditors faced uncertainty, so trade credit was preferred to
bank loans, even with the enhancements in the availability of the latter. Demand for trade
credit then increases if trade credit is not a costly nancial source. If this account holds|
that is, if bank loans and trade credit are complements|small businesses would receive more
trade credit with the improved availability of bank loans following the establishment of the
ECG program.
In addition to trade credit received, the availability of bank loans has positive eects on
trade receivables, which is a proxy for the provision of credit to customers. As Meltzer (1960)
and Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue, rms with better access to bank loans redistribute
credit to credit-constrained rms via trade credit. If better access to bank loans increases the
provision of trade credit to customers, the trade receivables of rms meeting the ECG program
requirements would also increase because bank loan availability for these rms exogenously
increased through the ECG program.
6.4 Data
In this study, we use rm-level data on small businesses in Japan from 2006 to 2009. We
selected the sampling period to include the two years before and after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. The data are from the Credit Risk Database for Small and Medium
Enterprises (CRD) established by several nancial institutions and the CGCs under the
guidance of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan. The data set used in this
study includes only corporations in the manufacturing industry that were present in the CRD
for more than the past three consecutive years. We omit nancial and small farm businesses.
Furthermore, some variables7 include outliers in only the upper values, so we truncate the
sample at the 99 percentile to exclude these outliers. When variables8 include outliers in both
the upper and lower values, we truncate at both the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of the sample.
The data collected on the 80,625 rms from 2006 to 2009 include 91 items from their balance
7The variables are Trade Payables, Bank Loans, Trade Receivables Growth, Leverage, Sales Growth, Col-
lateralizable Assets, and Interest Rate.
8The variables are Trade Payables Growth, Bank Loans Growth, and ROA (Return on assets).
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sheets and prot and loss statements. The total number of rm-year observations is 278,611.
Focusing on the distribution of the number of employees, we can see that the value for
the rst quartile is 4, the value for the second quartile (median) is 10, and the value for the
third quartile is 26. This suggests that the CRD data include many micro rms. The 99th
percentile of employees is 248, so the sample share of larger small businesses is small. Overall,
although the CRD includes some bias, it also provides a huge rm-level panel data set for a
very large number of Japanese small businesses around the time of the global nancial crisis,
which comprises a great empirical advantage for our analysis. Therefore, the CRD is suitable
for investigating the choice of nancing in small businesses.
6.5 Trade Payables and Bank Loan Availability
6.5.1 Eects of the ECG Program on Firms' Borrowings
We rst determine the eects of the ECG program on rms' bank loans. If the rms' bank
loan availability improves following the establishment of the ECG program, the number of
bank loans by rms satisfying the ECG program requirements should increase. We estimate
the following equation:
Bank Loansi;t = 1Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t + 2Xi;t + i + i:t: (6.1)
Bank Loansi;t is the ratio of a rm's total loans to total assets in year t (total borrowings
in year t/total assets in year t). The ratio of total loans increases when the total assets in
year t decrease, even if the amounts of bank loans are constant. Therefore, there could be
bias in the estimates if we were to use the ratio of bank loans normalized by total assets. To
address this problem, we also specify the growth rate of bank loans, which is dened as [(total
borrowings in year t { total borrowings in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1] as a proxy for
Bank Loansi;t. Guaranteei is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a rm satises
the requirements for inclusion in the ECG program. i;t is the error term for rm i in year t
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from 2006 to 2009. i is rm i's xed eects. We regard the observations for rms where the
guarantee dummy is equal to one as the treatment group.
To identify rms that satisfy the requirements of the ECG program (as described in
Subsection 6.2.2), we require monthly nancial data on small businesses. However, only
yearly nancial data are available from the CRD.9 In addition, data on the purchase cost of
oil are unavailable, so we identify these requirements using data on the cost of goods sold.
Using the yearly nancial data, we identify rms that satisfy any of the following requirements
of the ECG program: 1) small businesses whose sales in 2008 fell by more 3% from 2007; 2)
small businesses whose cost of goods sold increased by more 20%; and 3) small businesses
whose average net prot or operating income to total sales in 2008 declined by 3% compared
with 2007. The ECG program commenced at the end of October 2008, so its policy eects
should appear in rm nancial statements after 2009 because the accounting year-end for
many rms in Japan is March 31. Therefore, as a variable for the policy change, we use
a year dummy that takes a value of one if the year is 2009 (Y earDummy2009t ). If those
rms satisfying the ECG program requirements increase their total loans after the program
commences, the estimated coecient for Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t will be positive.
Xi;t is a vector of seven control variables (Firm Scale, Firm Age, Sales Growth, Current
Assets Ratio, Return on assets (ROA), Collateralizable Assets, Interest Rate, Year Dummy).
Firm scale is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t{1. Sales growth and ROA are
proxies for rm performance, where sales growth is the annual growth rate of a rm's sales
[(sales in year t { sales in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1]. We dene ROA as the ratio
of the sum of a rm's operating income, interest receivables, and dividends to total assets
in year t{1. The current assets ratio is a proxy for the demand for short-term credit. The
current assets ratio is the ratio of a rm's current assets, excluding cash, to total assets in
year t{1. Collateralizable assets are a proxy for collateral, which we dene as the ratio of
tangible xed assets to total debts in year t{1. We dene the interest rate as the ratio of
a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term debt and discounted notes
9In general, small businesses prepare nancial statements once a year, so monthly data are generally
unavailable in any database.
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receivable in year t{1.
Table 6.1 provides some summary statistics. As shown, the medians and means of all the
explanatory variables are similar, which suggests that outliers are not a signicant problem
in our estimation. Table 6.2 details the means of the dependent and independent variables
by year. In 2009, trade payables and receivables largely fall as a result of the decline in
transactions with both suppliers and customers. This is consistent with the data that the
mean of sales growth is negative in 2009. In contrast, bank loans increase substantially in
2009, which is after the commencement of the ECG program. The trend in ROA is consistent
with the business cycle. We can see that the remaining variables do not change greatly over
the sample period.
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Table 6.2: Means of Dependent and Independent Variables, by Year
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009
Trade Payables 0.122 0.120 0.116 0.093
Trade Payables Growth 0.005 0.003 -0.002 -0.026
Trade Receivables 0.169 0.165 0.161 0.148
Trade Receivable Growth 0.007 0.003 -0.007 -0.044
Bank Loans 0.625 0.637 0.650 0.721
Bank Loans Growth 0.028 0.024 0.017 0.052
Guarantee 0.642 0.641 0.642 0.644
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.644
Firm Age 3.336 3.362 3.383 3.432
Firm Scale 12.138 12.096 12.093 12.116
Leverage 0.869 0.875 0.879 0.884
ROA 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.006
Sales Growth 0.042 0.034 0.003 -0.133
Collateralizable Assets 0.379 0.375 0.373 0.376
Current Assets Ratio 0.372 0.374 0.375 0.372
Interest Rate 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.023
Note: This table provides the means of the dependent and independent variables by year. The denitions of
the variables are given in the notes accompanying Table 6.1.
Table 6.3 provides the estimated results for equation (6.1). As shown in column (1),
we include only Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 in the regression equation. The estimated
coecient for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 is positive and statistically signicant at the 1%
level, which suggests that the bank loan to assets ratio for rms satisfying the requirements
of the ECG program increased by 0.02602 after the program began. This result is consistent
with the view that credit availability was enhanced by the ECG program (Ono et al., 2013).
We also estimate interactive variables with the natural logarithm of the amount of bank loans
in year t{1 (column 2) and the ratio of bank loans to total assets in year t{1 (column 3).
The estimated coecients for the interactive variables for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and
ln(the amount of bank loans), and those for the bank loans ratio in year t{1 are positive and
statistically signicant at the 1% level. The ceiling on the credit guarantee program could
represent a restriction for rms with a large amount of loans. This result suggests that these
rms increased their bank loans following the start of the ECG program.
The eect of rm scale is negative and statistically signicant. This implies that smaller
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Table 6.3: Estimation Results for Eect of Emergency Guarantee on Bank Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Bank Loans Bank Loans Bank Loans Bank Loans Bank Loans Bank Loans
(Ratio) (Ratio) (Ratio) (Growth) (Growth) (Growth)
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 0.02602 -0.11368 -0.08127 0.00150 -0.01460 -0.01286
(0.00129) (0.00206) (0.00176) (0.00132) (0.00236) (0.00205)
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 0.28962 0.03262
 ln(Amount of Bank Loans) (0.00338) (0.00442)
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 0.16227 0.02107
 Bank Loans in year t{1 (0.00186) (0.00262)
Firm Scale -0.04244 -0.03231 -0.02997 0.02178 0.02505 0.02535
(0.00184) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00253)
Firm Age 0.00891 0.00845 0.00851 0.01109 0.01101 0.01101
(0.00145) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00142)
Sales Growth -0.18014 -0.18343 -0.18337 -0.05183 -0.05103 -0.05105
(0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.00147) (0.00147)
Current Assets Ratio 0.02070 0.01709 0.01775 0.02377 0.02290 0.02292
(0.00534) (0.00523) (0.00522) (0.00623) (0.00622) (0.00622)
Collateralizable Assets 0.09226 0.07833 0.07993 0.10092 0.10050 0.10053
(0.00572) (0.00560) (0.00560) (0.00656) (0.00656) (0.00656)
ROA -0.35005 -0.34234 -0.34136 -0.05504 -0.05028 -0.05003
(0.00409) (0.00402) (0.00402) (0.00518) (0.00514) (0.00514)
Interest Rate -1.04020 -0.91801 -0.92720 0.43632 0.45653 0.45742
(0.04540) (0.04445) (0.04442) (0.04707) (0.04713) (0.04713)
Year = 2007 0.00288 0.00284 0.00278 -0.00443 -0.00445 -0.00445
(0.00078) (0.00076) (0.00076) (0.00098) (0.00098) (0.00098)
Year = 2008 0.01476 0.01429 0.01419 -0.01170 -0.01185 -0.01184
(0.00079) (0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00093) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Year = 2009 0.04966 0.04816 0.04799 0.01804 0.01793 0.01791
(0.00118) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00125)
Observations 276,255 276,056 276,056 248,541 247,236 247,236
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table presents the estimates of the xed-eects (in columns 1{3) and OLS regressions (in columns
4{6) with Bank Loans and Bank Loans Growth as dependent variables. Bank Loans is the ratio of a rm's
total loans to total assets in year t [total borrowings in year t/total assets in year t]. Bank Loans Growth
is (a rm's total borrowings in year t - total borrowings in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1. Guarantee is
a dummy variable that has a value of one if a rm satises the requirements of the ECG program. Interest
Rate is the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term debt, and discounted bills
receivable for each year in year t{1. ln(Bank Loan) is the natural log of total loans in year t{1. Firm Scale
is the natural log of (total assets) in year t{1. Firm Age is the natural log of (1+ rm age) in year t. Sales
Growth is (a rm's sales in year t - sales in year t-1)/sales in year t-1. The Current Asset Ratio is the ratio
of current assets, excluding cash, to total assets in year t{1. Collateralizable Assets is the ratio of tangible
xed assets to total debts in year t{1. ROA is the ratio of the sum of a rm's operating income, interest
receivables, and dividends to total assets. In columns (4){(6), we use the annual lag of independent variables,
apart from Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and the interaction variables with Guarantee  Year Dummy2009.
We include year dummies from 2007 to 2009. The reference year is 2006.  denotes signicance at the 10%
level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at the 1% level.
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rms depend more on bank loans because these rms are relatively informationally opaque.
Firm age has a positive eect on bank loans, which implies that older rms are more cred-
itworthy and transparent. The eect of sales growth is negative, which suggests that the
assets of rms are growing faster than their total borrowings. Firms with more current assets
need more working capital, so the estimated coecient for the ratio of current assets to bank
loans is positive and statistically signicant. The collateralizable assets have positive eects
on bank loans because collateral mitigates the information problem. Firms with higher cash
ow do not need to borrow as much; therefore, the coecient for ROA is negative and sta-
tistically signicant. Finally, the estimated coecient for the interest rate is negative and
statistically signicant at the 1% level.
As we have argued, the increase in the ratio of bank loans to total assets can result from a
decline in total assets, not just from an increase in bank loans, so we reestimate the regression
using the annual growth rate of bank loans. The F-test that all i = 0 is accepted, so we
estimate using OLS regression. We specify the annual dierences in Xi;t as control variables.
The estimated results for the growth rates of bank loans are shown in columns (4){(6) of
Table 6.3. As shown, the estimated coecient for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 is not
statistically signicant (column 4). However, the estimated coecients for the interactions
between Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and ln(the amount of bank loans) and the bank loans
ratio in year t{1 are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, which indicates
similar results to when we specied the ratio of bank loans as the dependent variable.
6.5.2 Eects of the ECG Program on Trade Payables
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between trade payables and bank loan
availability. To investigate the hypothesis described in Section 6.3, we estimate the following
equation:
Trade Payablesi;t = 1Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t +Xi;t2 + i + i;t: (6.2)
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Xi;t is a vector of control variables (Firm Scale, Firm Age, Sales Growth, Current Assets
Ratio, ROA, Collateralizable Assets, Interest Rate, Year Dummy). i;t is the error term of
rm i in year t from 2006 to 2009. i is the rm i's xed eects. Following Petersen and
Rajan (1997), we use the ratio of a rm's trade payables to total assets in year t as a proxy
for Trade Payablesi;t. To investigate the eects of the ECG program on trade credit, we use
the DID approach. We focus on the interactive variable Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t . If
rms experiencing improving availability of bank loans receive less trade credit, the estimated
coecient for Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t should be negative. The eect of Guaranteei
is subsumed into the rm's xed eects i, so we omit Guaranteei from equation (6.2).
Enhanced credit availability could have eects on both the level and change in trade
payables, so we estimate the level of trade payables and the dierence in the ratio of trade
payables to total assets from year t{1 to t. In addition, we use the growth rate of trade
payables [dened as (trade payables in year t { trade payables in year t-1)/total assets in
year t-1] because this ratio changes when total assets decrease, even if trade payables are
constant. In the equations using the dierence or growth of trade payables as a dependent
variables, we also use the dierence in the control variablesXi;t and omit the rm xed eects,
i. Given that an F-test indicates that all i = 0 is accepted, we estimate the equation using
OLS regression when the growth rate or the dierence in trade payables is specied as a
dependent variable.
We control for the eects of trade payables by adding several variables in each year;
namely, rm scale, rm age, sales growth, the current assets ratio, ROA, collateralizable
assets, and interest rates in year t{1. According to Petersen and Rajan (1997), rm demand
for short-term credit in general and trade credit in particular determine trade payables. Firm
scale, sales growth, the current assets ratio, and ROA are proxies for the demand for short-
term credit. To control for the eect of rm size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets
in year t{1. Firms whose sales are expanding quickly need working capital and therefore
increase their trade payables. The eects of sales growth are positive for trade payables.
Firms with higher current assets require short-term nancing to match the maturity of their
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assets with those of their liabilities, which implies that the current assets ratio has positive
eects on trade payables. The current assets ratio also controls for the eect of inventories on
trade payables, as argued by Emery (1987) and Daripa and Nilsen (2011). Firms that make
more prot receive less trade credit because they have greater cash ow, so we predict that
ROA has a negative eect on trade payables. Conversely, rms with lower ROA are poorly
performing rms, so ROA can also have positive eects on trade payables.
Firm demand for trade credit is particularly aected by the availability of bank loans.
We specify collateralizable assets and interest rates as proxies for the availability of bank
loans. As Frank and Maksimovic (2005) argue, suppliers have an advantage in salvaging
value from existing assets, which means that they can oer credit to rms with relatively
few collateralizable assets. Thus, rms that possess fewer collateralizable assets receive more
trade credit because they cannot borrow suciently from banks. Furthermore, we predict
that rms with a higher interest rate use more trade credit. We use ln(1+age) as a proxy for
rm age.
Unfortunately, we do not have information about all of the factors that aect trade
payables. Because we employ panel data, we can use the xed-eects model to eliminate
time-invariant unobserved eects (i). As argued in Section 6.1, the literature on transaction
motives asserts that seasonalities in demand for a rm's product have positive eects on
trade payables. The strength of these seasonalities then depends on the type of product, so
these eects are controlled for by the rm xed eects (i). Also, the frequency of transaction
(argued by Ferris, 1981) is not often changed during the sample period. Therefore, we control
this eect by the rm xed eects (i).
Table 6.4 shows the estimated eects of the ECG program on trade payables. If the
substitutes hypothesis holds, the estimated coecients for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009
should be negative. However, the estimated coecients are positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level. These results suggest that rms satisfying the requirements of the
ECG program increased trade payables following the start of the program. This implies that
rms experiencing enhanced credit availability increased their trade payables, and that bank
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Table 6.4: Estimation Results for the Eect on Trade Payables
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables
(Ratio) (Dierence) (Growth)
Guarantee  0.00243 0.00365 0.00344
Year Dummy2009 (0.00040) (0.00047) (0.00049)
Firm Scale -0.01789 -0.02389 -0.01612
(0.00057) (0.00086) (0.00081)
Firm Age -0.00045 -0.00041 0.00052
(0.00046) (0.00045) (0.00050)
Sales Growth 0.04921 0.04113 0.05179
(0.00047) (0.00057) (0.00059)
Current Assets Ratio 0.00485 -0.04507 -0.04221
(0.00167) (0.00214) (0.00213)
Collateralizable Assets -0.00355 0.00859 0.01856
(0.00179) (0.00187) (0.00189)
ROA 0.01890 0.03368 0.04334
(0.00125) (0.00149) (0.00152)
Interest Rate 0.13011 -0.06696 0.00668
(0.01428) (0.01657) (0.01677)
Year = 2007 -0.00040 -0.00020 -0.00123
(0.00024) (0.00030) (0.00034)
Year = 2008 -0.00223 -0.00161 -0.00551
(0.00025) (0.00029) (0.00032)
Year = 2009 -0.02189 -0.02112 -0.02660
(0.00037) (0.00043) (0.00046)
Observations 278,611 249,460 248,582
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.09 0.11
Note: This table presents estimates of the xed-eects (in column 1) and OLS regressions (in columns 2 and
3) with Trade Payables and Trade Payables Growth as dependent variables. Trade Payables is the ratio of a
rm's trade payables to total assets in year t. Trade Payables Growth is (a rm's trade payables in year t -
trade payables in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1. The denitions of the independent variables are the same
as those in the notes accompanying Table 6.3. In column (2), we specify the annual lags of the dependent and
independent variables, apart from Guarantee  Year Dummy2009. In column (3), we specify the annual lags
of all the independent variables, except for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009. Standard errors in parentheses. 
denotes signicance at the 10% level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at
the 1% level.
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loans and trade payables are complementary, which is our main result. As we predicted, the
estimated coecients for sales growth, the current asset ratio, and the interest rate are all
positive while that for collateralizable assets is negative, as shown in column (1).
In column (2), we estimate equation (6.2) using the annual dierences in the ratio of trade
payables to total assets and Xi;t. In addition, we estimate the regression using the annual
growth rate in trade payables and the annual dierences in Xi;t in column (3). In columns (2)
and (3), we estimate using OLS regression. As shown, the estimated coecient for Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009 is also positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, which suggests
that rms increase trade payables with the commencement of the ECG program.
6.5.3 IV Regression
To investigate the relationship between bank loans and trade credit more directly, we estimate
the following equation:
Trade Payablesi;t = 1BankLoansi;t +Xi;t2 + i + i:t: (6.3)
Xi;t is a vector of control variables dened in Subsection 6.5.2. i;t is the error term for rm
i in year t from 2006 to 2009. i is rm i's xed eects. If trade payables are substitutes
for bank loans, the estimated coecient for bank loans should be negative. In contrast, if
trade payables are complementary to bank loans, the estimated coecient for bank loans
should be positive. Equation (6.2) therefore contains simultaneous relations between bank
loans and trade payables, so we estimate using a two-stage least squares xed-eects model
using instrumental variables.
We specify several instrumental variables. One instrumental variable is Guarantee  Year
Dummy2009, as dened in Subsection 6.5.1. The basis for including this variable is that rms
satisfying the requirements of the ECG program increased the amount of bank loans after the
start of the program. Therefore, the correlation between bank loans and Guarantee  Year
Dummy2009 is considered to be positive. As discussed in Subsection 6.5.2, positive eects of
195
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 on trade payables are the result of the increasing availability
of bank loans, which do not directly aect trade payables. Therefore, the eects of Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009 on trade payables that do not occur via increasing bank loan availability
are considered to be insignicant, so Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 is a suitable instrumental
variable for bank loans.
To test for overidentifying restrictions, we specify several other instrumental variables.
As noted in Subsection 6.2.1, the ceiling on the credit guarantee program for the general
guarantee program is 80 million yen (without collateral) and 200 million yen (with collat-
eral). Firms with higher amounts of bank loans are then likely to meet the ceiling on the
credit guarantee, which represents a severe credit constraint for these rms. Increases in the
credit guarantee ceiling relax the credit constraints and enhance credit availability for rms
with higher amounts of bank loans. Therefore, the interaction variables of Guarantee  Year
Dummy2009 and the amount of bank loans in year t{1 are positively correlated with the ratio
of bank loans to total assets in year t. Meanwhile, trade credit for rms with large amounts
of bank loans changes only through the enhanced bank loan availability resulting from es-
tablishment of the ECG program. Therefore, we consider the interaction between Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009 and the amount of bank loans in year t{1 as a suitable instrumental
variable. We use the natural log of total loans in year t{1 as a proxy of the amount of bank
loans. To check for robustness, we also use the bank loans to total assets ratio in year t{1
(Bank Loans in year t{1) as a proxy of the amount of bank loans.
The results for equation (6.3) are shown in Table 6.5. The instrumental variables are
Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 in column (1), Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans in year t{1) in column (2), and Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  Bank Loans in year t{1 in column
(3). The results of the rst-stage regression are shown in Table 6.3. The signs of the in-
strumental variables are consistent with our predictions. The coecients of all instrumental
variables are statistically signicant at the 1% level, which suggests that we can reject the
weak instruments. In addition, the p-values of the instrumental variables are 0.600 in column
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Table 6.5: Estimation Results for Eect of Bank Loans on Trade Payables (IV Regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables
(Ratio) (Ratio) (Ratio) (Growth)
Bank Loans 0.09409 0.10160 0.09557 1.03388
(0.01706) (0.00404) (0.00395) (0.19974)
Firm Scale -0.01369 -0.01340 -0.01367 -0.04369
(0.00098) (0.00067) (0.00066) (0.00590)
Firm Age -0.00127 -0.00134 -0.00129 -0.01082
(0.00052) (0.00051) (0.00050) (0.00266)
Sales Growth 0.06649 0.06790 0.06681 0.10500
(0.00313) (0.00090) (0.00088) (0.01028)
Current Assets Ratio 0.00234 0.00253 0.00264 -0.06715
(0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00819)
Collateralizable Assets -0.01215 -0.01280 -0.01223 -0.08429
(0.00255) (0.00203) (0.00201) (0.02116)
ROA 0.05240 0.05531 0.05312 0.09813
(0.00634) (0.00204) (0.00201) (0.01191)
Interest Rate 0.23101 0.24043 0.23403 -0.44803
(0.02383) (0.01640) (0.01625) (0.10077)
Year = 2007 -0.00070 -0.00072 -0.00070 0.00340
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00138)
Year = 2008 -0.00370 -0.00383 -0.00374 0.00682
(0.00037) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00257)
Year = 2009 -0.02668 -0.02719 -0.02679 -0.04355
(0.00116) (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00372)
Observations 276,255 276,056 276,056 245,735
J-statistics - 0.276 0.011 2.345
P-value of J-statistics - 0.600 0.918 0.126
Note: This table presents estimates of the two-stage least squares xed-eects regression (columns 1{3) and the
two-stage least squares regression (column 4) with Trade Payables and Trade Payables Growth as dependent
variables. Trade Payables is the ratio of a rm's trade payables to total assets in year t. Trade Payables Growth
is (a rm's trade payables in year t - trade payables in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1. The instrumental
variables are Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 in column (1), Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee 
Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans) in column (2), Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009  Bank Loans in year t{1 in column (3), and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount
of Bank Loans) and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  Cash Holdings in column (4). The denitions of the
independent variables and instrument variables are the same as those in the notes accompanying Tables 6.1
and 6.3. In column (4), we use the annual lag of independent variables, apart from Bank Loan Growth.
ln(Amount of Bank Loans) is the natural log of total loans in year t{1. Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash
holdings to total assets in year t{1. Standard errors in parentheses.  denotes signicance at the 10% level,
 denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at the 1% level.
197
(2) and 0.918 in column (3), so the requirements for the instrumental variables are satised.
In all specications, the estimated coecients for bank loans are positive and statistically sig-
nicant at the 1% level. These results thus reject the substitution hypothesis between trade
payables and bank loans. The results of the control variables are similar to those estimated
by the xed-eects model shown in column (1) of Table 6.4.
To check robustness, we use the growth rate of trade payables growth as a dependent
variable and the growth rate of bank loans growth as an independent variable in column (4)
of Table 6.5. Given that the F-test indicates that the hypothesis that all i = 0 is accepted,
we estimate the equation using two-stage least squares regression. We nd that the J-test of
instruments rejects exogeneity if we employ the same instrumental variables used in columns
(2) and (3). Therefore, we use Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans
in year t{1) and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  Cash Holdings (dened as the ratio of
cash holdings to total assets in year t{1). We omit the Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 from
the list of instrumental variables because this variable does not have a signicant eect on
the growth rate of bank loans (see Table 6.3). In addition, rms with higher cash holdings
do not have an incentive to increase borrowings, so we use the interactive variable with cash
holdings. The J-statistics show that the requirement for instrumental variables is satised
in column (4). The results of the IV regression show that the estimated coecient for the
growth rate of bank loans is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. This also
implies that the relationship between trade payables and bank loans is complementary.
6.5.4 Discussion
Sucient Amount of Funds?
We interpret the results in this section as being consistent with the complementary hypothesis,
but our results can also be consistent with the substitution hypothesis as follows. After
commencing the ECG program, rms can increase loans from nancial institutions, but these
may not be sucient. Therefore, they increase trade payables to compensate for any nancial
shortfall. This implies that the positive relationship between trade payables and bank loans
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is consistent with the substitution hypothesis. To investigate which hypothesis is suitable,
we need to establish whether small businesses meeting the requirements of the ECG program
face severe nancial constraints. If they can borrow a sucient amount of funds, we interpret
this as inferring support for the complementary hypothesis.
As we argued in Section 6.2, the ECG program ceilings for each small business were 80
million yen in the case of a guarantee without collateral, and 200 million yen in the case of
a guarantee with collateral, these amounts being in addition to the ceilings on the general
public guarantee program. That is, the total ceilings are 160 million yen in the case of a
guarantee without collateral, and 400 million yen in the case of a guarantee with collateral.
According to Chusho Kigyo Jittai Chosa (Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises)
by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the total average borrowings of a small business
are 85.6 million yen (in scal year 2009), so this ceiling is a sucient amount for small
businesses to relax their credit constraints. Therefore, after the start of the ECG program,
banks increased their credit supply for small businesses because they oered loans without
any credit risk. We can interpret this as meaning that small businesses that satised the
requirement of the ECG program were less credit rationed after the commencement of the
program.
In addition, interest rates are not very high for rms with guarantee requirements. The
average interest rates for these rms are 2.16% in 2007, 2.30% in 2008, and 2.14% in 2009.
These values suggest that the average interest rates returned to their precrisis level in 2009.
This implies that rms did not suer under a higher cost of bank loans after the start of the
ECG program. Based on this discussion, rms meeting the requirements of the ECG program
should be able to borrow a sucient amount of bank loans and therefore we interpret this
positive relationship between bank loans and trade payables as supporting the complementary
hypothesis.
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Supply-side Eects on Trade Credit
We argue that the one reason for the positive relationship between trade payables and bank
loan availability is the increase in the supply of trade credit by sellers. However, if this eect
is signicant, positive eects could be consistent with the substitution hypothesis. When
the increase in the supply eects of trade credit oset the decrease in the demand eects
through enhanced loan availability, we observe positive relationships under the substitute
relationship. To address this, we estimate equations (6.2) and (6.3) for only those rms with
a constant supply of trade credit by including rms with an already high level of ability to
repay trade payables before the commencement of the ECG program. As these rms are
already creditworthy, the supply eects on trade credit resulting from the ECG program
should be insignicant.
We use liquidity (dened as the ratio of cash holdings to total assets) in year t-1 as a
proxy for the ability to repay. We limit ourselves to rms with liquidity in the top tertile,
as these have a high ability to repay. Columns (1){(3) in Table 6.6 provide the estimation
results obtained using OLS and xed-eects regressions, and Columns (4){(7) detail those
obtained using IV regression. As shown, apart from the estimates in columns (1) and (4), the
coecients for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Bank Loans are positive and statistically
signicant. These results suggest that we continue to support the complementary hypothesis
when we control for the supply eects of trade credit. However, the magnitudes of the
coecients are smaller than when we included all rms in the sample. For example, column
(1) of Table 6.6 shows that the coecient for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 on the trade
payables ratio is 0.00086, which is not statistically signicant. In contrast, in column (1) of
Table 6.4, the same coecient is 0.00243, which is larger than when we restricted our sample
to rms with high liquidity. This suggests that the positive relationships found are not robust
for rms with high liquidity. A possible reason is that the supply eects caused by enhancing
credit availability are weak for rms with high liquidity. However, we do not nd support for
the substitution hypothesis, even if we control for the supply eects of trade credit.
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Table 6.6: Estimation Results for Eect of Bank Loans on Trade Payables (Firms with High
Liquidity)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables
(Ratio) (Dierence) (Growth)
Guarantee  0.00086 0.00236 0.00198
Year Dummy2009 (0.00078) (0.00083) (0.00087)
Observations 92,870 82,274 81,888
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.09 0.11
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables Trade Payables
(Ratio) (Ratio) (Ratio) (Growth)
Bank Loans 0.03112 0.06084 0.06054 0.41128
(0.02869) (0.00622) (0.00604) (0.07999)
Observations 92,269 92,212 92,212 87,082
J-statistics - 1.942 1.901 0.562
P-value of J-statistics - 0.1634 0.168 0.454
Note: This table presents estimates of the xed-eects regression (in column 1), OLS regressions (in columns
2 and 3), the two-stage least squares xed-eects regression (columns 4{6) and the two-stage least squares
regression (column 7) with Trade Payables and Trade Payables Growth as dependent variables using observa-
tions with liquidity in the top tertile. Liquidity is dened as the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. The
denitions of the independent and dependent variables are the same as those in the notes accompanying Tables
6.4 and 6.5. We omit the results of control variables from this table. The instrumental variables are Guar-
antee  Year Dummy2009 in column (4), Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009
 ln(Amount of Bank Loans) in columns (5) and (7), and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee 
Year Dummy2009  Bank Loans in year t{1 in column (6). In columns (2), (3), and (7), we use the annual lag
of independent variables, apart from Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Bank Loan Growth. In column (2),
we use the annual lag of Trade Payables as a dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.  denotes
signicance at the 10% level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at the 1%
level.
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6.6 Trade Receivables and Bank Loan Availability
6.6.1 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we investigate the relationship between trade receivables and bank loan avail-
ability. To investigate whether bank loan availability has positive eects on trade receivables,
we estimate the following regression equation:
Trade Receivablesi;t = 1Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t +Yi;t2 + i + i:t: (6.4)
Yi;t is a vector of control variables (Firm Scale, Firm Age, Sales Growth, ROA, Leverage,
Interest Rate, Year Dummy). i;t is the error term for rm i in year t from 2006 to 2009.
i is rm i's xed eects. Following Petersen and Rajan (1997), we use the ratio of a rm's
trade receivables to total sales in year t as a proxy for Trade Receivablesi;t. We regress the
annual dierence in the ratio of trade receivables to total sales because Guaranteei can have
some eects on both the level and the change in Trade Receivablesi;t. We also estimate
the regression using the growth rate of trade receivables [dened as (trade receivables in
year t { trade receivables in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1] because this ratio changes
when total sales decrease, even if trade receivables are constant. Guaranteei is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if a rm satises the requirements of the ECG program.
Y earDummy2009t is a dummy variable with a value of one if the year is 2009, being the year
of the policy change. If rms experiencing higher bank loan availability oer trade credit to
their customers, the coecient of Guaranteei  Y earDummy2009t is positive.
The provision of trade credit to customers is costly for suppliers because it means that
they nance all trade receivables until maturity. Accordingly, if the borrowing constraint
for customers is binding, the suppliers must reduce their level of inventory investment. In
addition, they carry default risk and so must frequently monitor the creditworthiness of
their customers, which also suggests that the suppliers of trade credit bear monitoring costs.
Therefore, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Molina and Preve (2009) conclude, creditworthy
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rms oer more trade credit, whereas rms experiencing nancial distress reduce their oers
of trade credit. In addition, if rms face a reduced supply of bank credit (for example, when
banks charge higher interest rates), they have every incentive to reduce trade credit to their
own customers.
We employ the interest rate and leverage as proxies for rm creditworthiness. We dene
interest rates as the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term
debt and discounted notes receivable in year t{1. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to total
assets in year t{1. We predict that leverage and interest rates exert negative eects on trade
receivables.
Following Petersen and Rajan (1997), we also specify rm scale, rm age, sales growth,
and ROA (as a proxy for protability), as control variables. To control for rm size, we
specify the natural logarithm of the rm's assets. We predict that protable and growing
rms oer more credit, so we expect the estimated coecients for ROA and sales growth to
be positive. Alternatively, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue, the estimated coecients for
ROA and sales growth can be negative because rms that reduce their sales and prots oer
more trade credit to maintain customer relationships. We dene ROA as the ratio of the sum
of a rm's operating income, interest receivables, and dividends to total assets in year t{1.
Sales growth is dened as the annual growth rate of a rm's sales [(sales in year t { sales
in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1]. In justication, Long et al. (1993) demonstrate that
younger rms oer more credit to allow customers to evaluate the quality of their product
prior to payment. Following these results, we expect the estimated coecient for rm age
to have a negative eect on trade credit. For this, we use the natural logarithm of one plus
rm age. Seasonalities and the sales uncertainty of a rm's product depend on the type of
product. Therefore, we control for these eects on trade receivables using rm individual
eects (i;t). Firm individual eects (i;t) also control for the frequency of transactions, (as
argued by Ferris, 1981).
203
6.6.2 Eects of the ECG Program on Trade Receivables
The estimation results are shown in Table 6.7. We estimate equation (6.4) using the xed-
eects model in column (1) and OLS in columns (2) and (3) because the null hypothesis that
all i = 0 is accepted. We show the result using ratios in column (1), the result using the
annual dierence in the ratio of trade receivables to total sales from year t{1 to t in column
(2), and the result using the growth rate of trade receivables in column (3). The estimated
coecients for Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 are positive and statistically signicant at the
1% or 5% level in columns (1) and (2). These results suggest that rms meeting the ECG
program requirements oer more trade credit, which implies that bank loan availability has a
positive eect on trade receivables. However, if we use the growth rate of trade receivables (in
column 3), the coecient of Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 becomes negative and statistically
signicant at the 1% level, which suggests that the relationship between bank availability and
trade receivables is not robust.
As shown in columns (1){(3), the eects of rm age are negative, but not statistically
signicant in columns (1) and (2). The coecients of sales growth and ROA are negative
and statistically signicant at the 1% or 10% level in columns (1) and (2). The interest rate
and leverage have negative eects on trade receivables apart from the result for the interest
rate in column (3), supporting the argument that creditworthy rms oer more trade credit.
6.6.3 IV Regression
Similar to Subsection 6.5.3, we estimate the following regression:
Trade Receivablesi;t = 1Bank Loansi;t +Yi;t2 + i + i:t: (6.5)
i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from 2006 to 2009. i is rm i's xed eects. If rms
that experience enhanced credit availability oer more trade credit to their customers, the
estimated coecient for Bank Loansi;t will be positive. We assume that BankLoansi;t is an
endogenous variable. We use Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 as an instrumental variable. To
test for overidentifying restrictions, we also use Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount
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Table 6.7: Estimation Results for the Eect on Trade Receivables
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables
(Ratio) (Dierence) (Growth)
Guarantee  0.00157 0.00129 -0.00359
Year Dummy2009 (0.00044) (0.00050) (0.00071)
Firm Scale -0.01743 -0.04316 -0.01621
(0.00063) (0.00088) (0.00133)
Firm Age -0.00034 -0.00035 -0.00151
(0.00050) (0.00056) (0.00074)
Sales Growth -0.00144 -0.01180 0.08992
(0.00052) (0.00063) (0.00089)
ROA -0.00278 -0.01210 0.03457
(0.00143) (0.00152) (0.00271)
Interest Rate -0.10738 -0.08994 0.10935
(0.01554) (0.01551) (0.02550)
Leverage -0.00527 -0.00869 -0.00496
(0.00101) (0.00138) (0.00219)
Year = 2007 -0.00123 -0.00174 -0.00332
(0.00026) (0.00034) (0.00049)
Year = 2008 -0.00501 -0.00490 -0.01175
(0.00027) (0.00032) (0.00047)
Year = 2009 -0.01881 -0.01660 -0.03764
(0.00040) (0.00045) (0.00065)
Observations 274,219 245,538 247,331
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.03 0.13
Note: This table presents estimates of the xed-eects (in column 1) and OLS regressions (in columns 2 and
3) with Trade Receivables and Trade Receivables Growth as dependent variables. Trade Receivables is the ratio
of a rm's trade receivables to total sales in year t. Trade Receivables Growth is dened as (a rm's trade
receivables in year t - trade receivables in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1. Leverage is the book value of debt
divided by the book value of assets in year t{1. The denitions of the other independent variables are the same
as those in the notes accompanying Tables 6.1 and 6.3. In column (2), we use the annual lag of dependent
and independent variables, apart from Guarantee  Year Dummy2009. In column (3), we use the annual lag of
independent variables, apart from Guarantee  Year Dummy2009. Standard errors in parentheses.  denotes
signicance at the 10% level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at the 1%
level.
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Table 6.8: Estimation Results for Eect of Bank Loans on Trade Receivables (IV Regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables
(Ratio) (Ratio) (Ratio) (Growth)
Bank Loans 0.06239 0.06672 0.06121 0.38256
(0.01803) (0.00600) (0.00603) (0.15315)
Firm Scale -0.01707 -0.01703 -0.01709 -0.02746
(0.00068) (0.00065) (0.00065) (0.00469)
Firm Age -0.00074 -0.00078 -0.00073 -0.00530
(0.00053) (0.00051) (0.00051) (0.00174)
Sales Growth 0.01028 0.01111 0.01005 0.11082
(0.00351) (0.00127) (0.00128) (0.00833)
ROA 0.01103 0.01216 0.01090 0.05615
(0.00439) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00860)
Interest Rate -0.06589 -0.06269 -0.06635 -0.07359
(0.01996) (0.01650) (0.01645) (0.07864)
Leverage -0.02644 -0.02812 -0.02604 -0.01909
(0.00682) (0.00252) (0.00253) (0.00650)
Year = 2007 -0.00133 -0.00134 -0.00133 -0.00162
(0.00028) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00084)
Year = 2008 -0.00565 -0.00570 -0.00563 -0.00712
(0.00035) (0.00029) (0.00028) (0.00188)
Year = 2009 -0.02143 -0.02169 -0.02136 -0.04701
(0.00112) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00294)
Observations 273,233 273,160 273,160 245,692
J-statistics - 0.077 0.011 0.001
P-value of J-statistics - 0.782 0.915 0.976
Note: This table presents estimates of the two-stage least squares xed-eects regression (columns 1{3) and
the two-stage least squares regression (column 4) with Trade Receivables and Trade Receivables Growth as
dependent variables. Trade Receivables is the ratio of a rm's trade receivables to total sales in year t.
Trade Receivables Growth dened as (a rm's trade receivables in year t - trade receivables in year t-1)/total
assets in year t-1. The instrumental variables are Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 in column (1), Guarantee
 Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans) in year t{1 in column
(2), Guarantee  Year Dummy2009 and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  Bank Loans in year t{1 in column
(3), and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans) in year t{1 and Guarantee  Year
Dummy2009  Cash Holdings in year t{1 in column (4). The denitions of the independent variables and
instrumental variables are the same as those in the notes accompanying Tables 6.3 and 6.7. In column (4), we
use the annual lag of the independent variables, apart from Bank Loan Growth. Standard errors in parentheses.
 denotes signicance at the 10% level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level, and  denotes signicance at
the 1% level.
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of Bank Loans) and Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  Bank Loans in year t{1 as instrumental
variables. The estimation results are shown in columns (1){(3) of Table 6.8. We employ the
two-stage least squares xed-eects model. In columns (2) and (3), the p-values of the
J-statistics are 0.782 and 0.915, respectively, which conrm the null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Therefore, the instrumental variables used
in columns (2) and (3) are valid. In all specications, the estimated coecients for bank
loans are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, which implies that bank loan
availability has positive eects on the provision of trade credit. In contrast to the results
in Table 6.7, the coecients of sales growth turn out to be positive, which suggests that
better-performing rms oer more trade credit to their customers. The estimated results for
leverage and the interest rate are similar to those obtained by the simple model in Table 6.7.
In addition, we use the annual growth rate of trade receivables and bank loans as de-
pendent and independent variables to conrm robustness in column (4) of Table 6.8. We
use Guarantee  Year Dummy2009  ln(Amount of Bank Loans) and Guarantee  Year
Dummy2009  Cash Holdings, which are the same instrumental variables used in Table 6.5.
We estimate the two-stage least squares model because the null hypothesis that all i = 0
is accepted. The p-value of the J-statistic is 0.976, so the requirement for the instruments
is satised. As shown, the estimated coecient for bank loans is positive and statistically
signicant, which suggests that bank loan availability has a positive eect on trade receiv-
ables.10
6.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between bank loan availability and trade credit
during the global nancial crisis using small business data. By adopting a unique identi-
cation strategy, we nd that the substitution hypothesis between bank loan availability and
trade payables is not supported. Instead, we show that the relationship between these sources
10 In the regressions for equations (6.4) and (6.5), we specify trade receivables growth normalized by total
sales. The results are similar with those using trade receivables growth normalized by total assets. However,
with those normalized by total sales, the p-values of the J-statistics are less than the 1% level, which shows
that the correlations between the error terms and the instruments are signicant.
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of nance is complementary. Similar to many previous studies, the relationship between bank
loan availability and trade receivables is positive, which implies that creditworthy rms oer
more trade credit to their customers.
Our ndings have some implications for the ongoing debate about whether trade credit
is inferior to bank loans. As we argued, existing studies (for example, Smith, 1987; Petersen
and Rajan, 1994) argue that the cost of trade credit is extremely high, so the substitution
relationship between trade credit and bank loans is supported. However, we nd that rms
with high levels of bank loan availability also use trade credit, which suggests that bank loans
and trade payables are instead complementary. This implies that trade credit is not inferior
to bank loans.
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Abstract
Highly leveraged small businesses cannot obtain enough credit because of the debt overhang
problem. Therefore, highly leveraged rms may lose potential prots from protable invest-
ment opportunities in which they are unable to invest. On the other hand, highly leveraged
small businesses can enhance their performance because banks and trade creditors monitor
their activity and prevent inecient management. Using small-business data for Japan, we
empirically investigate the relationship between rm performance and leverage. We nd,
rst, that highly leveraged small businesses increase their trade payables less even if they
have investment opportunities. Second, highly leveraged small businesses convert more bills
receivables into cash by selling them to nance companies to nance their growth opportuni-
ties. Third, highly leveraged rms enjoy stronger performance (measured as rm sales growth
or protability) compared with low-leveraged rms. These results highlight the benets of
high leverage for small businesses.
Keywords: leverage; trade credit; bank credit; rm performance; small business
JEL classication: G32; G33
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7.1 Introduction
We investigate how highly leveraged small businesses nance their protable investment op-
portunities, and the relationship between leverage and rm performance for small businesses.
We also focus on the eects of extremely high leverage, which has been regarded as nancial
distress in previous studies (for example, Opler and Titman, 1994). Previous studies showed
that the cost of high leverage can lead to a negative relationship between leverage and rm
performance. First, as Myers (1977) argued, debt overhang problems create underinvestment
problems and cause poor rm performance. Even if rms with high leverage have new in-
vestment projects that generate positive net present values (NPV), they cannot issue new
junior debt. Because the earnings generated by new investment projects are used to pay o
debts to existing debt holders, new junior debtors do not obtain adequate payments from the
earnings of new projects. Therefore, banks and other creditors do not oer credit for new
projects with positive NPVs. As highly leveraged rms cannot obtain enough credit, they
can lose potential prots from protable investment opportunities of which they are unable
to take advantage.
Second, highly leveraged rms have a high probability of bankruptcy on average (Alt-
man, 1984). For creditors, it is dicult to judge whether highly leveraged rms have good
investment opportunities because the information asymmetry between borrowers and cred-
itors is signicant. As a result, highly leveraged rms with positive NPVs cannot nd new
creditors, and they lose potential earnings from new projects. In the case of small businesses,
the asymmetric information is more severe (Berger and Udell, 1998). Third, some papers
(for example, Cole et al., 2004) argued that large banks mitigate the information asymme-
try for small businesses by using hard information, such as information from rms' nancial
statements.1 However, banks might deny loan applications from highly leveraged (generally,
nancially weak) small businesses, even if they face protable investment opportunities.
The corporate nance literature for large and listed rms mainly focuses on the cost of
high leverage. In contrast, especially for small businesses, the benets of high leverage have
1Caneghem and Campenhout (2012) showed that the quality of nancial statements increases borrower's
leverage.
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been established. First, according to Storey (1994), \small business owners do not have to
concern themselves with reporting their actions to external shareholders, and so `performance
monitoring' eectively does not exist" (p. 11). If small businesses use high levels of debt (i.e.,
bank loans or trade credit), banks and trade partners monitor the activity of small businesses
and prevent inecient management.
Second, as Jensen (1986) argued, the threat of defaulting on debt payments makes rms
more ecient.2 As highly leveraged rms that have large amounts of debt have to pay o
debts and make interest payments, they have an incentive to earn more cash from ecient
investments and to enhance their performance. Furthermore, because of the threat of de-
fault on debt payments, they do not increase their debts and nance protable investment
opportunities without using debt. In the case of small businesses, owners lose personal assets
when their rms default because these assets generally are pledged as collateral. Therefore,
the incentive for ecient management is strong in highly leveraged small businesses.
Third, as highly leveraged rms have greater access to credit than low-leveraged rms,
they enjoy greater competitiveness (Campello, 2006). The information asymmetry between
small businesses and creditors is signicant, which leads to credit rationing for small busi-
nesses. More highly leveraged small businesses and their creditors might mitigate the infor-
mation problem using some form of lending technology (argued in Berger and Udell, 2006),
so that these rms can improve their performance.
Many studies investigated the cost of high leverage for borrowers using data on listed
rms. Opler and Titman (1994) is a leading empirical study about high leverage. They
showed that highly leveraged rms, which are more likely to be nancially distressed, lose
their sales and operating incomes in industry downturns. As a result, they lose some of their
substantial market shares to their more conservatively nanced competitors. Similarly, Lang
et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005), Ahn et al. (2006), and Cai and Zhang (2011) found
negative relationships between leverage and rm performance. Using small-business data,
Weill (2008) investigated the relationships between leverage and rm performance and found
2As Berger and Udell (1998) argued, the agency problem between shareholders and managers and the
free cash ow problem discussed by Jensen (1986) is not signicant in the case of small businesses because
ownership and control generally are not separated.
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that these relationships are either positive or negative using data of EU countries. Agostino
and Trivieri (2010) also argued that the performance of rms with higher bank debts is lower
and that the negative eects are weakened by the high competition between banks in Italy.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between leverage and rm performance,
focusing on small businesses. As we argued, the relationship between leverage and rm
performance can be either positive or negative for small businesses, but few studies have
investigated this relationship empirically using small-business data. Furthermore, previous
empirical studies have mainly focused on the cost of high leverage. To overcome the limita-
tions of previous studies, we use rm-level data from about 90,000 small businesses located
in Japan after 1998 to investigate the relationship between leverage and rm performance.
Small-business data from Japan are suitable for investigating the relationship between
leverage and rm performance. According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) (in Table
1), the ratio of bank assets to GDP in Japan is the third highest among the 63 countries
considered in the study.3 Therefore, the Japanese credit market is regarded as a bank-based
nancial system. Access to bank loans in Japan for small businesses is considered to be easier
than in other developed countries. As a result, the leverage of small businesses is higher. In
fact, the average leverage rate in our data is 0.90 (see Table 7.3), which is higher than the
leverage of small businesses in the EU (shown in Joeveer, 2013). Japanese data include a
large number of very highly leveraged small businesses, which is the main dierence between
our database and that of previous studies. Therefore, we can investigate more accurately
whether the costs and benets of high leverage are signicant for small businesses using
Japanese data.
The main ndings of this paper are as follows. First, we investigate whether highly lever-
aged rms can acquire enough credit from banks or trade partners when they face protable
investment opportunities. Previous studies have argued that highly leveraged rms cannot
acquire enough credit compared with low-leveraged rms if the debt overhang problem is se-
rious. Our results show that short-term borrowings from banks and trade payables for highly
leveraged small businesses do not increase even if the small businesses have protable invest-
3Switzerland has the highest ratio, while Hong Kong has the second highest.
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ment opportunities. Second, we investigate whether highly leveraged small businesses can
obtain alternative nancing to bank loans and trade payables. Small businesses can choose
ways of nancing protable investment opportunities, such as discounting bills receivables
and factoring. If highly leveraged rms face some constraint on using bank loans and trade
payables, they can use alternative ways of nancing their protable investment opportunities
to mitigate this credit constraint. Our results show that highly leveraged rms with signi-
cant investment opportunities are most likely to convert bills receivables into cash by selling
them to nance companies.
Third, we estimate the ex post rm performance of highly leveraged small businesses. If
the cost of high leverage creates signicant problems for small businesses, highly leveraged
rms lose potential prots and sales. As a result, their ex post performance should be
lower than that of low-leveraged rms, after controlling for the eects of rm characteristics
and unobserved time-invariant xed eects. On the other hand, if highly leveraged rms
reduce their level of debt to avoid the cost of bankruptcy, their ex post performance will
not be lower. In addition, if the benet of leverage for rm eciency is signicant, rm
ex post performance can be higher. We nd that the performance (measured as industry-
adjusted rm sales growth or protability) of highly leveraged rms is higher than that of low-
leveraged rms in Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This result implies that the
benet of high leverage is signicant for small businesses because the high leverage makes the
management of small businesses more ecient. The results also imply that highly leveraged
small businesses decrease their amount of debt to avoid the cost of bankruptcy because
they can nance investment opportunities without using bank loans and trade payables.
Many previous studies have shown that the negative relationship between leverage and rm
performance is supported using data on listed rms. We show that for small businesses,
a positive relationship between leverage and rm performance is supported, even if small
businesses are extremely leveraged and regarded as nancially distressed. This nding is our
contribution to the literature.
Our paper has implications for studies investigating what types of small businesses face
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credit constraints. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) argued that
small businesses with shorter relationships with banks are credit rationed or use higher-cost
sources of nance. Furthermore, Canton et al. (2013) argued that the smallest and youngest
small businesses perceive themselves as having low accessibility to bank loans. Bottazzi
et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between credit constraints and rm performance
of small businesses, and found that nancial constraints in small businesses lower their sales
growth. However, to our knowledge, few studies have investigated the seriousness of nancial
constraints caused by high leverage focusing on small businesses.
Our paper also has some implications for studies examining the relationship between trade
credit and bank loans using rm-level data on small businesses. Many previous studies have
claimed that small rms use trade credit when bank loans are not available because the cost
of trade credit is extremely high. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) showed that
small rms with short relationships with banks use trade credit more because credit from
banks is unavailable. However, few studies have investigated how small businesses nance
their investment opportunities if bank loans and trade credit are unavailable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes our data set
and the characteristics of highly leveraged rms. We discuss the hypothesis and empirical
strategy in Section 7.3 and present our empirical results in Section 7.4. In Section 7.5, we
discuss the robustness of our results. Section 7.6 concludes the paper.
7.2 Data
7.2.1 Database of Small Businesses
In this study, we use rm-level data on small businesses in Japan from 1996 to 2006. The
data are from the Credit Risk Database for Small and Medium Enterprises (CRD), which
was established by several nancial institutions and credit guarantee corporations under the
guidance of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan and is managed by the CRD
Association.
The rst quartile of employees is ve, the median is 12, and the third quartile is 32. The
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distribution of employees suggests that the CRD data include many micro rms: these are
typically more informationally opaque. The 99th percentile of employees is 285; therefore, our
sample also includes some larger small businesses. The detailed distribution of the number
of observations by sector, sales, total assets, and number of employees is shown in Table 7.1.
7.2.2 Denition of Leverage
Following Opler and Titman (1994), we dene leverage as the book value of debts divided by
the book value of assets in year t-2. We use book values rather than market values because
the market values of debt and assets for small businesses are unavailable. Lower-performing
rms are likely to make large losses and to increase short-term borrowing to cover the losses,
so the current leverage and rm performance can be negatively correlated. Therefore, similar
to Opler and Titman (1994), we use ex ante leverage in year t-2 to avoid the endogeneity
problem and spurious correlation. Furthermore, following Opler and Titman (1994) and
Molina and Preve (2012), we use dummy variables to indicate whether a rm's leverage is in
the top two deciles of its industry in a particular year as a proxy of leverage (hereafter, we
refer to the variable as the High-leverage Dummy).
7.2.3 Performance of Highly Leveraged Firms
In Table 7.2, we show quartiles of the ratio of industry-adjusted operating income to total
assets (hereafter, the industry-adjusted operating income ratio), the industry-adjusted sales
growth rate, and the industry-adjusted operating income growth rate for both highly lever-
aged and non-highly leveraged groups, divided by the high-leverage dummy.4 Panel A shows
that the industry-adjusted operating income ratios of the highly leveraged group have a wide
range. For example, the third quartile of the industry-adjusted operating income ratio for the
4The industry-adjusted operating income ratio is dened as the ratio of operating income to total assets,
calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial classication averaged
for two years from year t to t+1. Industry-adjusted sales growth is dened as the growth rate of sales for
two years from t-1 to t+1 ([salest+1 { salest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value in the
medium category in the industrial classication. The industry-adjusted operating incomes growth is dened
as the growth rate of operating incomes for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([operating incomest+1 { operating
incomest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial
classication.
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Table 7.1: Distribution of Observations by Sectors, Sales, Total Assets, and Number of
Employees
Panel A: Sectors
Freq. Percent Cum.
Food 40,168 11.01 11.01
Textile Mill Products 27,879 7.64 18.65
Lumber and Wood Products - except Furniture 17,422 4.77 23.42
Furniture and Fixtures 6,638 1.82 25.24
Pulp - Paper and Paper Products 9,147 2.51 27.75
Printing and Allied Industries 26,618 7.29 35.04
Chemical and Allied Products 7,539 2.07 37.11
Petroleum and Coal Products 464 0.13 37.23
Plastic Products- except Otherwise Classied 9,148 2.51 39.74
Rubber Products 2,141 0.59 40.33
Leather Tanning - Leather Products and Fur Skins 1,225 0.34 40.66
Ceramic - Stone and Clay Products 15,919 4.36 45.03
Iron, Steel, and Metal 72,188 19.78 64.81
General Machinery and Precision Instruments 54,453 14.92 79.73
Electrical Machinery - Equipment and Supplies 23,957 6.56 86.29
Transportation Equipment 17,687 4.85 91.14
Others 32,332 8.86 100
Panel B: Sales
(million yen) Freq. Percent Cum.
-100 121,295 33.24 33.24
100-500 137,694 37.73 70.97
500-1000 42,390 11.62 82.59
1000- 63,546 17.41 100
Panel C: Number of Employees
Freq. Percent Cum.
-5 94,942 26.02 26.02
6-20 140,627 38.54 64.55
21-100 104,124 28.53 93.09
101- 25,232 6.91 100
Panel D: Total Assets
(million yen) Freq. Percent Cum.
-100 136,758 37.48 37.48
100-500 127,039 34.81 72.29
500-1000 39,946 10.95 83.23
1000- 61,182 16.77 100
Note: This table shows the frequency and percentage distribution for the number of observations divided by sector,
sales, total assets and number of employees.
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Table 7.2: Distribution of Performance of Highly Leveraged and Non-highly Leveraged Firms
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Operating Income Ratio
p25 Median p75 IQR
Non-highly Leveraged -1.82 0.88 3.33 5.15
Highly Leveraged -5.68 0.54  4.97 10.65
Total -2.30 0.85 3.55 5.84
Panel B: Industry-adjusted Sales Growth
p25 Median p75 IQR
Non-highly Leveraged -17.52 -1.66 14.44 31.97
Highly Leveraged -26.68 -5.57  14.72 41.40
Total -19.00 -2.26 14.49 33.49
Pane C: Industry-adjusted Operating Income Growth
p25 Median p75 IQR
Non-highly Leveraged -3.68 -0.45 2.94 6.61
Highly Leveraged -7.15 -0.37  7.01 14.16
Total -4.10 -0.44 3.44 7.54
Note: This table shows the quartiles of the industry-adjusted operating income ratio, sales growth, and
operating income growth. The industry-adjusted operating income ratio is dened as the ratio of operating
income to total assets, calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial
classication averaged for two years from year t to t+1. The industry-adjusted sales growth is dened as the
growth rate of sales for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([salest+1 { salest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the
mean value in the medium category in the industrial classication. The industry-adjusted operating incomes
growth is dened as the growth rate of operating incomes for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([operating incomest+1
{ operating incomest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the
industrial classication. The numbers are expressed in percentage terms. We test the null hypothesis that
the median of each variable is equal between observations for highly and non-highly leveraged rms using the
Wilcoxon{Mann{Whitney test. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and  denotes
signicance at the 1 percent level.
highly leveraged group is 4.97, which is higher than that for rms in the non-highly leveraged
group. The rst quartile of the operating income ratio for rms in the highly leveraged group
is -5.68, which is lower than that for rms in the non-highly leveraged group. The interquar-
tile range (IQR) is higher for the highly leveraged group, implying that highly leveraged
rms are more likely to be either strong or weak performers. We also show the quartiles of
industry-adjusted sales growth (in panel B) and industry-adjusted operating income growth
(in panel C). Both panels show that the trend in the distribution of sales and operating
income growth is similar to that in panel A, also suggesting that highly leveraged rms are
more likely to be either strong or weak performers.
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7.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we use econometric methods to investigate whether nancial institutions and
trade partners oer less credit to highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities.
Furthermore, we investigate the ex post performance of highly leveraged rms.
7.3.1 Hypothesis
The debt overhang problem can mean that highly leveraged rms are unable to obtain enough
credit from banks and suppliers, even if they have new projects with positive NPVs (Myers,
1977). As new creditors obtain only small payments from the earnings of new projects, they
do not oer new credit for highly leveraged rms that have projects with positive NPVs. In
addition, Altman (1984) argued that highly leveraged rms face diculties in obtaining credit
to nance new opportunities because, on average, there is a high possibility of bankruptcy
of highly leveraged rms. In the case of small-business nance, the asymmetric information
between lender and borrowers is more severe (Berger and Udell, 1998), so the leveraged small
businesses face strict nancial constraints. Furthermore, banks (especially large banks) will
reduce the number of loans to small businesses if they screen small-business borrowers based
on hard information, such as nancial statements (Cole et al., 2004).
On the other hand, highly leveraged rms have an incentive to reduce their level of
debt because they have to avoid the cost of bankruptcy. We predict that highly leveraged
rms with good investment opportunities have less reliance on bank loans and trade payables.
Furthermore, if these rms do not increase credit available to them from nancial institutions
and trade partners to nance new opportunities, we predict that highly leveraged rms with
better investment opportunities obtain credit instead of using bank loans and trade payables.
To discover whether the cost of high leverage is signicant for small businesses, we inves-
tigate whether the performance of highly leveraged rms is lower than that of low-leveraged
rms. Because of information asymmetry in the credit market, small businesses generally
cannot issue bonds or equity. As a result, their creditors are limited to banks and suppliers
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Therefore, if banks and suppliers reduce credit for highly lever-
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aged small businesses and alternative ways of nancing are unavailable, rm performance is
likely to deteriorate. If the cost of high leverage (i.e., the debt overhang problem and the
high cost of borrowing) is a signicant problem for small businesses, the eects of leverage
should be negative. In contrast, in the case of small businesses, the monitoring activities of
shareholders are weak because small businesses are unlisted rms, and the owners and share-
holders generally are not separated (Storey, 1994). Additionally, banks and trade creditors
monitor indebted small businesses eciently using lending technologies, as argued by Berger
and Udell (2006). Furthermore, many small businesses pledge the owners' assets as collateral,
so owners have an incentive to avoid default. As a result, highly leveraged rms are more
ecient in earning sucient cash ow. If the high level of debt makes small businesses more
ecient, the eects of leverage should be positive in small businesses.
7.3.2 Alternative Ways of Financing for Highly Leveraged Firms
In addition to using bank loans and trade payables, small businesses have two other means
of obtaining nance; namely, discounting bills receivables and factoring. Factoring and sell-
ing bills receivables are easier methods of nancing for highly leveraged rms. 5 In Japan,
factoring is not popular for small businesses because they can discount (liquidate) bills re-
ceivables more easily, which is called \Tegata Waribiki" in Japanese.6 Both the banks and
nance companies involved in discounting bills receivable (called \Tegata Waribiki Gyousha"
in Japanese) underwrite the bills receivable. Bills receivables are sold to banks with recourse,
so underwriting is based on the risk of the bills receivables themselves and the rm that
holds the bills. Banks do not accept the risk of default of the bills, so discounting rates are
not high in banks. According to reports from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI)7, banks underwrite bills using low discount rates of about 1 to 3 percent. However,
highly leveraged rms cannot sell bills to banks because they and their bills have a high credit
5According to Klapper (2006), factoring is \a type of supplier nancing in which rms sell their creditworthy
accounts receivable at a discount (generally equal to interest plus service fees) and receive immediate cash."
(pp. 3111{3112). See Klapper (2006) for a detailed discussion about factoring.
6See Matsumura and Ryser (1995) for details about bill discounting in Japan.
7See pp. 79{80 in \Hacchu hoshikitou torihikijyouken kaizenchousa jigyouhoukokusho
2011 (Study to improve trading conditions such as ordering systems)", downloaded from
http://www.meti.go.jp/meti lib/report/2012fy/E002152.pdf (last accessed: April 2014)
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risk.
In contrast, nance companies underwrite the bills with nonrecourse clauses, in exchange
for high discounting rates. Underwriting is based on the risk of the bills receivables themselves
rather than the risk of the rm holding the bills, so highly leveraged rms can sell bills
to nance companies. When rms with high credit risk have bills receivables, they can
acquire money easily by selling these receivables at a high discount rate. For example,
according to Turnaround PARTNERS GUIDE 2012, 72 percent of customers in one large
nance company were uncreditworthy rms (rms oered debt payment rescheduling by
banks or civil rehabilitation rms)8; however, these rms sell bills to nance companies at
high annual discount rates, from 6 to 15 percent. As Table 7.3 shows, the median interest
rate in each small business is 2.39 percent. Therefore, discounting bills receivables to nance
companies is a high-cost nancing method for small businesses. We predict that highly
leveraged rms sell more bills receivables at a high discount than creditworthy rms.
7.3.3 Financial Sources
Equation
To investigate which nancial sources are used by highly leveraged rms with greater invest-
ment opportunities, we estimate the following regression.
yi;t 1!t+1 = 1Leveragei;t 2 + 2Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 (7.1)
+ 3Leveragei;t 2  Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 + Zi;t 14
+ i + i;t
where yi;t 1!t+1 is a dependent variable for rm i from year t-1 to t+1.9 We use short-term
borrowings growth, trade payables growth, trade receivables growth, and the bills discount
8See the article \Tegata waribiki ni tokka shite shikin choutatsu wo shien" (Support for bills discounting
in business nance), pp. 66{67, Turnaround PARTNERS GUIDE 2012.
9Following previous studies, we use the independent variables from t-1 to t+1. The results are similar if
we use the independent variables from t to t+1.
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as dependent variables. To focus on the additional funds available after the distress period,
we use the growth rate of each variable from year t-1 to year t+1 as dependent variables.
Each growth rate is normalized by total assets in year t-1. The bills discount is dened as
the ratio of a rm's discounting bills receivables to total trade receivables, averaged using
those in years t and t+1. Zi;t 1 is a set of control variables in year t-1. We also control for
unobserved rm heterogeneity through an individual eect i. i;t is the error term of rm i
in year t. We estimate standard errors based on clustering across rms.
In this paper, we focus on short-term credit to nance inventory investment and work-
ing capital. As rms with greater investment opportunities need more external funds to
nance working capital or inventory investment, they increase their short-term credit. The
coecients of Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 should be positive if banks or trade cred-
itors oer credit to rms with greater investment opportunities. As we argued, lenders do
not oer sucient credit if highly leveraged rms have greater investment opportunities. If
highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities do not use bank loans and trade
payables, whereas low-leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities do use them, the
coecients of Leveragei;t 2 Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 for short-term borrowings
and trade payables growth should be negative. The negative coecients of the interaction
variables mean that the positive eects of Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 are weakened
if rms are highly leveraged. The coecients of Leveragei;t 2 are assumed to be negative be-
cause creditors do not oer debt facilities for uncreditworthy borrowers, and highly leveraged
rms have an incentive to decrease their amount of debt.10
Furthermore, if highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities use other
nancing sources, including reducing their trade receivables and discounting bills receiv-
ables, they decrease the amount of trade receivables on their balance sheets. As a re-
sult, the coecients of Leveragei;t 2  Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 should be neg-
ative for trade receivables growth. If rms sell bills receivables to increase their cash hold-
10If creditors acknowledge the positive NPV of projects (not the burden of debts), they oer credit for
highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities. If this eect is strong, the coecients of
Leveragei;t 2  Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 should be positive. The reason is that the negative
eects of Leveragei;t 2 are weakened when rms have greater investment opportunities.
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ings, the amount of discounted bills receivables is larger. As a result, the coecients of
Leveragei;t 2Investment opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 should be positive for bill discounts. The
coecient of Investment opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 for trade receivables growth rates is expected
to be positive because rms that are expanding their businesses increase trade receivables for
their customers.
Proxies of Investment Opportunities
As Petersen and Rajan (1994) argued, investment opportunities for small businesses depend
on the industry of the rm. We use the performance of the industries that the rms operate in
as proxies of investment opportunities. Firms in strongly performing industries face greater
investment opportunities because they need inventory investment to expand their business.
We use the diusion index of business conditions (hereafter called the \business DI") from the
Bank of Japan's TANKAN survey (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises)11 as a proxy
for the level of investment opportunities.12 According to the web site of the Bank of Japan13,
the TANKAN survey is \conducted to provide an accurate picture of the business trends of
enterprises in Japan". It is conducted quarterly in March, June, September, and December.
The Bank of Japan sends the TANKAN questionnaires to rms with 50 or more workers. The
target rms are randomly sampled using data from the Establishment and Enterprise Census
conducted by the Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications. The survey questions
use the following format. \Please choose one of the three alternatives that best describes
the current (from three months earlier) and forecasted survey, excluding seasonal factors."
One survey item relates to the business conditions of respondents, who are asked to select
one option from the following three alternatives: 1) \favorable"; 2) \not so favorable"; or 3)
\unfavorable". The diusion index is dened as the percentage of rms selecting \favorable"
less the percentage of rms selecting \unfavorable." We use the business DI for small and
11The business DI is available on the web site of the Bank of Japan (last accessed: April 2014)
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/tk/gaiyo/2001/index.htm/).
12In previous studies using data on listed rms, the level of investment opportunities is measured by the
market-to-book ratio or Tobin's Q. In our studies using data on nonlisted rms, the market-to-book ratio and
Tobin's Q are unavailable.
13http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/outline/exp/tk/extk.htm/#01 (last accessed: April 2014)
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medium enterprises dened under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law. Industries
with a higher business DI face better business conditions, so rms in these industries have
better investment opportunities. As CRD data are annual and TANKAN data are seasonal,
the TANKAN data are averaged for the two scal years to match the CRD data. The business
DI for the medium category in the Japan Standardized Industrial Classication is available.
Control Variables
The control variables are the natural log of (1+sales) in year t-1, the ratio of operating income
to total assets in year t-1 (the Operating Income Ratio), the growth rate of sales from t-1
to t+1 (Sales Growth) , the ratio of current assets to total assets in year t-1 (the Current
Assets Ratio), the ratio of cash holdings to current liabilities in year t-1 (the Cash{Current
Liabilities Ratio), the ratio of tangible xed assets to total liabilities in year t-1 (the Tangible
Fixed Assets Ratio), a rm's average interest rate in year t-1 (the Interest Rate), and the
Annual Change in the Interest Rate from year t-1 to year t. A rm's average interest rate
is dened as the ratio of that rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term
debt and discounted bills receivables. The denition of each variable is also given in the notes
for each table.
Our hypothesis for the control variables is as follows. We use the operating income ratios
as indicators of rm performance. High-performing rms generally have sucient cash ow;
therefore, they do not need more short-term credit. In contrast, poorly performing rms are
more likely to default; therefore, creditors reduce the credit supply to these rms. In sum, the
ratios of operating and ordinary incomes have some eect on trade payables and short-term
borrowings, although the signs of the coecients are ambiguous. Growing rms that have
to nance increasing amounts of working capital need trade credit and/or short-term bank
credit. Therefore, we hypothesize that the coecient on sales growth is positive. Because
rms with a higher current assets ratio nance their working capital needs until maturity,
they must increase trade credit and/or short-term bank credit. Thus, we hypothesize that
the coecient on the current assets ratio is positive.
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The cash{current liabilities ratio measures the liquidity of rms given that rms with a
lower level of liquidity are less likely to pay o their credit by the due date. Therefore, the
credit risk of these rms is higher, and creditors are more likely to reduce credit to these
rms. We hypothesize that the coecient on the cash{current liabilities ratio is positive for
trade payables and short-term borrowings growth. The tangible xed assets ratio is a proxy
for collateral assets. Banks in Japan generally are secured lenders, whereas trade partners
are unsecured lenders. As a result, rms that have more tangible xed assets use bank
loans more; therefore, the coecient on the tangible xed assets ratio should be positive for
short-term borrowings. Furthermore, rms with less tangible xed assets use trade payables
more; therefore, the coecient on the tangible xed assets ratio should be negative for trade
payables. We can also calculate the average interest rate on bank credit using a rm's balance
sheets and prot and loss statements. The interest rate on bank credit has a negative eect
on short-term borrowings and a positive eect on trade payables. We hypothesize that the
coecients for the levels and changes in interest rates are negative for short-term borrowings
and positive for trade payables. We include the natural logarithm of 1+sales14 and year
dummies. As industry eects are subsumed into rm xed eects (i), we do not use industry
dummies as control variables.
7.3.4 Firm Performance
Equation
To investigate whether the cost of high leverage is signicant for small businesses, we estimate
the following regression:
Firm Performancei;t 1!t+1 = 1Leveragei;t 2 +Xi;t 12 + i + i;t (7.2)
where Xi;t is a matrix of control variables, i;t is the error term of rm i in year t from 1998 to
2005, and i are the unobserved time-invariant eects for rm i. We estimate standard errors
based on clustering across rms. If highly leveraged rms encounter severe constraints, these
14When the sales of rms are zero, we set the value of this variable equal to 1.
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rms will experience poorer performance because they lose potential prots and investment
opportunities. Therefore, we predict that 1 is statistically negative if these rms lose poten-
tial prots and the costs of high leverage are signicant. We use the ratio of book values of
debts to assets and the high-leverage dummy (which equals one if a rm's leverage is in the
top two deciles of its industry in a particular year) in year t-2 as proxies of Leveragei;t 2.
Our sample comprises data on unlisted small businesses; therefore, performance data
using stock returns or Tobin's Q are unavailable.15 Instead, we use accounting prot as a
proxy for rm performance. We employ several other proxies for rm performance. First,
we use the ratio of operating income to total assets, calculated by subtracting the mean
value in the medium category in the industrial classication (the industry-adjusted operating
income ratio) averaged for two years from year t to t+1. Similar to Opler and Titman
(1994) and Molina and Preve (2012), we also use the growth rate of sales for the two years
from t-1 to t+1 ([salest+1 { salest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value
in the medium category in the industrial classication (industry-adjusted sales growth) and
that of operating incomes for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([operating incomest+1 { operating
incomest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in
the industrial classication (the industry-adjusted operating income growth) as a proxy for
rm performance.16
Control Variables
We specify rm scale, rm age, and the current assets to total assets ratio in year t-1 as
control variables. Furthermore, following Opler and Titman (1994), we use the industry-
adjusted operating incomes to assets ratio in year t-1, industry-adjusted tangible xed assets
growth from year t-2 to t-1, and industry-adjusted total assets growth from year t-2 to t-117
as control variables. We include rm scale and rm age to control for rm characteristics.
15For example, Kang and Stulz (2000) specied stock returns as a proxy for rm performance in considering
listed rms.
16From a textbook point of view, the objective of rms is to maximize prots. However, an increase in sales
is not always consistent with prot maximization. Despite this, many previous studies (for example, Opler and
Titman, 1994; Molina and Preve, 2012) have used real growth in total sales as a proxy for rm performance.
17Industry-adjusted (tangible xed) assets growth is calculated as (tangible xed) assets growth calculated
by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial classication.
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We use the ratio of current assets to total assets as our proxy for liquidity. We control for
the eects of capital and inventory investment in prior years by adding tangible xed assets
and total assets growth rates in the estimation equations. We include year dummies for all
years except the rst year. To control the eects of industry-specic business cycles, we also
include the proxy of investment opportunities dened in Subsection 7.3.3.
We lack complete information about the determinants of rm performance, although
certain information, such as the owner's abilities and the legal type of rms, is likely to be
important. In particular, the rms that are managed by owners with lower abilities are likely
to suer large losses and a large debt burden to compensate for the loss. If we estimate
equation (7.2) using simple OLS, the eects of owner's abilities are omitted, and the error
terms include these eects. As owner abilities can be correlated with the level of leverage,
we need to counter the potential problem of omitted variables. As we employ panel data,
we can estimate rm performance using a xed-eects model to eliminate the time-invariant
unobserved eects.
Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 7.3. In
Table 7.4, we show the median value of the dependent and independent variables, divided by
the high-leverage dummy. The medians of ln(1+sales), ln(1+rm age), cash{current liabilities
ratio, and tangible assets ratio in the highly leveraged group are smaller and statistically
signicant, suggesting that rms in the highly leveraged group are smaller and younger.
Furthermore, they have less collateralizable assets.
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7.4 Results
7.4.1 Short-term Borrowings and Trade Payables
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 7.5 present the results of equation (7.1) using short-term bor-
rowings growth rates [(short-term borrowingst+1 { short-term borrowingst 1)/total assetst 1]
as the dependent variable. The coecients of leverage and the high-leverage dummy are neg-
ative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, which implies that highly leveraged
rms use bank loans less often than low-leveraged rms. The coecient of leverage  in-
vestment opportunities is negative but not statistically signicant. On the other hand, the
coecient of the high-leverage dummy  investment opportunities is negative and statisti-
cally signicant at the 1 percent level. The eects of investment opportunities for short-term
borrowings are not statistically signicant. In sum, the result in column (2) suggests that
rms with greater investment opportunities in the highly leveraged group use short-term
borrowings less than rms in the non-highly leveraged group. Furthermore, from the results
for investment opportunities, rms with good investment opportunities do not increase their
bank loans. As we predicted, the coecients of the current assets ratio, the cash{current
liabilities ratio, and the tangible xed assets ratio are positive, and the coecients of the
annual change in interest rates are negative. These coecients are all statistically signicant
at the 1 percent level. However, the coecients of sales growth are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level, implying that growing rms do not use bank loans. The
coecients of the level of interest rates are positive and statistically signicant.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 7.5, we present the estimation results using the trade
payables growth rates [(trade payablest+1 { trade payablest 1)/total assetst 1] as the depen-
dent variable. In column (3), we show the results for leverage. The coecient of leverage
is negative for trade payables growth and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, sug-
gesting that trade creditors decrease payables for highly leveraged rms. The coecient of
the proxy of investment opportunities is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent
level, suggesting that rms with greater investment opportunities have larger trade payables,
not bank loans. In contrast, the coecient of leverage  investment opportunities is statis-
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Table 7.5: Regression Results for the Eects on Short-term Borrowings and Trade Payables
for Financially Distressed and Nondistressed Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Trade Payables
Leverage -0.06354 -0.01853
(0.00405) (0.00154)
Leverage -0.00002 -0.00006
 Investment Opportunities (0.00006) (0.00002)
High Leverage Dummy -0.02702 -0.00824
(0.00226) (0.00109)
High Leverage Dummy -0.00020 -0.00013
 Investment Opportunities (0.00005) (0.00002)
Investment Opportunities -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00016 0.00013
(0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Sales Growth -0.00655 -0.00674 0.06793 0.06787
(0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00084) (0.00083)
Operating Income Ratio 0.02709 0.00759 0.04731 0.04167
(0.00496) (0.00484) (0.00251) (0.00242)
Current Asset Ratio 0.05272 0.05504 -0.11674 -0.11605
(0.00536) (0.00535) (0.00311) (0.00311)
Cash-C.Liability Ratio 0.03019 0.03109 0.00516 0.00541
(0.00064) (0.00064) (0.00023) (0.00023)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.01746 0.01935 -0.00660 -0.00606
(0.00063) (0.00064) (0.00036) (0.00036)
Interest Rate 0.00420 0.00397 -0.00091 -0.00098
(0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00033) (0.00033)
Annual Change -0.00799 -0.00806 -0.00169 -0.00171
in Interest Rate (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00024) (0.00024)
ln(1+sales) -0.00204 0.00113 -0.01133 -0.01044
(0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00119) (0.00117)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 364,925 364,925 364,925 364,925
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.16
Note: This table presents estimates of xed-eects regressions with Short-term Borrowings Growth and Trade
Payables Growth as dependent variables. Short-term Borrowings Growth is the growth rate of a rm's
short-term borrowings [(short-term borrowingst+1{short-term borrowingst 1)/total assetst 1]. Trade Payables
Growth is the growth rate of a rm's trade payables [(trade payablest+1{trade payablest 1)/total assetst 1].
Leverage is dened as the ratio of a rm's total liabilities to its total assets in year t-2. High-leverage Dummy
takes a value of one if a rm's leverage in year t-2 is in the top two deciles of its industry in a particular year.
Investment Opportunities denotes the business DI, averaged over year t to year t+1. Operating Income Ratio
is the ratio of a rm's operating income to total assets in year t-1. Sales Growth is the growth rate of a rm's
sales [(salest + 1-salest 1)/salest 1]. The Current Assets Ratio is the ratio of current assets, excluding cash,
to total assets in year t-1. The Cash{Current Liabilities Ratio is the ratio of a rm's cash holdings to current
liabilities in year t-1. The Tangible Fixed Assets Ratio is the ratio of a rm's tangible xed assets (the sum
of the book value of buildings and land) to total debts in year t-1. The Interest Rate is the ratio of a rm's
interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted bills receivables for each
year in year t-1. Annual Change in Interest Rate is the Interest Rate in year t minus the Interest Rate in year
t-1. lm(1+Sales) is the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year t-1. We include nine year dummies from 1999
to 2005. The reference year is 1998. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on clustering across
rms. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level,
and  denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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tically negative at the 5 percent level. Although rms with greater investment opportunities
have larger trade payables, this is not the case for highly leveraged rms. These results imply
that highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities have diculty in increasing
trade payables. Column (4) shows the results using the high-leverage dummy. Similar to the
results in column (3), the coecient of the high-leverage dummy is negative and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the coecient of the high-leverage dummy 
investment opportunities is negative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. These
results imply that highly leveraged rms with greater investment opportunities have lower
trade payables than low-leveraged rms.
In contrast to our expectations, the eects of the current assets ratio and interest rate
are negative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. As we argued, the current
assets ratio is a proxy of a rm's short-term credit demand. Firms with higher short-term
credit demand have more short-term borrowings, and therefore these rms might decrease
their trade payables. The other control variables are consistent with our predictions.
Our results in Table 7.5 imply that rms with good investment opportunities have larger
trade payables. In contrast, highly leveraged rms with good investment opportunities do not
have larger trade payables than low-leveraged rms. These results imply that the costs of high
leverage (in terms of the diculty in obtaining credit to nance investment opportunities)
are supported by our rm-level data.
7.4.2 Alternative Ways of Financing
If small businesses need more funds to nance their investment opportunities, they use al-
ternative and expensive ways of nancing to mitigate nancial shortages. To investigate
the use of alternative nancial sources, we estimate equation (7.1) using trade receivables
growth [dened as (trade receivablest+1 { trade receivablest 1)/total assetst 1] and the bills
discount rate [dened as a rm's discounted bills receivables/(trade receivables + discounted
bills receivables), averaged over two years from t to t+1] as dependent variables. If highly
leveraged rms with investment opportunities sell bills receivables or use factoring services,
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the amount of trade receivables in rms' balance sheets decreases. As a result, the coe-
cients of Leveragei;t 2Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 for trade receivables growth are
negative. Highly leveraged rms with good investment opportunities can sell bills receivables
at a signicant discount rate in exchange for immediate money to nance their investment
opportunities. The more bills receivables they sell at a discount, the more likely it is that
the coecients of Leveragei;t 2Investment Opportunitiesi;t 1!t+1 for the discounted bills
rate are positive.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7.6, we show the results for the trade receivables growth
rate. The coecients of the proxies of investment opportunities are positive and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level, which suggests that rms in the industries with greater
investment opportunities have more trade receivables. The coecient of leverage  invest-
ment opportunities is negative and statistically signicant at the 10 percent level, suggesting
that highly leveraged rms with good investment opportunities have less trade receivables
than low-leveraged rms. However, the coecient of the high-leverage dummy  investment
opportunities is not statistically signicant.
As we argued, the amount of trade receivables is increasing when rms' sales are expand-
ing, which is consistent with the estimated positive coecients of sales growth. As Petersen
and Rajan (1997) argued, creditworthy rms oer trade credit to customers and have a large
amount of trade receivables. Our results show that the coecients of the cash{current li-
abilities ratio and the tangible xed assets ratio are positive, whereas those of the annual
change of interest rates are negative for trade receivables growth. Firms that have larger cash
holdings and tangible xed assets are more creditworthy because they have more collateral
assets. Our results for trade receivables imply that creditworthy rms oer more trade credit
to customers, which is consistent with previous studies.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.6, we show the results for the bill discounting rate.
We estimate equation (7.1) using a Tobit model because the bill discounting rate of many
rms is zero, as shown in Table 7.3. The coecients of the level of leverage and the high-
leverage dummy are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. Generally,
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Table 7.6: Regression Results of the Eects on Trade Receivables and Bill Discounts for
Financially Distressed and Nondistressed Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Trade receivables Bill Discounts Rate
Leverage 0.01380 0.07660
(0.00214) (0.00419)
Leverage -0.00007 0.00065
 Investment Opportunities (0.00003) (0.00011)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00589 0.04388
(0.00138) (0.00392)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00000 0.00069
 Investment Opportunities (0.00003) (0.00010)
Investment Opportunities 0.00025 0.00019 -0.00044 0.00003
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00013) (0.00008)
Sales Growth 0.10456 0.10460 0.00171 0.00116
(0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00188) (0.00188)
Operating Income Ratio -0.03713 -0.03276 -0.03631 -0.03575
(0.00344) (0.00335) (0.00963) (0.00966)
Current Asset Ratio -0.46024 -0.46078 -0.12901 -0.13601
(0.00469) (0.00469) (0.00730) (0.00731)
Cash-C.Liability Ratio 0.00355 0.00336 -0.02989 -0.03464
(0.00037) (0.00036) (0.00154) (0.00154)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00307 0.00265 -0.03638 -0.04358
(0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00178) (0.00177)
Interest Rate 0.00275 0.00279 0.03362 0.03406
(0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00111) (0.00111)
Annual Change -0.00420 -0.00419 0.00776 0.00769
in Interest Rate (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00080) (0.00080)
ln(1+sales) 0.01460 0.01388 0.03292 0.03101
(0.00120) (0.00118) (0.00095) (0.00096)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 364,925 364,925 359,639 359,639
R-squared 0.28 0.28
Note: Columns (1) and (2) in this table present estimates of xed-eects regressions with Trade Receivables
Growth as a dependent variable. Trade Receivables Growth is the growth rate of a rm's trade receivables
[(trade receivablest+1{trade receivablest 1)/total assetst 1]. Columns (3) and (4) in this table present esti-
mates of Tobit regressions with the Bills Discount Rate as a dependent variable. The Bills Discount Rate is
the amount of a rm's discounted bills normalized by trade receivables plus discounted bills (that is, it equals
Discounted Bills Receivables)/(Trade Receivables + Discounted Bills Receivables), averaged in year t and year
t+1. Other denitions of each variable are given in the note for Table 7.5. We include year dummies from
1999 to 2005. The reference year is 1998. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on clustering
across rms. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes signicance at the 5 percent
level, and  denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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highly leveraged rms are uncreditworthy rms. Therefore, they use more bill discounting
because they can convert bills receivables to cash. The coecients of leverage  investment
opportunities are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. Highly leveraged
rms discount more bills receivables to nance their investment opportunities. This result is
similar if we use the high-leverage dummy  investment opportunities. The coecients of
the cash{current assets ratio and the tangible xed assets ratio are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level. The coecients of the level and annual change in interest
rates are positive and statistically signicant. As we argued, rms with lower cash and
tangible xed assets ratios and higher interest rates are uncreditworthy. Therefore, these
rms sell more bills receivables at a discount. The coecients of investment opportunities
are negative or statistically insignicant. Firms in industries with the business DI increase
trade payables, so they do not sell more bills receivables.
7.4.3 Firm Performance
We present the estimation results of equation (7.2) in Table 7.7. In column (1), the proxy for
rm performance is the industry-adjusted operating income ratio. The coecient of leverage
is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that highly
leveraged rms enjoyed better performance after controlling for rm-invariant xed eects.18
The results are similar if we specify industry-adjusted sales growth and operating income
growth as the proxies for rm performance and sales growth (columns 2 and 3), suggesting
that highly leveraged rms increased their sales and enjoyed higher operating incomes during
the period examined.
The coecients of ln(1+rm age) are not statistically signicant in columns (1) and (2).
The eects of ln(1+sales) are negative, indicating that smaller rms perform better than
larger rms. The eects of current assets on the industry-adjusted operating income ratio
and growth are negative, suggesting that rms with less current assets have larger prots.
18The results are similar if we specify the industry-adjusted ordinary income ratio as the proxy for rm
performance (results are not shown in the table). Ordinary income includes net nancial income and expenses.
Therefore, this measure of income is naturally lower when interest payments are large. However, our results
do not indicate that highly leveraged rms make large interest payments.
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Table 7.7: Regression Results of the Eects of Leverage on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Dependent Variable Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
Leverage 0.14804 0.05070 0.11208
(0.00297) (0.01216) (0.00292)
Log (1+Sales) -0.00822 -0.63280 -0.00869
(0.00087) (0.02662) (0.00100)
Log(1+Firm Age) -0.00033 0.00130 -0.00171
(0.00061) (0.00368) (0.00073)
Industry-adjusted -0.11370 -0.58101 -1.12058
Operating Income Ratio (t-1) (0.00329) (0.02611) (0.00397)
Current Assets Ratio -0.03213 0.01133 -0.02313
(0.00307) (0.02280) (0.00351)
Industry-adjusted -0.01597 -0.06869 0.00691
Tangible Assets Growth (0.00205) (0.01349) (0.00273)
Industry-adjusted 0.00695 0.06081 -0.00904
Total Assets Growth (0.00116) (0.00802) (0.00162)
Investment Opportunities 0.00067 0.00533 0.00063
(0.00002) (0.00010) (0.00002)
Year Dummy (1999) 0.00059 0.06412 0.01731
(0.00040) (0.00265) (0.00063)
Year Dummy (2000) -0.00543 0.02130 0.00645
(0.00052) (0.00447) (0.00067)
Year Dummy (2001) -0.00770 -0.06254 -0.00514
(0.00054) (0.00456) (0.00066)
Year Dummy (2002) -0.00320 -0.03132 0.01335
(0.00055) (0.00450) (0.00067)
Year Dummy (2003) -0.00346 -0.03393 0.01292
(0.00061) (0.00614) (0.00075)
Year Dummy (2004) -0.01233 -0.09899 -0.00046
(0.00077) (0.00719) (0.00091)
Year Dummy (2005) -0.02030 -0.14590 -0.00738
(0.00090) (0.00732) (0.00104)
Number of Observations 360,686 360,686 359,890
R-squared 0.13 0.24 0.57
Note: This table presents estimates of xed-eects regressions with the Industry-adjusted Operating Income Ratio,
Industry-adjusted Sales Growth, and Industry-adjusted Operating Income Growth as dependent variables. The Industry-
adjusted Operating Income Ratio is dened as the ratio of operating income to total assets averaged for two years from
year t to t+1, calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial classication. Industry-
adjusted Sales Growth is dened as the growth rate of sales for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([salest+1 { salest 1]/assetst 1),
calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in the industrial classication. Industry-adjusted
Operating Incomes Growth is dened as the growth rate of operating incomes for two years from t-1 to t+1 ([operating
incomest+1 { operating incomest 1]/assetst 1), calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category in
the industrial classication. Leverage is dened as the ratio of a rm's total liabilities to its total assets in year t-2.
ln(1+Firm Age) is the natural log of rm age in year t-1. ln(1+Sales) is the natural log of (1+rm sales) in year t-1.
Tangible Fixed Assets Growth is the annual growth rate of a rm's tangible xed assets in year t-1 [(tangible xed
assetst 1-tangible xed assetst 2)/total assetst 2], calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category
in the industrial classication. Total Assets Growth is the annual growth rate of a rm's total assets in year t-1
[(total assetst 1-total assetst 2)/total assetst 2], calculated by subtracting the mean value in the medium category
in the industrial classication. Investment Opportunities denotes the business DI, averaged over year t to year t+1.
Year Dummy(t) is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is t and zero otherwise. Estimated standard errors in
parentheses are based on clustering across rms. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes
signicance at the 5 percent level, and  denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7.8: Regression Results of the Eects of Leverage on Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Dependent Variable Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
High Leverage Dummy 0.04802 0.03234 0.03550
(0.00103) (0.00552) (0.00116)
Number of Observations 360,686 360,686 359,890
R-squared 0.07 0.24 0.56
Note: This table presents estimates of xed-eects regressions with the Industry-adjusted Operating Income
Ratio, Industry-adjusted Sales Growth, and Industry-adjusted Operating Income Growth as dependent variables.
The High-leverage Dummy takes a value of one if a rm's leverage in year t-2 is in the top two deciles of its
industry in a particular year. Denitions of the other variables are given in the note for Table 7.7. The same
variables as in Table 7.7 are used, apart from leverage. The results of the control variables are omitted, as
they are similar to those in 7.7. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on clustering across rms.
The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and
 denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
The eects of industry-adjusted tangible xed assets growth are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level in columns (1) and (2). Many rms are struggling with
the burden of a large amount of xed debt because of overinvestment during the bubble.
Therefore, many need to engage in asset restructuring. As a result, the performance of rms
that reduced their holdings of tangible xed assets is better than the performance of rms
that did not. In contrast, the industry-adjusted total asset growth rates have positive eects
on rm performance in columns (1) and (2). However, the coecient of industry-adjusted
tangible xed assets is positive and that of industry-adjusted total assets growth is negative
on industry-adjusted operating income growth in column (3), which is inconsistent with the
results in columns (1) and (2). The estimated coecients of investment opportunities are
positive, which ts with trends in the industry-specic business cycles.
In Table 7.8, we show the estimated eects of the high-leverage dummy on rm perfor-
mance. The dependent variables are the same as those in Table 7.7. The coecients of the
high-leverage dummy for the industry-adjusted operating income ratio and operating income
growth are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. These results also
imply that highly leveraged rms enjoy higher protability. In addition, the coecient of the
high-leverage dummy on industry-adjusted sales growth is positive and statistically signi-
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cant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that rms with high leverage increase their sales. The
control variables are the same as those in Table 7.7. The results (not shown in the table) are
similar to Table 7.7.
7.5 Robustness Check
7.5.1 Firm Size
To investigate the eect of dierences in rm size, we divide the sample into two subsamples,
small and medium. Under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan, \Small
enterprises" are dened as enterprises with 20 or fewer employees. Therefore, rms with 20
or fewer employees are categorized as small-sized rms and rms with 21 or more employees
as medium-sized rms. We regress equations (7.1) and (7.2) using the xed-eects model.
Table 7.9 shows the estimation results of equations (7.1). We show the results using
observations of small rms in panel A and those of medium rms in panel B. In each panel, we
do not show the results of the control variables. We show the results for short-term borrowings
in columns (1) and (2), and those for trade payables in columns (3) and (4). Panel A shows
that the coecients of leverage  investment opportunities are not statistically signicant.
The coecients of the high-leverage dummy  investment opportunities are negative and
statistically signicant. In panel B, the coecients of the interactive variables with investment
opportunities are negative and statistically signicant for the short-term borrowings (columns
1 and 2), but those coecients become positive and statistically signicant for the trade
payables (columns 3 and 4). These imply that the credit constraint of small rms in the
highly leveraged group is more severe than that of medium rms.
In columns (5){(8) of each panel, we show the results of trade receivables and the bill
discount rate. The results of small rms in panel A are similar to the results using all rms
in Table 7.6, suggesting that highly leveraged small rms with investment opportunities use
alternative ways of nancing, especially bill discounting. On the other hand, if we focus
on the results using medium rms (in panel B), we see that the coecients of leverage (or
high-leverage dummy) and investment opportunities for trade receivables change to positive
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Table 7.9: Regression Results for Short-term Borrowings, Trade Payables, Trade Receivables,
and Bill Discounts, Divided by Firm Size
Pane A: Small Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Trade Payables
Leverage -0.06048 -0.01330
(0.00448) (0.00165)
Leverage 0.00001 -0.00001
 Investment Opportunities (0.00007) (0.00003)
High Leverage Dummy -0.02657 -0.00634
(0.00260) (0.00121)
High Leverage Dummy -0.00020 -0.00007
 Investment Opportunities (0.00006) (0.00003)
Investment Opportunities -0.00010 -0.00005 0.00006 0.00006
(0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 235,569 235,569 235,569 235,569
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.13
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Trade Receivables Bill Discounts Rate
Leverage 0.01583 0.06550
(0.00236) (0.00467)
Leverage -0.00006 0.00042
 Investment Opportunities (0.00004) (0.00012)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00737 0.05232
(0.00160) (0.00448)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00002 0.00044
 Investment Opportunities (0.00004) (0.00012)
Investment Opportunities 0.00025 0.00019 -0.00030 -0.00000
(0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00016) (0.00012)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 235,569 235,569 231,047 231,047
R-squared 0.27 0.27
[continued to the next page]
239
Panel B: Medium Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Trade Payables
Leverage -0.08913 -0.02138
(0.00859) (0.00492)
Leverage -0.00018 0.00019
 Investment Opportunities (0.00011) (0.00007)
High Leverage Dummy -0.02415 0.00142
(0.00457) (0.00280)
High Leverage Dummy -0.00020 0.00015
 Investment Opportunities (0.00012) (0.00007)
Investment Opportunities 0.00012 -0.00000 0.00004 0.00018
(0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00003)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 129,356 129,356 129,356 129,356
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.24
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Trade Receivables Bill Discounts Rate
Leverage 0.02437 0.24048
(0.00579) (0.01279)
Leverage 0.00015 0.00095
 Investment Opportunities (0.00008) (0.00032)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00937 0.03344
(0.00315) (0.00866)
High Leverage Dummy 0.00017 0.00024
 Investment Opportunities (0.00007) (0.00024)
Investment Opportunities 0.00005 0.00015 -0.00083 -0.00010
(0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00028) (0.00011)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 129,356 129,356 128,592 128,592
R-squared 0.31 0.31
Note: This table presents estimates of xed-eects and Tobit regressions with the Short-term Borrowings
Growth, Trade Payables Growth, Trade Receivables Growth, and Bills Discount Rate as dependent variables,
where the sample is divided by rm size. Firms with 20 or fewer employees are categorized as \Small", and
rms with 21 or more employees as \Medium". The results for small rms are shown in Panel A, and those
for medium rms are shown in Panel B. The dependent and independent variables are shown in Tables 7.5
and 7.6. We omit the results of some control variables from this table. Denitions of the variables are given
in the notes for Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on clustering across
rms. We estimate Tobit regressions if we use Bills Discount Rate as the independent variable. The symbol
 denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and  denotes
signicance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7.10: Regression Results of the Eects of Leverage on Firm Performance, Divided by
Firm Size
Panel A: Small
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Dependent Variable Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
Leverage 0.15381 0.07758 0.11385
(0.00334) (0.01408) (0.00327)
Number of Observations 232,281 232,281 231,542
R-squared 0.15 0.25 0.58
(4) (5) (6)
High Leverage Dummy 0.05354 0.04534 0.03890
(0.00121) (0.00658) (0.00137)
Number of Observations 232,281 232,281 231,542
R-squared 0.08 0.25 0.57
Panel B: Medium
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Dependent Variable Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
Leverage 0.11810 -0.01887 0.09910
(0.00623) (0.02849) (0.00648)
Number of Observations 128,405 128,405 128,348
R-squared 0.07 0.27 0.51
(4) (5) (6)
High Leverage Dummy 0.02437 -0.00641 0.01868
(0.00165) (0.01013) (0.00194)
Number of Observations 128,405 128,405 128,348
R-squared 0.04 0.27 0.51
Note: This table presents estimates of xed-eects regressions with the Industry-adjusted Operating Income
Ratio, Industry-adjusted Sales Growth, and Industry-adjusted Operating Income Growth as dependent variables,
where the sample is divided by rm size. Firms with 20 or fewer employees are categorized as \Small", and
rms with 21 or more employees as \Medium". The results for small rms are shown in Panel A, and those
for medium rms are shown in Panel B. The dependent and independent variables are presented in Table
7.7. We omit the results of some control variables from this table. Denitions of the variables are given in
the notes for Table 7.7. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on clustering across rms. The
symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and 
denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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and statistically signicant (columns 5 and 6). Furthermore, those for bill discount rates
are positive but not statistically signicant in column (8). These results suggest that highly
leveraged medium rms with investment opportunities use fewer alternative ways of nancing,
which is consistent with the interpretation that credit constraints for highly leveraged medium
rms are less severe.
Table 7.10 shows the estimation results of equation (7.2) after dividing the sample by rm
size. Panel A shows the estimation results using data of small rms and panel B shows that
for medium rms. The coecients of leverage are positive and statistically signicant at the
1 percent level, apart from the result in columns (2) and (5) of panel B. This suggests that
the high performance of highly leveraged rms is supported. Focusing on the magnitude of
the coecients, we see that the coecients of leverage for small rms are larger than those
for medium rms. This suggests that the positive eects of leverage are larger in small rms.
7.5.2 Instrumental Variable Regression
Following Opler and Titman (1994), we assume the exogeneity of leverage in year t-2. How-
ever, as Aivazian et al. (2005) argued, the simultaneity between rm performance and leverage
could be serious. To address this potential problem, we estimate an instrumental variable
regression, assuming that leverage is an endogenous variable. We use two instrumental vari-
ables, which are collateralizable assets and average interest rate in year t-3.19 Firms with
higher collateralizable assets can use external nance because the information problem is not
severe. As a result, availability of bank loans is enhanced, and leverage is higher for rms
with collateralizable assets. On the other hand, the eects of collateralizable assets on rm
performance, other than via increasing leverage, are considered to be insignicant, so collat-
eralizable assets are suitable instrumental variables for rm performance. We use the ratio of
a rm's tangible xed assets to total assets in year t-3 (the Tangible Fixed Assets{TA ratio)
and the ratio of the book value of a rm's land and buildings to total assets in year t-3 (the
Land and Building{TA ratio) as proxies of collateralizable assets.
19Aivazian et al. (2005) also used the ratio of tangible assets to total assets as an instrumental variable for
leverage. Our idea of using collateralizable assets as an instrument variable is similar to Aivazian et al. (2005).
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Furthermore, we use the average interest rate in year t-3 as an instrumental variable: rms
with higher interest rates have smaller bank loans, which causes lower leverage. Therefore,
the correlation between interest rates and leverage is considered to be negative. On the other
hand, the eects of interest rates on rm performance are indirect, which is through changes
in loan size. Therefore, the eects of interest rates on rm performance other than via
increasing leverage are considered to be insignicant. Similar to the collateralizable assets,
interest rates are also suitable instruments. A rm's average interest rate is dened as the
ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of its short- and long-term debt and discounted
bills receivable in year t-3 (the Interest Rate).
The estimated results are shown in Table 7.11. We use the tangible xed assets{TA ratio
in column (1) and the land and building{TA ratio in columns (2) and (3) as a proxy of
the collateralizable assets. In all columns, the coecient of interest rates for leverage are
negative, and those of tangible xed assets{TA ratio and land and building{TA ratio are
positive. F-test that all coecents of excluded instruments equal zero is rejected at the 1
percent level. These results suggest that the weak instruments are not a problem. As shown
at the bottom of Table 7.11, the p-values for the J-statistics are 0.886, 0.430, and 0.706,
respectively. These suggest that the correlations between the error terms and instrumental
variables are statistically insignicant. In columns (1) and (3) of Table 7.11, the coecients
of leverage are positive and statistically signicant, suggesting that the positive eects of
leverage on operating incomes are supported if we mitigate the problem of endogeneity.
However, the eect on sales growth is positive, but not statistically signicant (column 2).
7.5.3 Sample Selection Problem
Our small-business data consist of the client data of banks. Poorly performing and highly
leveraged rms might be more likely to be removed from the CRD data because they are more
likely to default, and banks will not continue relationships with them. According to our data,
the ratios of the truncated observations are 18.91 percent for rms in the highly leveraged
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Table 7.11: Regression Results of the Eects of Financial Distress on Firm Performance (IV
Estimation)
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Dependent Variable Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
Leverage 0.28676 0.79005 0.29017
(0.04387) (0.50984) (0.10817)
Log (1+Sales) 0.00185 -0.64334 0.00677
(0.00391) (0.05937) (0.00914)
Log(1+Firm Age) -0.00105 -0.00441 -0.00169
(0.00080) (0.00482) (0.00110)
Industry-adjusted -0.21552 -0.95253 -1.23159
Operating Income Ratio (t-1) (0.02285) (0.26291) (0.05583)
Current Assets Ratio -0.02226 0.09653 -0.00319
(0.00835) (0.09422) (0.01897)
Industry-adjusted -0.00679 0.05171 0.02486
Tangible Assets Growth (0.00574) (0.06598) (0.01371)
Industry-adjusted 0.00519 0.00223 -0.01601
Total Assets Growth (0.00224) (0.02160) (0.00453)
Investment Opportunities 0.00066 0.00530 0.00065
(0.00002) (0.00015) (0.00003)
Year Dummy (2001) 0.01436 0.17253 0.01440
(0.00100) (0.00719) (0.00120)
Year Dummy (2002) 0.01096 0.08461 0.00127
(0.00118) (0.00948) (0.00181)
Year Dummy (2003) 0.01522 0.11284 0.01985
(0.00134) (0.01093) (0.00204)
Year Dummy (2004) 0.01408 0.10028 0.01767
(0.00094) (0.00728) (0.00148)
Year Dummy (2005) 0.00661 0.03874 0.00587
(0.00045) (0.00360) (0.00080)
Number of Observations 199,848 196,261 195,931
P-value of J-statistics 0.886 0.430 0.706
First Stage Coecients of Excluded Instruments on Leverage
Interest Rate -0.00299 -0.00302 -0.00300
(0.00048) (0.00049) (0.00049)
Tangible Fixed Assets{TA ratio 0.06631
(0.00795)
Land and Building{TA ratio 0.00268 0.00345
(0.00780) (0.00778)
F-statistic of excluded instruments 54.85 19.07 19.07
Note: This table presents estimates of the two-stage least squares xed-eects regression with the Industry-
adjusted Operating Income Ratio, Industry-adjusted Sales Growth, and Industry-adjusted Operating Income
Growth as dependent variables. We use collateralizable assets and average interest rates in year t-3 as instru-
ment variables. A rm's average interest rate is dened as the ratio of a rm's interest expenses to the sum of
its short- and long-term debt and discounted bills receivables in year t-3. The proxy of collateralizable assets
is the ratio of a rm's tangible xed assets to total assets in year t-3 (the Tangible xed assets{TA ratio) or
the ratio of the book value of a rm's land and building to total assets in year t-3 (the Land and building{TA
ratio). The denition of independent variables is same as those used in Table 7.7. Estimated standard errors
in parentheses are based on clustering across rms. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level,
 denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and  denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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group and 11.52 percent for those in the non-highly leveraged group.20 This suggests that
the highly leveraged rms are more truncated in our database.
Truncated highly leveraged rms experience larger reductions in short-term borrowings
and/or trade payables because they stop transacting with banks. Therefore, if our database
included these rms, the coecients of leverage  investment opportunities would also be
negative and the magnitude would be larger. As the estimated magnitude of leverage in
equation (7.1) is considered to be biased downward, additional tests are not required. How-
ever, if poorly performing and highly leveraged rms are more likely to be truncated, we
need additional tests for the results of equation (7.2). The reason is that the performance
of highly leveraged rms would be lower if our database included truncated highly leveraged
rms. As a result, we are concerned that the coecients of leverage on rm performance
would be negative in data including truncated observations.
To correct for the attrition bias, we estimate the Heckman selection model following
Wooldridge (2010):
Firm Performancei;t 1!t+1 = 1Leveragei;t 2 +Xi;t 12 +i;t (7.3)
si;t = 1[!i;t + vi;t] (7.4)
where Xi;t is a matrix of control variables and i;t is the error term of rm i in year t
from 1998 to 2004. si;t is the selection indicator for each year t, where si;t = 1 if the
dependent and independent variables in t+1 are observed. To remove the unobserved time-
invariant individual eects, we rst dierence all variables in equation (7.3). We assume that
Cov(i;t; vi;t) = , where  is not equal to zero. wi;t includes all undierenced independent
variables in t-1, the average interest rates in t-1, the short- to long-term borrowings ratio in t-
1, and the 16 industry dummies listed in panel A of Table 7.1.21 Our data are constructed from
the client data of banks, so truncated samples shorten the duration of the bank relationships
20We dene the ratio of truncated rms in year t as 1 | (number of existing rms in year t/number of
existing rms in year t-1). The ratio of the truncated samples is 12.87 percent across all samples.
21We use the food industry as a benchmark.
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that can be examined. Therefore, we include the control variables used in Ongena and Smith
(2001), which can be used to estimate over the full duration of the banks' relationships with
rms. 22
Column (1) in Table 7.12 presents the estimates of equation (7.4) using industry-adjusted
operating income as a proxy of rm performance. Firm age, sales, industry-adjusted operating
income ratio, and investment opportunities have positive eects on the selection indicator,
whereas leverage, the current assets ratio, the interest rate, and the short- to long-term
borrowings ratio have negative eects. Firms with a large amount of current assets also have
adequate internal cash. Therefore, credit demand for these rms is low. As a result, these
rms are more likely to be truncated. The short- to long-term borrowings ratio is the proxy
for maturity. Firms with a higher short-term borrowings ratio have a shorter maturity period
and therefore are more likely to pay o their loans. Firms that pay higher interest rates are
more likely to be truncated because they have an incentive to stop their transactions with
banks to reduce the burden of interest expenses. Thus, we suggest that the results of the
selection model are reasonable. After controlling for these variables, the eect of leverage is
negative for the selection indicator. This means that highly leveraged rms are more likely
to be dropped from the database, which suggests that banks cease transactions with these
rms because they have higher default risks. The estimated  is statistically signicant at
the 1 or 5 percent level.
Columns (2){(4) in Table 7.12 provide the results of equation (7.3). The denitions of
the dependent variables in each column are the same as in Table 7.7. The eects of leverage
for the industry-adjusted operating incomes ratio and growth are positive and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level. These results imply that highly leveraged rms enjoy higher
rm performance in terms of protability after correcting for attrition bias. The coecient of
leverage on industry-adjusted sales growth is positive and statistically signicant, suggesting
that highly leveraged rms increase their sales. The results of the control variables are similar
to the results using a simple xed-eects model in Table 7.7.
22Ongena and Smith (2001) showed that sales, age, protability, Tobin's Q, and leverage aect the duration
of bank{rm relationships. To estimate the selection variable, we include these variables, except for Tobin's
Q, as it is unavailable.
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Table 7.12: Regression Results of the Eects of Financial Distress on Firm Performance
(Heckman Selection Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Selection Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted Industry-adjusted
Operating Income Sales Growth Operating Income
Ratio (t, t+1) (t-1 ! t+1) Growth (t-1 ! t+1)
Leverage -0.22393 0.15213 0.05783 0.04032
(0.00795) (0.00290) (0.01452) (0.00348)
Log (1+Sales) 0.08338 -0.01189 -0.87163 -0.01008
(0.00254) (0.00084) (0.04534) (0.00122)
Log(1+Firm Age) 0.09188 -0.00030 -0.00519 -0.00175
(0.00451) (0.00041) (0.00311) (0.00088)
Industry-adjusted 0.49980 -0.28275 -0.57557 -1.05988
Operating Income Ratio (t-1) (0.04654) (0.00233) (0.03941) (0.00463)
Current Assets Ratio -0.38461 -0.05207 -0.20216 -0.03451
(0.01491) (0.00251) (0.03220) (0.00468)
Industry-adjusted 0.03523 -0.02444 -0.05459 0.00429
Tangible Assets Growth (0.04449) (0.00144) (0.01384) (0.00311)
Industry-adjusted -0.00099 0.01207 -0.05385 -0.00854
Total Assets Growth (0.02240) (0.00079) (0.00712) (0.00181)
Investment Opportunities 0.00337 0.00051 0.00385 0.00022
(0.00041) (0.00001) (0.00011) (0.00002)
Interest Rate -0.01305
(0.00267)
Short-Long Term -0.09847
Borrowings Ratio (0.01020)
Year Dummy (1999) -0.00455 -0.01582 -0.00118 -0.03803
(0.01392) (0.00157) (0.01917) (0.00302)
Year Dummy (2000) -0.06549 -0.01428 0.05387 -0.01940
(0.01384) (0.00130) (0.01543) (0.00251)
Year Dummy (2001) -0.06892 -0.01667 0.02967 -0.01750
(0.01307) (0.00108) (0.01118) (0.00207)
Year Dummy (2002) 0.00853 -0.01298 -0.03794 -0.02662
(0.01265) (0.00082) (0.00860) (0.00159)
Year Dummy (2003) -0.01705 -0.00423 0.00320 -0.00770
(0.01338) (0.00059) (0.00660) (0.00117)
Year Dummy (2004) -0.35154 -0.00091 0.01528 0.00237
(0.01712) (0.00031) (0.00287) (0.00074)
Number of Observations 299,719 299,719 299,719 299,752
 0.03477 -0.03646 0.00655
Log Likelihood 306423.1 -214241.8 128862.5
Note: This table presents estimates of Heckman selection regressions with the Industry-adjusted Operating
Income Ratio, Industry-adjusted Sales Growth, and Industry-adjusted Operating Income Growth as dependent
variables. All variables in columns (2), (3), and (4) are rst dierences. Column (1) shows the results of the
selection equation for the estimation in column (2). The Short- to Long-term Borrowings Ratio is the ratio of
a rm's short-term borrowings to total borrowings in year t-1. The Interest rate is the ratio of a rm's interest
expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted bills receivables for each year in
year t-1. Denitions of the other variables are given in the notes for Table 7.7. Estimated standard errors in
parentheses are based on clustering across rms. The symbol  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level, 
denotes signicance at the 5 percent level, and  denotes signicance at the 1 percent level.
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7.6 Conclusion
We investigated whether the cost or benet of high leverage is signicant for small businesses
using rm-level data in Japan. We report three broad ndings. First, we nd that the
performance (measured as rm sales growth or protability) of highly leveraged rms is higher
than that of low-leveraged rms after controlling for time-invariant rm eects and selectivity
bias. These results imply that the cost of high leverage is not a signicant problem for small
businesses. Second, although the performance of highly leveraged rms is not poorer, they
increase short-term borrowings and trade payables less when they have protable investment
opportunities. This suggests that highly leveraged small businesses reduce the burden of
debts and avoid the cost of bankruptcy. Third, highly leveraged rms use alternative ways of
nancing: selling bills receivables without increasing debt. Thus, we conclude that the costs
of high leverage are not binding for small businesses because they have alternative ways of
nancing to increasing debt.
Our results have some policy implications for small-business lending. According to the
\Inspection manual for deposit-taking institutions" by the Financial Services Agency of
Japan,23 banks should classify rms with negative net worth (which are very highly leveraged
rms) as \borrowers in danger of bankruptcy (Hatan Kenen Saiken)" or \borrowers in de
facto bankruptcy (Jissitsu Hatan Saiken)" in their self-assessment of assets if the protability
of these borrowers is not expected to be enhanced. Therefore, when banks judge that the
protability of these rms with negative net worth will not improve, they are likely to classify
the loans of very highly leveraged rms as \borrowers in danger of bankruptcy" or \borrow-
ers in de facto bankruptcy". The banks' loans to \borrowers in danger of bankruptcy" and
\borrowers in de facto bankruptcy" are classied as nonperforming loans, so banks reduce
the credit supply for these rms. This is consistent with the results in Table 7.5, suggesting
that highly leveraged rms take fewer loans even if they have good investment opportuni-
ties. However, our results show that ex post performance (in terms of protability and sales
growth) is higher, so these rms have the ability to repay. This implies that banks need to
23See http://www.fsa.go.jp/manual/manualj/yokin.pdf (in Japanese) (last accessed: April 2014) for more
detail.
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evaluate the credit risk of very highly leveraged small businesses more carefully.
Our results also have implications for understanding the dierence between large listed
rms and small rms. For listed rms, high leverage (especially, the situation in which total
debts exceed total assets) is a very serious situation because the risk of delisting is increased.
For example, the criteria for delisting on the Tokyo Stock Exchange include the situation
where \Liabilities exceed assets and this state remains unchanged for 1 year."24 On the
other hand, as we showed in Table 7.4, the median degree of leverage in rms with a high-
leverage dummy equal to one is 1.282, suggesting that debts exceed assets in many rms in
our small-business data set. This implies that unlike the large listed rms, the high leverage
(especially the case of debt exceeding assets) is not serious for (unlisted) small rms.
24See the website of Tokyo Stock Exchange: http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/delisting/summary/index.html.
(last accessed: April 2014)
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Chapter 8
Variance of Firm Performance and
Leverage of Small Businesses
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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between leverage and rm performance using small business
data from Japan by estimating the eects of leverage on both average rm performance and
the variance of rm performance. We nd that leverage has a negative eect on average
rm performance and a positive eect on the variance of rm performance. This suggests
that the problem of moral hazard is severe for highly leveraged rms. However, when highly
leveraged rms have sucient collateral assets, the eects of leverage are positive for average
performance, but negative for the variance of performance. This implies that when small
rms have sucient collateral assets, highly leveraged businesses are better performers.
Keywords: leverage; rm performance; small business
JEL classication: G32; G33
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks and Future
Work
9.1 Concluding remarks
The conclusions of the thesis are summarized as follows. First, although many studies support
the value of lending relationships for mitigating asymmetric information between borrowers
and banks, the ineciency associated with ending the relationships is not severe.1 Borrowers
and banks end their relationships because the credit demand of borrowers is low, the credit
risk of borrowers is high, and bank health is deteriorated. These imply that inecient credit
allocation through lending relationships is not a serious issue. In addition, rms without
bank relationships used cash holdings to nance credit demand during the nancial shock
period. This means that borrowers with no relationships had alternative nancial sources to
mitigate the liquidity shortage during the shock.
Second, dependence on bank loans is benecial rather than harmful for small businesses.
Highly leveraged rms enjoy higher rm performance, in terms of sales growth and protabil-
ity. Furthermore, during the shock period, rm performance of bank-dependent rms, which
are considered to be vulnerable to a large nancial shock, was higher than that of independent
rms. This implies that ineciency caused by dependence on bank loans is not signicant in
1The results in this thesis do not show whether the value of lending relationships is signicant or not.
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the loan market for small businesses. This result is consistent with recent work that supports
the benets of relationship lending during the shock period (for example, Jiangli et al., 2008;
Cotugno et al., 2013; Dewally and Shao, 2014; Gobbi and Sette, 2014).
Third, the main reason for using trade credit by small businesses is not the unavailability
of bank loans, which implies that trade credit is not a last resort. They used trade credit
even if the availability of bank loans was enhanced during the nancial shock, which does not
suggest that trade credit and bank loans are substitutes.
9.2 Future research
These ndings have not been adequately argued in the literature, and some important issues
remain for future research.
Denition of no lending relationship Berger and Udell (2006) argue that \[U]nder
relationship lending, the nancial institution relies primarily on soft information gathered
through contact over time with the SME, its owner and the local community to address the
opacity problem" (p. 2951). Chapters 2 and 3 dene rms ending lending relationships as
those for which short-term and long-term borrowings from nancial institutions in a particular
year are zero or observations are dropped from the database. Under these denitions, rms
with no borrowings are identied as those without contact over time with banks. However,
under the denitions of lending relationships applied in this thesis, the rms that have lending
relationships according to the literature are identied as those with \no relationships." First,
a credit line is ignored by the denition of lending relationship in this thesis. If rms have
an available credit line, the lending relationships (or contact over time between banks and
borrowers) continue even if the amount of borrowings in a rm's nancial statement is zero.
Indeed, some studies (for example, Campello et al., 2011, 2012) show that during the nancial
shock, rms nanced nancial shortages using credit lines. This implies that rms continued
lending relationships with banks using credit line contracts during the nonshock period to
cope with the negative eects of unexpected shocks. Because of the limitations of the data, we
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cannot identify whether rms use credit lines or have credit line contracts. However, we need
to dene nonborrowing rms with credit line contracts as those with lending relationships.
Second, we dene termination of lending relationships using borrowing data in one or
two consecutive years. This denition also has some shortcomings for investigating ending
relationships. If banks accumulate enough soft information, the eects of lending relationships
remain over several years even though a lending transaction does not take place. We need to
investigate when the value of lending relationships ceases after the nal transaction. Recently,
Drexler and Schoar (2014) show that unexpected loan ocer turnover reduces the credit
supply for rms, suggesting that the accumulation of soft information disappears after the
turnover. The negative eects of ending relationships might be signicant when the loan
ocer changes.
Third, we only focus on the relationships with banks through lending transactions. Be-
cause banks can continue relationships through deposit transactions, banks and rms can
continue relationships even if rms stop borrowing. These problems are caused by using data
for \lending" and not data for \lending relationships" as dened in the literature.
Alternative nancial sources and lending relationships Chapters 2 and 3 investigate
the determinants of the end of lending relationships between banks and small business bor-
rowers. To investigate this issue, we focus on all types of small businesses. However, start-up
rms and those that are growing rapidly do not need close relationships with banks because
venture capital oers equity to nance their growth opportunities. In addition, subsidiaries
can borrow sucient funds from parent rms, so they also do not need close relationships
with banks. To estimate the ineciency of lending relationships more accurately, we limited
our analysis to small businesses that need lending relationships with banks.
Credit demand for bank loans and trade credit Chapter 6 investigates the relationship
between bank loans and trade credit, showing that the estimated relationships are positive.
This implies that the relationships between bank loans and trade credit are complements,
rather than substitutes. However, Chapter 6 does not show adequately why the relationships
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are complements. In Subsection 6.5.4, we check simply whether the supply or demand eects
of trade credit are signicant. However, we do not show the drivers of demand for trade credit
and bank loans. To understand the reason why they are complements, we need to show why
small businesses have credit demand for bank loans and trade credit. For example, Cunat
(2007) shows that suppliers oer trade credit for customers to maintain supplier{customer
relationships when customers have credit demand in situations of liquidity shortage. Wilner
(2000) considers these relationships focusing on credit demand for nancially distressed rms,
which supports the negative relationships between bank loans and trade credit. This implies
that if we focus on the credit demand of distressed rms and those experiencing liquidity
shocks, the relationship between bank loans and trade credit might be negative. Other
studies (for example, Mateut et al., 2006; Love et al., 2007) investigate the relationship
focusing on the credit demand for severely credit-constrained rms during the nancial crisis.
If we limit the credit demand during the nancial crisis, then bank loans and trade credit
are substitutes, empirically. This implies that the relationships depend on the types of credit
demand, so we need to investigate the relationships in greater detail.
Buyer{supplier network Chapter 6 investigates the empirical relationship between trade
credit and bank loans using the data from nancial statements. These data have some
shortcomings because information about the networks of supplier{customer relationships is
not available. As some studies (for example, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 2002) argue, suppliers
oer credit to rms, while rms oer credit to their customers. As rms construct buyer{
supplier networks through trade credit, the determinants of the trade credit of rms are
aected by the characteristics of suppliers and the suppliers' suppliers as well as customers
and the customers' customers. For example, if suppliers of rms' suppliers are large and
creditworthy rms, the eects of the credit constraints of their suppliers are mitigated. In
this case, the relationships between bank loans and trade credit can be negative because their
suppliers can oer sucient credit by using credit obtained from the buyer{supplier network.
Furthermore, the characteristics of a rm's suppliers or customers are not controlled in our
estimations. Because limitations in terms of data availability meant that we could only
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focus on particular relationships between suppliers and customers, the insights available from
buyer{supplier networks are not included.
Identication problem for ending relationships Chapters 2 and 3 do not adequately
identify whether rms or banks end lending relationships. Some studies (for example, Jimenez
et al., 2012) argue that loan demand is observed through loan applications. Therefore, if data
availability is limited to only those rms with loan applications, the end of lending relation-
ships is caused by low credit supply from banks. Using data from the Basic Survey of Small
and Medium Enterprises, we found that many nonborrowing rms do not apply for loans;
however, we cannot limit our econometric analysis to only those rms with loan applications.
Therefore, the identication problem was a major issue in our estimation. In future research,
we should use a two-stage regression that estimates whether rms apply for loans in the rst
equation and whether banks oer loans to the applicants in the second equation. In addition,
we should consider discouraged borrowers, which are rms that did not apply for a bank loan
because they felt they would be rejected (as argued by Kon and Storey, 2003).
To identify whether banks or borrowers end the lending relationships, structural estima-
tion is also appropriate. Not all chapters in the thesis apply this approach, so it would be
valuable to apply structural estimation to investigate the relationships between banks and
borrowers or those between rms and suppliers to reveal the causality.
Unnatural selection caused by public credit guarantees To consider the issue of
natural and unnatural selection of relationship lending, the ineciency caused by the public
credit guarantee program should be also discussed.2 The aim of public credit guarantee
programs is to increase the supply of bank loans for small businesses that do not borrow
suciently to nance protable investment opportunities. However, banks have an incentive
to oer credit-guaranteed loans to rms that do not face protable investment opportunities,
which should end the lending relationships. The reason for the continuation of relationships
with these rms is that banks do not incur losses when borrowers do not repay credit-
2Saito and Tsuruta (2014) investigate the ineciency of the credit guarantee program in Japan, caused by
information asymmetry between banks and credit guarantee corporations.
295
guaranteed loans, which creates a moral hazard problem. The main cause of this issue
is the information advantage of banks over credit guarantee corporations. Some studies (for
example, Ono et al., 2013) show that relationship lenders oer more public credit-guaranteed
loans to risky rms, implying that the credit guarantee may cause an unnatural selection of
lending relationships. To investigate this issue, we should examine to what extent ineciency
caused by public credit guarantees is serious.
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